By any honest reading of history, the international monetary system was never neutral. It was a political settlement, forged in 1944 at Bretton Woods, that elevated one country’s currency to the status of global money.
That settlement—shaped by the ideas of Harry Dexter White and accepted despite the objections of John Maynard Keynes—served the world well for the post-World War II period. But its core asymmetry has outlived its legitimacy.
Today’s global economy is multipolar in production, consumption and distribution, but unipolar in its financial system. The dominance of the US dollar has created a structural imbalance: the issuer of the reserve currency can run persistent deficits, while the rest of the world must struggle to adjust through painful austerity, reserve accumulation or volatile capital flows.
This has created a persistent challenge for the global economy: dollars are American, but its problems are shared by developing countries. This is the very dilemma Keynes warned against when he proposed a neutral international currency, known as “bancor”, managed through a clearing union that disciplined both trade surplus and deficit countries.
Eighty years later, the case for a modern bancor has returned—not as a nostalgic revival, but as a practical necessity of the time. The most credible impetus for reform is emerging not from Washington or Brussels, but from the Global South, particularly the expanding BRICS grouping and its New Development Bank.
Beyond dollar hegemony
The debate is often caricatured as a geopolitical contest between the dollar and rival national currencies. That is the wrong frame.
Replacing one hegemonic currency with another would simply reproduce the instability of the current system. A Chinese renminbi-dominated order, for example, would raise the same concerns about asymmetry, external constraint and political leverage that now surround the greenback.
It seems that China, as the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and technology, does not want its currency to become a global reserve currency. Doing so would likely cause the renminbi to appreciate, making Chinese exports more expensive and potentially reducing global demand for its goods, services and technology.
The real alternative is not another national currency, but a non-national one. This is why both the Global South and Global North should consider a BRICS currency for settlement purposes rather than as a reserve currency.
A BRICS-led reserve asset, structured as a basket or digital clearing unit anchored in a diversified set of currencies and commodities, could approximate Keynes’s vision for bancor.
Its purpose would not be to displace national currencies, but to act as a neutral unit of account and settlement for international trade and finance. Crucially, it would be governed multilaterally, with no single country able to weaponize it for domestic or geopolitical ends, as the US has been doing with the dollar.
This is not a utopian idea. Elements already exist in bilateral currency swaps, local-currency settlement mechanisms and pooled reserve arrangements. What is missing is integration into a coherent clearing system with automatic stabilizers—precisely what Keynes proposed 80 years ago.
Restoring symmetry and stability
At the heart of Keynes’s design was a principle still absent from today’s system: symmetry of adjustment.
Under a modern clearing union, persistent surplus countries would face charges on excess reserves, incentivizing them to expand domestic demand or invest abroad. Deficient countries, meanwhile, would have access to overdraft facilities that prevent sudden contraction.
This is not merely a technical fix. It would rebalance the global economy away from chronic underconsumption and deflationary bias towards stable, demand-led economic growth. It would also reduce the need for developing countries to accumulate vast dollar reserves as self-insurance for payment of import and foreign debt service—a practice that diverts resources from the domestic investment and social development they desperately need.
For many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, such a system would offer what the current one does not: macroeconomic policy space for their economies. Governments could pursue job creation, industrialization and climate investment without the constant threat of currency crises, global North economic shocks or World Bank- and IMF-imposed austerity measures.
Critics of reform often argue that the dollar system underwrites global trade and financial openness.
Yet, in practice, it has increasingly been used as an instrument of coercion—through sanctions, financial exclusion and regulatory overreach. This erodes trust and fragments the very globalization it claims to support. It is imperative to respond to US policy instability every four years and recently to its rising protectionism.
A neutral clearing currency would delink trade from geopolitical leverage. It would make sanctions more targeted and legitimate rather than resort to system-wide disruptions. It would also encourage genuine free trade by lowering transaction costs and exchange-rate volatility across diverse currency zones.
This is not an argument against open markets. On the contrary, it is an argument for a fairer infrastructure for open global markets—one that does not privilege the domestic policy needs of a single country over the stability of the global financial system as a whole.
