As the United States weighs fresh strikes on Iran, the prospect of a wider regional conflict is once again coming into focus. For many of Washington’s allies, the question is no longer whether escalation is possible, but how they would respond if it spiralled into all-out war.
Australia faces a familiar challenge. Maintaining regional stability while navigating an assertive ally, intent on reshaping the Middle East by force. Canberra distanced itself from last year’s strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, expressing tacit approval while insisting they were “unilateral” US actions.
Only seven months on, a wider and sustained conflict in the region would likely demand a more proactive stance. Yet Australia finds itself critically unprepared for this new dimension of alliance politics.
Part of this lack of preparation comes from decades of strategic tunnel vision and the failure to recognize that any crisis (or opportunity) in the Middle East will inevitably echo through the Indo-Pacific.
As the global rules-based order faces a reckoning elsewhere, Australian foreign policy has become increasingly shaped by its immediate region. Australia’s foreign policy strategy has surged engagement and funding for governments across Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
Yet this laser focus has come at the expense of keeping step with the rapidly evolving dynamics in regions closely connected to Australia’s own backyard.
By sidestepping involvement in the Middle East, Australia has forgone the chance to influence outcomes, let alone manage the fallout of potential mass displacement, migration and downstream effects of a regional war, where its own treaty obligations might apply.
Importantly, Australia has not connected the strategic dots between what regime change in Iran would mean for China’s expanding reach across Eurasia, and in particular, its foothold in the Indian Ocean. Regime change in Iran, however distant or elusive, would carry enormous consequences for China and reshape its influence across the Indo-Pacific.
Now, as the US once again seeks decisive action in Iran, Australia finds itself unable to either support or persuade otherwise, reflecting a failure to engage more actively with the US administration and Israel on one hand, and the Gulf and Arab states on the other.
While Australia may have boxed itself out of the region’s complex dynamics for now, this strategic blind spot need not last forever. A Middle East re-forged in America’s strategic vision can be congruent with Australia’s own strategic interests.
As a maritime trading nation, Australia would benefit from greater stability in the Indian Ocean Region. Threats from Iranian-backed proxy networks in the Gulf of Aden and the Hormuz Strait represent risks to vital chokepoints that Australia relies on for a majority of its oil imports.
Moreover, the strategic convergence between Iran, North Korea and Russia provides a rationale for greater alignment with US-led initiatives that work to counter those threats cohesively.
Practically speaking, how might Australia go about increasing its stake in the Middle East?
Without jeopardizing relations with neighboring Muslim-majority Indonesia or raising red flags in Beijing, greater diplomatic engagement across the Middle East should go beyond mere alignment with US foreign policy goals and work to strengthen pragmatic ties with regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Australia could consider offering tangible support for an extended US campaign against the Ayatollah regime in Iran. This would need to lean on Australia’s strengths and align with existing diplomatic and strategic tracks. A few stand out:
First is the AUKUS Partnership. As uncertainty and delays grip AUKUS Pillar I, greater movement on Pillar II is a strategic no-brainer. The promise of greater interoperability among allies for applying advanced undersea, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities can demonstrate that the utility of the AUKUS partnership extends well beyond just submarines.
Next, Australia’s naval capabilities and its position as an Indian Ocean littoral state make it both conveniently isolated from and strategically adjacent to the Middle East theatre. NATO members offer a glimpse of the kind of logistical air support that the US relies on.
Air bases in Mildenhall and Lakenheath (UK) and Ramstein (Germany) have facilitated a steady military airlift from mainland United States to the Middle East over January, ferrying advanced air defense equipment and tankers to forward US bases in Jordan and Qatar.
As Gulf States restrict their airspace for operations against Iran, Australia may quietly step in with increased naval and even air support from behind.
Complementing the US forward presence in Diego Garcia, Australia’s northern and Western shores are ready to support more long-range and stand-off operations where Middle East-centric bases are too exposed or politically sensitive.
The US now has a greater strategic footprint across Northern Australia and Western Australia, including the Submarine Rotational Force West at HMAS Stirling and the Marine Rotational Forces in Darwin. While these have typically been tooled with a traditional northward-facing threat orientation, these assets could easily come into play in a wider Middle East contingency.
Regardless of any future role, the premise for Australia’s involvement in any greater Middle East conflict must come from a position of strategic flexibility, rather than compromise or coercion by Washington. The dividends for Australia’s core alliance and its ability to shape its near region are too potent to ignore.
Johannes Kornberger is an Australian geopolitical analyst and founder of Mackinder Advisory, a boutique strategic communications consultancy, having held prior positions with UNHCR, the Council of Europe, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.