Europe’s flagship bid for sixth-generation air power is stalling, forcing the continent to confront hard choices between strategic autonomy, US dependence and deeper defense integration with Indo-Pacific partners.
Last month, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Germany has signaled that its flagship 100 billion euro Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program with France may no longer produce a jointly built fighter jet, raising fresh doubts about one of Europe’s most ambitious defense projects.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the troubled Franco-German initiative could continue in a scaled-back form focused on joint systems rather than a next-generation combat aircraft, after Airbus Defence and Space said it had effectively abandoned plans to build a common jet with France’s Dassault Aviation.
While Merz insisted France and Germany would “definitely” deliver some jointly developed capabilities under FCAS, he acknowledged that the core element — a shared fighter aircraft — could be scrapped as governments reassess feasibility following years of industrial deadlock.
Airbus chief executive Michael Schoellhorn said cooperation had broken down after Dassault sought dominant control over design, suppliers, and decision-making, a model Airbus argued was incompatible with a cooperative European program. The dispute has pushed key decisions to late February after talks between Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron.
Although France continues to press for the program’s survival, officials privately concede political backing is weaker in Germany, highlighting how industrial rivalry and diverging national priorities are undermining Europe’s push for defense integration.
The FCAS impasse is now spilling beyond Europe, with its collapse potentially reshaping defense-industrial alignments between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
The stalling of the European FCAS program may drive some of its partners closer to the competing UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Air Program (GCAP). The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported last month that Japan’s next-generation fighter jet program with the UK and Italy is set to gain momentum after Germany, France and Spain effectively put their rival FCAS project on hold.
As a result, attention has shifted to the Japan-UK-Italy GCAP, which aims to field a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. Japan faces more urgent pressure than its partners to replace aging F-2 fighters and counter China’s rapidly advancing air power, making GCAP strategically critical despite development delays.
However, while interest from additional countries could grow if FCAS collapses, Japan may resist new entrants to protect its industrial stake and design priorities.
The urgency for a next-generation fighter is felt in Europe and East Asia. Highlighting this need, Maurizio De Guida and other writers argue in a September 2025 article for the Joint Air Power Competence Center (JAPCC) journal that a sixth-generation fighter is required because modern air power faces a qualitatively harsher, more connected and contested battlespace in which control of the air is harder, more decisive and more time-critical than before.
De Guida and others cite the return of state-on-state conflict, expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones, layered air defenses, cyber and space threats, and saturation tactics as drivers that demand “Survivability 2.0,” longer range, and greater operational agility.
They contend that only a sixth-generation, system-of-systems platform can integrate sensing, computing, connectivity, crewed-uncrewed teaming, and command functions to preserve freedom of maneuver, sustain deterrence, and orchestrate combat effects across domains under intense electromagnetic and kinetic pressure.
While France and Germany have developed the FCAS in response to those needs, the project may have run into turbulence. As Ulrike Franke points out in a December 2025 article for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the FCAS has stalled because national incentive structures diverged rather than converged.
Franke notes that Germany’s post-Ukraine “Zeitenwende” shifted the country from symbolic European cooperation toward hard capability scrutiny and industrial self-interest. At the same time, she mentions France’s booming Rafale exports made the latter more protective of its competitive advantages.
She also says that differing export philosophies, carrier versus range-driven design priorities, asymmetric industrial maturity, and the absence of enforceable supranational governance have compounded delays, eroded trust, and exposed the limits of political will in building a genuinely European defense industry.
The possible collapse of the FCAS project would have significant consequences for European security.
In an October 2025 article for The Parliament, Wannes Verstraete notes that such an event could leave a significant capability gap for two decades, as no European country could develop a sixth-generation fighter alone because of the extreme costs and technological sophistication involved. That situation leaves Europe with two choices: continue to purchase the F-35 or diversify its defense partnerships.
Should European states continue to purchase the F-35, Andrii Vdovychenko mentions in a March 2025 Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) article that the aircraft offers Europe unmatched combat, intelligence, and interoperability advantages, providing immediate fifth-generation capabilities critical for deterring Russia and operating seamlessly within NATO.
However, Vdovychenko warns that these benefits carry strategic risks: European operators lack complete control over software, upgrades, and sustainment, which remain US-controlled, creating long-term dependence. He also notes that political uncertainty in the US has heightened fears that access to updates, maintenance, or intelligence could be restricted, degrading aircraft effectiveness over time.
With the F-35, Vdovychenko notes that while Europe gains short-term military superiority, reliance on the type exposes vulnerabilities tied to US political decisions and supply chains.
Alternatively, European states could diversify their partners to develop a sixth-generation aircraft, as exemplified by the GCAP program. The UK Defense Journal reported in December 2025 that the UK has signaled it is open to Germany joining the GCAP as uncertainty deepens over the FCAS project.
According to the report, UK Defense Minister Luke Pollard stressed that while the UK, Italy and Japan are prioritizing delivery of GCAP “at pace,” the program remains open to additional partners.
The report mentions that the following growing frustration in Germany over FCAS deadlock, with GCAP increasingly framed as an alternative model offering clearer leadership, firmer industrial alignment, and a more stable path to a sixth-generation fighter entering service in the mid-2030s.
If that happens, David Sacks, in an October 2024 East-West Center article, states that defense-industrial cooperation could link European and Indo-Pacific partners via shared development, interoperability, and coproduction. He notes that defense-industrial cooperation on high-end platforms reinforces both regions if the US faces an Indo-Pacific conflict and rebalances forces from Europe.
However, letting in more participants in the GCAP program may be easier said than done. In a March 2025 report for the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Elio Calcagno argues that admitting new partners into GCAP would be structurally complicated because the program’s technical requirements are already consolidating, and its treaty-based governance and joint venture structure are complex to reshape.
He adds that Japan may resist added complexity and that expanding membership risks recreating Eurofighter-style inefficiencies and lowest-common-denominator outcomes.
This clash between ambition and governance may ultimately force Europe to choose between US-led airpower dependence and deeper defense integration with Indo-Pacific partners, reshaping not just European security but the balance between Atlantic and Pacific theaters.