Multipolar order
If Bretton Woods reflected the power realities of 1945, a new settlement must reflect those of 2026. Emerging economies now account for the majority of global growth and a rising share of trade, savings and investment. Yet they remain underrepresented in the governance of Western-dominated legacy institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
A BRICS-anchored clearing union would not replace these institutions overnight. But it would create a parallel pillar, one that is more representative, more development-oriented and less loan-conditionality-driven. Over time, it could catalyze reform within older institutions, forcing them to become more inclusive and responsive to the concerns of Global South nations.
To succeed, any new system must avoid becoming a vehicle for the dominance of its largest member. That requires transparent rules, rotating leadership and voting structures that balance economic weight with regional representation.
The principle must be clear: no country, however large, can monopolize or weaponize the global financial system. That only levels the playing field for the Global South countries.
Skeptics will note that global financial orders do not change easily. They are embedded in legal contracts, financial markets and political alliances. But history shows that they do change, often in response to crisis. The breakdown of the gold standard, the creation of Bretton Woods and the shift to floating exchange rates were all once deemed improbable before 1944. Now we are at the same moment.
The transition to a 21st-century bancor need not be abrupt. It can begin with incremental steps of expanding local-currency trade within BRICS and partner countries; issuing bonds and development loans denominated in a common unit; creating a digital clearing platform for cross-border payments; and gradually widening membership to include other emerging and advanced economies willing to participate in the system.
What matters is the direction of the trajectory: away from a system defined by a powerful nation’s privilege and towards one grounded in multilateral balance.
New Keynesian moment
At the end of day, the choice is not between the status quo and chaos in the global financial system. It is between an aging system that generates recurrent instability and a reformed one that internalizes the lessons Keynes taught eight decades ago.
To be sure, a neutral, rules-based, symmetric financial order would not eliminate crises. But it would make them less frequent, less contagious and less unjust for every country. It would allow countries to trade more freely, invest more productively and grow more inclusively together in ways that best serve their nationals.
For too long, the architecture of global financial system has been written in the language of power. It is time to rewrite it in the language of justice, fairness and inclusivity.
The Global South, through BRICS+ and beyond, now has both the incentive and the capacity to lead that effort. The question is no longer whether a new bancor is desirable. It is whether the world can afford to wait any longer to create it.
Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel

There is a simple solution for this.
We have a system in the stock market where the stock value is updated every hour and millions of people handle it transparently in real time from their verified individual accounts.
We also have the upi payment system in India which can handle millions of cash transactions
using a bank account and secure mobile phone.
My suggestion is to bring these two together.
Let’s consider you are an Indian with an account in the Indian rupee and you are in Russia where you want to transact in rubles.
What the system does he is it calculates the current demand of Indian rupee in rubles by the people who are trying to buy it, and designate a value for the Indian rupee in rubles in real time.
For example if the demand for Indian rupee is neutral it will be 10 Indian rupees for one ruble but if the demand for the Indian rupee is low it will be 12 Indian rupees for one rouble, just like variation in the currency market.
If many Indians asking for rubles Indian rupee value goes down just like what happens when many people are trying to buy the shares of a company.
the whole thing happens dynamically in real time and whenever anyone is exchanging currency the value at that point of time will be that at which the transaction is done.
The ultimate value of the currency will be totally dependent upon the productivity and export potential of that country in products and services. a more people will want to buy the products of that country in their currency.
hence the value of currency of the producing country increases.
Would a BRICS currency allow countries like India inflate its currency value?
Do you know why the US and West in general are against CBDCs? Firstly they benefit from the incu mbent financial system that is biased towards their rigged fraud and currencies. Second , and more importantly, DARPA, CIA and NED are threatened by the transparency of BLOCKCHAIN. CBDCs are blockchain technology that will be 100% transparent to sovereign governments tracking transactions.
The Western elites need covert dark money to funnel to bad actors, regime change operators and terrorists. CBDCs threaten their ability to covertly project power abroad.
Keep an eye on suitcases full of cash and DARPA’s dark crypto projects.
You’re dreaming. I don’t like the USD being the reserve currency.
But it ain’t going to change anytime soon. 100yrs maybe.
100/20= 5 years. And the USD will be teetering!
Meanwhile the squnits have a TFR below replacement.
Go quietly into the demographic night. You won’t be missed
100 years? YOU are dreaming. By the 2040s, you will see this toilet paper suffer serious credibility problems as the US debt approaches $100 trillion
RBD is a product of multigenerational cousin marriages