MQ-9 drones sharpen US eye on China’s Pacific moves

As the US spreads a dense web of MQ-9 Reapers across the Indo-Pacific to monitor China, it is making a high-stakes bet: that persistent drone surveillance will deter Chinese aggression—but these assets also risk exposing a critical vulnerability in America’s defense strategy if confronted by sophisticated adversaries.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the US is expanding a network of MQ-9 drones across the Indo-Pacific. This move sharpens surveillance pressure by combining long-endurance reconnaissance with strike options and by knitting allies into a shared intelligence architecture.

The turboprop MQ-9, which can operate up to about 50,000 feet and has been used in missions including the 2020 killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani, is being positioned and upgraded to widen coverage near China’s periphery, including with the MQ-9B SeaGuardian’s new sonobuoy-dispensing capability for submarine hunting.

The US Marine Corps has stationed six MQ-9s indefinitely at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, alongside eight Air Force drones already there, with another squadron at Kunsan in South Korea and a US Marine Corps unit deployed to Basa Air Base in the Philippines, putting the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea under persistent watch.

The US is also exporting the platform: Japan plans to double its Coast Guard MQ-9Bs to 10 and buy 23 SeaGuardians by 2032; Taiwan has ordered four; and India has agreed to buy 31 more after border clashes with China.

The proliferation creates a “collective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) web” that raises deterrence and escalation risks, even as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) claims it can counter the drones with air defenses, jamming or comparable unmanned systems.

Noting the increased use of MQ-9s against China, the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese think tank, notes in a September 2025 article that the MQ-9 Reaper is becoming a mainstay of US and allied reconnaissance against China because it sits within a layered, expanding unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network that emphasizes persistence, coverage, and low-risk presence.

SCSPI mentions that the MQ-9 provides “tactical support and strike capabilities” while contributing to a “layered and collaborative large-scale UAV ISR network” in the South China Sea and surrounding areas.

It also adds that the MQ-9’s long endurance, rotational deployments to bases such as Kadena in Japan and Basa in the Philippines, and growing share of close-in sorties—about 30%—make it a core, routine instrument of sustained pressure and situational awareness near China’s periphery.

Such operations carry immediate tactical and operational effects. Platforms such as the MQ-9 are part of a broader effort to use persistent unmanned surveillance to strengthen deterrence in the Western Pacific.

In line with that, Travis Sharp and other authors mention in a July 2023 US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report that “deterrence by detection” holds that China is less likely to undertake opportunistic aggression if it knows it is being watched constantly and that its actions can be publicized widely, making surveillance with attribution central to deterrence.

Sharp and others argue that detection and retaliation are inseparable: surveillance enables targeted retaliation and buys time to “mass sufficient combat power to prevent a fait accompli.”

They add that by using existing, long-endurance, non-stealthy UAVs, the concept seeks affordable, near-term, real-time situational awareness over areas such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait by repurposing assets already in service rather than building new forces.

Lawrence Stutzriem mentions in a November 2021 article for the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies that the drone should be reimagined not just as a sensor or shooter but as a network hub that “connects sensors and shooters at the battlespace edge,” acting as a communications node, relay, and datalink integrator within a larger system-of-systems.

Stutzriem highlights roles in Joint All-Domain Command and Control  (JADC2) and Advanced Battle Management Systems (ABMS), where MQ-9s can provide resilient connectivity, extend command and control (C2), and distribute data across joint and allied forces, reducing reliance on scarce high-end aircraft.

He also notes experiments showing MQ-9s supporting distributed, austere operations and integrating multiple platforms into a common operational picture, effectively making the drone an airborne networking layer rather than only an ISR platform.

Operationally, MQ-9 dispersion among US allies and partners is best understood as one piece of a larger posture-and-access competition. It aligns with the US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) operational concept, which disperses aircraft and small support teams across many shifting, austere bases to complicate PLA missile targeting, preserve sortie generation, and keep airpower operating within China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope.

However, proliferation and dispersal may not substantially enhance the survivability of what is fundamentally a vulnerable platform. As Douglas Barrie and other writers argue in a November 2024 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the MQ-9 is increasingly vulnerable in contested airspace, using Houthi operations as a central empirical case.

Barrie and others note that in Yemen, the Houthis assembled a patchwork air-defense network from legacy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), repurposed legacy air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and Iranian-supplied systems such as the “358” loitering surface-to-air missile, which proved “limited” against manned aircraft but “effective against medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs” such as the MQ-9.

Barrie and others report that the Houthis claimed to have shot down 33 coalition MALE UAVs and later claimed to have shot down 11 US MQ-9s during the Red Sea crisis. They also state US officials acknowledged several losses, illustrating how even non-state actors can attrit MQ-9s without changes to tactics or defenses.

If the MQ-9 proved vulnerable to even rudimentary air defenses, its survivability against China, which has far more sophisticated weapons than irregular groups such as the Houthis, is questionable.

As the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) shows, China has an overlapping air defense network in the South China Sea, complete with radars, fighter jets and SAMs such as the long-range HQ-9 system – far more advanced than what MQ-9s have had to contend with against the Houthis in Yemen.

Also, while losing an MQ-9 may not be as politically sensitive as losing a fighter aircraft due to the former’s lack of a human pilot, each MQ-9 downed presents a significant financial and capability loss. Each MQ-9 costs around USD 30 million in 2025, and losing even one could significantly degrade ISR and networking capabilities for US and allied forces.

In the end, the MQ-9’s expanding Indo-Pacific web may sharpen deterrence and knit allied forces together. Still, against China’s layered defenses, it also risks becoming a costly, attritable linchpin whose losses could expose the fragility of America’s surveillance-first strategy.