Gyalo Thondup, who died on February 8, 2026, at 97 at the Indian hill station Kalimpong, carried with him secrets of a vanished era — and a warning for the present one. As the elder brother of the 14th Dalai Lama and a principal architect of the Tibetan resistance, Thondup stood at the intersection of Tibet’s tragedy and Asia’s great-power rivalries.
His memoir, The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong, pulls back the curtain on a shadow war that entangled Tibet, India, China and the United States. It also offers a sobering lesson for New Delhi today.
Thondup’s greatest regret, he wrote, was trusting the CIA.
He wrote, “in all my life, I have only one regret: my involvement with the CIA. Initially, I genuinely believed that the Americans wanted to help us fight for our independence. Eventually, I realized that was not true. It was misguided and wishful thinking on my part. The CIA’s goal was never independence for Tibet. In fact, I do not think that the Americans ever really even wanted to help. They just wanted to stir up trouble, using the Tibetans to create misunderstandings and discord between China and India. Eventually they were successful in that. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war was one tragic result.”
In the 1950s and 1960s, he was convinced that Washington would selflessly support Tibet’s struggle against Chinese rule, Thondup worked closely with US intelligence. The CIA trained Tibetan fighters in Colorado, supplied arms and helped mount guerrilla operations from Mustang in Nepal. For Thondup and many Tibetans, the United States appeared to be a moral ally — a defender of freedom against communist expansion.
But when United States’ strategic priorities shifted in the early 1970s, so did US commitments. President Richard Nixon’s opening to China and Henry Kissinger’s secret diplomacy with Beijing recast the geopolitical chessboard. Tibet was no longer a useful lever against China. The covert program was quietly wound down. The fighters were left exposed. The cause was subordinated to détente. Thondup eventually recognized that the United States had not intervened out of devotion to Tibetan self-determination but to weaken a rival. Tibet had been a pawn in a larger contest. It was a painful realization — and one that carries uncomfortable resonance for India in 2026.
The echo of 1962
The 1962 Sino-Indian war remains one of the deepest traumas in modern Indian history. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had championed the slogan “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” — Indians and Chinese are brothers — framing the relationship in terms of Asian solidarity and a shared anti-colonial struggle. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, too, spoke the language of postcolonial partnership, even as fundamental differences simmered beneath the surface.
Nehru’s mistake was not idealism per se, but the failure to reconcile it with hard realities. Border disputes festered without resolution. Intelligence assessments were inconsistent. India’s “forward policy” sought to assert presence along contested frontiers without sufficient military preparation. Meanwhile, covert anti-China activities linked to Tibetan resistance — some facilitated through Indian territory and Nepal — deepened Beijing’s suspicions.
When war came in October 1962, it was swift and devastating. Western assurances proved thin. India found itself strategically isolated. The conflict exposed the dangers of misreading adversaries, overestimating external backing and allowing great-power rivalries to shape regional dynamics.
Thondup’s memoir underscores a parallel truth: Major powers act in pursuit of interest, not sentiment. For small actors — or even middle powers — the cost of miscalculation can be profound.
Modi’s strategic gamble
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, particularly since 2016, India has adopted a more openly confrontational posture toward China. After the 2017 Doklam standoff and the deadly 2020 Galwan clash, New Delhi hardened its rhetoric and recalibrated its strategy. India deepened defense cooperation with the United States through agreements represented by acronyms such as LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the United States, Japan and Australia gained renewed prominence. The “Indo-Pacific” became the organizing principle of strategic alignment.
Supporters describe this shift as overdue realism. China’s infrastructure buildup along the Line of Actual Control, its assertiveness in the South China Sea and its growing regional influence demand balancing. Closer ties with Washington, they argue, enhance deterrence and provide access to advanced technology and intelligence.
Yet Thondup’s experience invites a harder question: At what point does partnership become dependency?
If US policy toward China were to shift again — whether toward confrontation or accommodation — would India’s interests remain aligned? History suggests that great powers recalibrate without sentiment. A future “grand bargain” between Washington and Beijing, however unlikely it may appear today, could leave regional actors scrambling.
Moreover, India’s visible integration into the US-led frameworks risks reinforcing Beijing’s perception that New Delhi has crossed from strategic autonomy into the Western camp. That perception, in turn, can harden China’s approach along the Himalayan frontier.
The perils of misreading power
There are additional parallels to 1962 that merit reflection.
First is the danger of conflating domestic political signaling with strategic prudence. National resolve is important; so is avoiding escalation traps. Public postures that narrow diplomatic flexibility can make compromise politically costly, even when it’s strategically necessary.
Second is the risk of misjudging relative capabilities. Nehru’s forward policy underestimated China’s military readiness and resolve. Today, China’s sustained investments in border infrastructure and logistics contrast with India’s historically reactive approach. Strategic confidence must be grounded in sober assessment, not rhetoric or assumed external backing.
Third is the temptation to rely on intelligence streams that reflect allied priorities. Thondup later acknowledged that external agencies inevitably frame information to serve their own objectives. Policymakers who mistake shared data for shared destiny can miscalculate.
None of this argues for retreat or appeasement. China’s rise poses real challenges for India. Border management, maritime competition and regional influence are legitimate concerns. Cooperation with the United States can enhance India’s leverage and technological capacity.
But leverage is not the same as alignment, and alignment is not the same as subordination.
A lesson in strategic autonomy
Toward the end of his life, Thondup came to believe that progress required direct engagement with Beijing, not reliance on distant patrons. However fraught, bilateral dialogue was indispensable. External actors could amplify tensions; only the principals could resolve them.
For India, the core lesson is not to shun partnerships but to preserve strategic autonomy. That means maintaining diversified relationships, investing in indigenous capability and ensuring that border disputes are managed through sustained diplomatic channels, even amid rivalry.
It also means recognizing that great-power competition is cyclical. The United States and China may confront one another for years to come. They may also, at some point, find selective accommodation. India must be positioned to navigate either scenario without being cast as a proxy.
Gyalo Thondup’s life was marked by courage, improvisation and ultimately disillusionment. His story is not India’s story. India is not Tibet; it is a rising middle power in its own right. But the structural lesson endures: In contests among giants, even significant actors can be instrumentalized if they surrender strategic agency.
As India reassesses its Himalayan policy and its role in an increasingly polarized world, Thondup’s regret lingers as a cautionary note. Trust, in geopolitics, must be tempered by memory. Alliances are tools, not guarantees. And history, when ignored, has a habit of returning — often along familiar fault lines.
Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel
Agreed. One has only to look at Europe’s current situation which is a direct consequence of being a lackey of the USA for so long and neglecting their own populations’ interests.