US hoping sea drones can narrow China’s naval edge

As the US Navy races to field a hybrid manned–unmanned fleet built around swarms of robotic surface vessels, the effort underscores both an ambitious attempt to reshape naval warfare and a sobering response to China’s growing numerical and industrial advantage at sea.

This month, Defense Scoop reported that the US Navy is rapidly expanding its use of unmanned surface vessels (USV) as part of a long-term effort to transform nearly half of its surface fleet into robotic platforms by 2045, senior officials said.

Speaking at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, US Navy leaders detailed how the service is accelerating investment, experimentation and operational integration of sea drones to support a hybrid manned-unmanned force under its Surface Force Vision 2045 strategy.

Rear Admiral Christopher Alexander said the US Navy’s inventory of small USVs has surged from just four units in early 2025 to nearly 400 by the end of the year, with numbers expected to approach 500 by FY2026, alongside about 11 medium USVs.

The US Navy plans to spend nearly US$7 billion on unmanned systems, including $3.7 billion earmarked for surface forces, as it seeks to exploit drones’ range, endurance and lower costs for missions such as intelligence, surveillance, logistics and targeting.

Captain Garrett Miller said two upgraded prototype medium vessels, Sea Hunter and Sea Hawk, will soon transition from experimental status to fleet-controlled assets, with one slated to deploy alongside a carrier strike group in 2026.

Officials said the push reflects lessons from recent operations and aims to expand capacity and flexibility amid growing maritime competition.

Such efforts may be attempts to bring generational change to the US Navy, as noted by Jack Rowley in a July 2025 Proceedings article. Rowley notes that USVs can enable a true hybrid fleet that expands presence, striking power, and sensing capacity without the cost, manpower demands, or construction timelines of traditional warships.

He adds that by fielding large, medium, and small USVs at scale, the US Navy can put far more hulls in the water, distribute risk, keep sailors out of harm’s way, and rapidly adapt to contested environments where crewed ships are too vulnerable. He says that these systems also allow faster experimentation, modular mission packages, and affordable mass, letting the fleet evolve continuously rather than waiting decades for new ship classes.

But how would a hybrid fleet operate? George Galdorisi mentions in a June 2024 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article that a hybrid fleet operates by pairing manned warships with large, medium, and small unmanned surface, subsurface, and aerial vehicles to expand sensing, striking power, and presence without risking crews.

Galdorisi notes that large, unmanned surface vehicles (LUSVs) act as “trucks,” covertly delivering smaller USVs, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into contested littorals for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). At the same time, manned ships remain farther from enemy anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats.

He notes that once deployed, these unmanned craft disperse, execute autonomous tasks, and return to their LUSV motherships, allowing carrier and expeditionary strike groups to project far more capability at lower cost and with greater survivability.

A hybrid fleet would fit into a larger US operational strategy in the Pacific, consisting of inside, middle, and outside forces. Inside forces consist of numerous, dispersed, and survivable assets that could survive an initial attack and operate within China’s A2/AD umbrella in the First Island Chain, such as submarines, drones, mobile missile launchers, and special forces teams.

Adding context to how USVs would operate as part of an inside force, Rolando Machado mentions in an August 2024 Proceedings article that USVs could be effectively used in mine countermeasures (MCM) roles.

A J Douglas notes in a June 2023 Proceedings article that China could use offensive minelaying to blockade Taiwan. He notes that China could easily lay thousands of naval mines in one operation with little to no warning, using PLAN warships, the China Coast Guard (CCG), aircraft, maritime militia, and commandeered civilian vessels.

That would enable US forces such as surface action groups (SAG) and amphibious ready groups (ARG) to act as middle forces – staying outside China’s A2/AD zone yet supporting inside forces when needed. Outside forces, such as carrier battlegroups and nuclear-capable strategic bombers, would focus on sortie generation and providing a nuclear backstop for conventional operations.

However, the US Navy’s efforts to build a hybrid fleet are likely a response to naval shipbuilding decline and a fleet numerical disadvantage. In July 2023, The War Zone (TWZ) reported on a leaked US Office of Naval Intelligence slide that showed China has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the US.

Supporting that glaring disparity, the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) says that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the largest in the world in terms of hull numbers, with 370 platforms as of 2024, and was projected to grow by 395 ships in 2025, and 435 ships by 2030.

In contrast, a March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report says that as of its writing, the US Navy had 296 battle force ships as of January 2025, but projects a near-term decline due to retirements outpacing new construction, falling to 287 ships by the end of FY2025 and 280 ships by FY2027.

It notes that under current plans, fleet growth resumes only in the 2030s, surpassing 300 ships around FY2032, with long-term expansion dependent on industrial capacity and funding assumptions.

Stressing the importance of quantitative advantage, Sam Tangredi points out in a January 2023 Proceedings article, bigger fleets win since the side with more ships allows it to absorb more losses, see more of the battlespace, and deliver overwhelming concentrated fire.

Tangredi adds that when technology and competence are roughly equal, numerical superiority becomes decisive because a larger fleet can outlast short‑lived tech advantages and sustain adequate striking power after the first exchange.

Maintaining a quantitative edge is crucial in naval warfare, where fleet attrition, not territory, matters most. USVs can’t fully replace traditional warships due to limited range, endurance, firepower and survivability. In a US-China conflict over Taiwan, China might hold a numerical edge in close waters, while US forces are dispersed worldwide.

US allies like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand can contribute ships to mitigate the US’s numerical disadvantage against China. However, forming such a coalition raises several issues, including how to align diverse countries’ interests, policies and military capabilities in defending Taiwan.

In sum, the US Navy’s turn toward a hybrid manned–unmanned fleet represents a strategic adaptation to intensifying competition with China and a practical hedge against shipbuilding decline.

While the effort could expand US naval presence, distribute risk and accelerate adaptation, it may still fall short of replacing the decisive advantages that fleet size and traditional warships still confer in high-end naval war.