As the curtain fell on the Vietnamese Communist Party’s five-yearly 14th National Congress, international observers focused on the headlines: General To Lam’s unanimous re-election as general secretary and his ambitious 10% GDP growth target. The surface narrative was of continuity and stability.
However, a closer examination reveals a structural anomaly. In an unprecedented move, the Congress Resolution included a directive to propose amendments to the Party Charter “immediately after” the five-yearly event.
This directly contradicted pre-Congress statements by senior officials who assured the public and Party base that the Charter wouldn’t be changed.
In the opaque world of Vietnamese politics, where procedure is often as important as personnel, this flip-flop is significant. It signals that the existing political framework, the “four pillars” system carefully maintained by the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, is no longer compatible with Lam’s new emerging power structure.
Institutionalizing the exception
Under Trong, the Party Charter was the bedrock of political legitimacy. His “blazing furnace” anti-corruption campaign relied on the strict, literal enforcement of existing rules (Regulations 37, 41). Stability meant adhering to the Charter, not changing it.
The 14th Congress has inverted this logic. The urgency to amend the Charter after top personnel have been selected implies that the new leadership structure is rewriting the old rules.
One clear sign of this shift is the de facto unification of power. Immediately upon his re-election, Lam chaired an international press conference, a role diplomatically reserved for the head of state.
Meanwhile, the exclusion of the sitting prime minister and state president from the new Central Committee has effectively dismantled the checks and balances of the old “four pillars” system.
This creates the structure for Lam to operate as a singular power center. The forthcoming Charter amendments will likely serve to institutionalize these “exceptions,” possibly formalizing the unification of the general secretary and president titles, or granting the Party chief direct executive powers over the government apparatus that were previously separated.
Grand capital bargain
If the Charter is being rewritten, for whom is it being changed? The composition of the new Central Committee reveals a complex triangle of power replacing the old consensus model.
Lam and the Ministry of Public Security hold absolute political dominance, controlling the apex positions (general secretary, inspection commission, standing secretariat) and acting as the sword to protect the Party from all threats, internal or external.
The numbers tell a deceptive story. Of the 200 Central Committee members, 33 come from the armed forces. The military holds 26 seats while the police hold seven. On paper, the military appears dominant. However, this is an optical illusion.
Under Lam’s rule the military has been placated with seats and economic privileges. Crucially, even within the military there are now pragmatic forces who are willing to cooperate with the third important bloc, the capital groups backing Lam.
The rise of this third group is evident in figures like Nguyen Thanh Nghi, the eldest son of former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Nghi’s entry into the Politburo, after years of suppression under Trong, signals that a pragmatic grand bargain has been struck with Lam.
The 10% GDP growth target is a political promise a securocrat like Lam would be hard-pressed to orchestrate. Lam needs the technocratic competence and business networks of the so-called “interest faction”, a legacy of the Dung era, to deliver such high-octane economic results.
The old Party Charter, designed for collective leadership and ideological purity, is ill-suited for this new developmental security state, where the police and technocrats work hand in glove.
The coming amendments will likely aim to streamline this alliance, allowing for faster decision-making and protecting the technocrats from the very anti-corruption campaign that helped to bring Lam to power, provided they deliver fast growth.
Peak power trap
By consolidating power so overtly, Lam could be walking into a peak power trap. Under the previous collective leadership model, government failures could be blamed on the mechanism or specific ministries.
By dismantling the “four pillars” and potentially unifying certain titles, Lam is removing this safety buffer – Vietnam’s rendition of intra-Party checks and balances. Every economic stumble, every power outage and every diplomatic friction will now solely fall on him.
The rush to amend the Charter reveals an insecurity. It suggests that the current consensus is fragile, held together not by shared ideology but by a temporary alignment of interests between the security state and capital.
Vietnam is entering a new era where rules are becoming flexible and the definition of stability is being rewritten in real-time. For foreign investors and diplomats, the question is no longer who holds the titles, but whether a system built on security centralism will tolerate the openness required for a 10% growth economy.
The rewritten Party Charter will be the first test of that seeming contradiction.
Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, also known as Mother Mushroom, is a Vietnamese writer, human rights commentator and former political prisoner based in Texas, United States. She is the founder of WEHEAR, an independent initiative focusing on Southeast Asian politics, human rights and economic transparency.