The US military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro has generated far-reaching global repercussions. In East Asia, the intervention has intensified tensions between the United States and China and has disrupted South Korea’s existing peace-building strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing has condemned the operation as a violation of state sovereignty and international law, raising the issue at the United Nations and signaling that its implications extend well beyond the Western Hemisphere.
On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has reacted sharply to recent developments, conducting hypersonic missile tests and demanding the immediate release of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Against this backdrop, South Korea has found it increasingly difficult to secure the level of Chinese support it had anticipated for advancing rapprochement with North Korea during recent diplomatic engagements.
The sudden escalation of the crisis in the Americas has altered China’s strategic priorities and constrained its willingness to actively facilitate inter-Korean dialogue. As a result, South Korea is now compelled to reassess its diplomatic approach and to explore alternative pathways for restarting the peace process with North Korea under markedly less favorable international conditions.
Several key elements characterize this shift in the international power structure.
First, the operation reflects an escalation of US assertiveness. While the Trump administration justified the strike on the grounds that it was enforcing laws against narco-terrorism, critics have widely interpreted it as indicative of a broader trend toward unilateralism in US foreign policy.
Second, the intervention has generated significant international backlash and polarization, with multiple countries – including Russia, Brazil and Iran – publicly denouncing the action as a violation of state sovereignty.
Third, China has responded with an unprecedented level of diplomatic assertiveness, forcefully criticizing the US action and positioning itself as a defender of international norms and multilateral principles. At the same time, analysts suggest that Beijing may seek to leverage the episode to highlight contrasts between US unilateralism and China’s preferred vision of global governance.
A development reverberating beyond its immediate theater
This US unilateral action is not a distant or isolated development; rather, it is reverberating across East Asian strategic calculations, particularly by further narrowing the diplomatic space between the United States and China.
Regional policy analysts have observed that the Venezuela crisis has constrained opportunities for high-level US-China dialogue at a critical juncture, as preparations were underway for a US-China summit anticipated in April. The mutual distrust generated by the intervention is therefore likely to reduce the prospects for substantive breakthroughs on contentious bilateral and regional issues.
A key emerging tendency is that, as Washington adopts a more confrontational posture, Beijing becomes increasingly reluctant to engage in cooperative negotiations that involve US demands for strategic concessions. This dynamic directly affects triangular diplomacy involving South Korea, diminishing China’s traditional capacity to act as an effective intermediary.
Within this context, China’s hedging behavior has become more pronounced, as Beijing faces mounting pressure to signal strategic assertiveness to both domestic and international audiences by pushing back against perceived US unilateralism.
These dynamics also shaped the environment surrounding South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s recent state visit to China. Although the visit included discussions on multidimensional bilateral cooperation, it unfolded amid heightened geopolitical turbulence. As a result, both the diplomatic messaging and the potential outcomes of the visit were inevitably constrained.
All in all, the Venezuela crisis underscores the need for Seoul to carefully calibrate its strategic posture – strengthening bilateral high-level diplomacy with Beijing while simultaneously managing its increasingly consequential relationship with Washington.
North Korea’s response to the US military intervention in Venezuela has been sharply critical and closely linked to its broader security calculus. Pyongyang has characterized the US action as a serious violation of sovereignty and has explicitly drawn parallels between the intervention and its own justification for resisting external pressure. In this context, North Korea’s missile activities coinciding with the US intervention in Venezuela appear intended to signal strategic defiance and to test regional diplomatic boundaries.
The US operation in Venezuela carries significant policy implications for North Korea. Pyongyang appears to interpret the intervention as further evidence that international norms of sovereignty and nonintervention are eroding, particularly in the face of US unilateral use of force. This perception is likely to reinforce North Korea’s long-standing belief that nuclear deterrence constitutes the ultimate guarantee of regime survival.
Consequently, such developments risk diminishing further any remaining incentives for North Korea to contemplate engagement in denuclearization negotiations with either the United States or South Korea. Absent credible and sustained security assurances, this reinforced threat perception may substantially weaken Pyongyang’s willingness to participate in US-facilitated diplomatic processes going forward.
South Korea’s original expectation that an an April US-China summit could generate progress on the Korean Peninsula rested on assumptions of strategic cooperation and risk reduction between the two major powers. However, the Venezuela crisis risks delaying or diluting the substance of such a summit, as Washington and Beijing increasingly prioritize immediate strategic competition over collaborative agenda-setting.
For Seoul, this development raises the costs of overreliance on US-China-mediated breakthroughs and underscores the growing necessity of developing more autonomous and independent policy instruments to manage Korean Peninsula issues.
Policy implications for South Korea
In light of these evolving dynamics, South Korean policymakers may need to reassess fundamentally their approach to advancing the Korean Peninsula peace process. The earlier strategy of relying on the “good offices” of major powers appears increasingly untenable under conditions of intensified US-China rivalry and deepening strategic polarization.
To avoid being drawn into a rigid binary between Washington and Beijing, South Korea should strengthen direct communication with both capitals in order to manage expectations and preserve diplomatic flexibility. At the same time, Seoul may need to place greater emphasis on back-channel diplomacy and multilateral frameworks – such as ASEAN-led mechanisms or residual Six-Party Dialogue structures – that are better equipped to sustain engagement during periods when bilateral summit diplomacy encounters significant constraints.
In parallel, South Korea will need to recalibrate its approach toward North Korea. Policymakers must recognize that escalatory external developments, including crises such as the US intervention in Venezuela, can further harden Pyongyang’s threat perceptions.
Accordingly, Seoul may benefit from adopting a gradual, step-by-step strategy that prioritizes humanitarian assistance and limited economic cooperation as confidence-building measures before pursuing more ambitious peace initiatives. Comprehensive scenario planning for potential North Korean responses to major geopolitical shocks will be essential for maintaining momentum toward peace-building under uncertain conditions.
Although South Korea remains deeply integrated within the US-led security architecture, the increasingly competitive strategic environment necessitates a stronger emphasis on strategic autonomy. Seoul should clearly articulate red lines related to its core national interests while seeking stable and pragmatic cooperation with major regional powers wherever possible.
With respect to China, issue-specific engagement – particularly in economic, climate and people-to-people domains – may offer greater diplomatic resilience than expansive grand-strategic visions. In an era of intensified great-power competition, restrained and flexible strategic ambitions may ultimately serve middle powers such as South Korea more effectively.
Given the heightened likelihood that the planned US-China summit may be deferred – or yield limited outcomes even if convened – Seoul should begin preparing an alternative, independent diplomatic agenda. This agenda should include concrete proposals related to denuclearization pathways, economic cooperation,and confidence-building measures, rather than relying excessively on third-party mediation.
In a worst-case scenario, South Korea may be compelled to advance peace initiatives without strong backing from either Washington or Beijing. Under such circumstances, cooperation with regional partners – including India, ASEAN member states and other middle powers – could help construct multilateral frameworks capable of absorbing shocks from great-power rivalry while sustaining progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula.