Trump’s new order and Germany’s comeback opportunity

Donald Trump is changing the world. Foreign policy is no longer hiding behind legal masquerade, it is becoming real. It is no longer based on “values”, be they left-liberal-woke or neo-con, and it no longer acts universalistically in multilateral structures, but through bilateral deals.

These take into account the concrete geographical, cultural, spiritual, economic and political situation in the regional large spheres [Grossraeume] of the world. Germany can succeed in this new order, but is currently led by a political elite that does not grasp it intellectually, let alone know how to use it. What is possible and necessary, I will present in the following.

In part two of his series on Trump’s new global order, Maximilian Krah explores the consequences and opportunities for Germany and a comeback from economic and political decline. Read the first part here.

From EU to Europe

The US’s rejection of multilateralism as a structure and left-wing liberalism as content hits the EU head-on. It is obvious that Trump does not believe in the EU and that he wants a new Europe. This corresponds to the AfD’s program since 2013.

The lever for the restructuring of Europe is the Ukraine war. The Western Europeans have jazzed up support for Ukraine to a question of principle and are now prisoners of their own full-mouthed announcements.

The US drafts of peace between Russia and Ukraine, therefore, always include immediate access for Ukraine to the EU market and prompt EU accession. After the Western Europeans have always made such promises to Ukraine, they will now have to keep them.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in turn, has declared that he will only agree to Ukraine’s accession to the EU if Serbia is also admitted, which is then likely to extend to the entire Western Balkans. Even in the event of Orban’s election defeat in the spring of this year, this Hungarian position is likely to persist.

However, the EU cannot digest an enlargement to include Ukraine, let alone the Western Balkans, in its current form. In particular, agricultural and cohesion policies, which account for almost 70% of the EU budget, will then no longer be practicable in their current form.

In addition, the EU would no longer be able to act soundly with the notoriously corrupt Ukraine in tow, whose further political development is not at all foreseeable after the peace agreement, but which would have a veto right in the Council.

There will therefore have to be a reform before this enlargement, which will not lead to further integration for the time being, but to disintegration. The EU will be larger, but at the same time it will sink to the status of a mere economic community.

The political project is over, not only because of Ukraine, but also because some member states foreseeably will prefer good relations with Washington to the Brussels headquarters, or because EU-critical parties win elections.

The foreign policy establishment in Berlin is not prepared for this change. If you ask representatives of the ruling unity party of Christian Democrats, Socialists and Greens about their idea of Europe, it is an ever-increasing integration of the EU up to a European federal state.

The fact that of the three major economic areas of North America, Southeast Asia and Europe, the EU is the one with the lowest growth, the least innovative power, but the highest density of regulation, which is also demographically declining and cannot even defend itself, is not acknowledged.

But no one can rule against reality, not even German politicians. The EU is not delivering. It will therefore be unable to survive the inevitable changes caused by the Ukraine peace. The proposed solution of the European political establishment in Berlin, Brussels and Paris remains within the conventional framework.

There are plans to intensify the German-French partnership. This would create a less integrated, but larger EU, with a politically integrated German-French core. This idea collides with the new US policy and is also neither economically nor politically advantageous for Germany. The AfD will be the only party to reject this idea and thus be in line with US Europe policy.

This is very easy, because the idea of the Eurocrats has the economic facts against it. France is suffering from a structural budget deficit. Its government spending is too high.  The government’s share of GDP is 57%.

The largest item is pensions, on which alone about one-quarter of the budget is spent, supplemented by the pensions for soldiers, police officers, etc. Taxes are already beyond what is justifiable. Comprehensive deregulation, especially of the labor market, as well as savings in the budget, and thus in the largest item, pensions, are unavoidable.

However, no political grouping is prepared to do so. On the contrary, both the left-wing opposition – Melonchon – and the right-wing opposition – Le Pen – want to increase government spending further, to 64% and 63% of GDP respectively. It is inconceivable how the deficit can be reduced in the existing political structure.

However, France cannot continue to borrow because of the Maastricht criteria. If it did, it would have to reckon with noticeably higher interest rates, which it cannot afford. It is therefore dependent on Germany assuming liability for new debts or making direct tribute payments. One conceivable justification for this would be, for example, if the French nuclear force “Force de Frappe” were declared “European”, which in this constellation would mean: Germany pays, France commands.

It is clear that the US cannot tolerate such a “European”, i.e. multilateral, nuclear project, especially since it would be clearly directed against the new Pax Americana. It is also unacceptable for a patriotic party like the AfD to permanently support the budget deficit of a partner country, whether through loan collateral or tribute payments.

This solution also makes no strategic sense: France is not a growth market, it suffers from considerable domestic political problems, has no innovative industry beyond the production of luxury goods and offers little future potential. Historically, this solution would mean a voluntary return to Napoleon, against whom the German national idea was once born: a Confederation of the Rhine 2.0.

Germany must seize the opportunity that Trump brings on its own and become America’s best friend in Europe. The solution to this is a new “South-East Strategy.” The traditional resonance chamber of German politics and culture is Central and Southeastern Europe. The countries of Central and Southeastern Europe are closely linked to Germany historically, culturally, economically and, due to the migration movements of recent decades, also demographically.

Germany is already playing a leading role for them. The Federal Republic must break away from its one-sided turn to the West forced by the division of Europe and rediscover the classical space of German influence.

Specifically, Germany must offer leadership in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. This includes cooperation in military and scientific fields, encouraging German companies to invest and support cross-border infrastructure projects and political coordination forums, similar to the Visegrad format for voting on key political issues.

A realignment of Germany’s focus on Europe to the southeast also paves the way to Turkey, the geostrategic joker of the coming decades. Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has developed into an independent regional power. Economically, it has gained massive strength. Taking purchasing power parities into account, it has already overtaken Italy in terms of economic output and will have overtaken France by the end of the decade.

Due to its geographical location, it influences Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. In Central Asia in particular, it is playing an increasingly central role as the second-largest foreign direct investor after China, thus balancing out Chinese influence, which is viewed extremely critically by the US.

Turkey is in the same position as Germany in terms of relations with the US: there is a chance to conclude an advantageous deal in the post-multilateral order and become “America’s best friend” in its region. Due to the historically close partnership between Germany and Turkey, the relevant Turkish immigrant community in Germany and similar foreign policy interests, the possibility of close German-Turkish cooperation is almost obvious.

If you draw a connecting line between Berlin and Ankara on a map, this corresponds to the European policy focus on Central and Southeastern Europe and results in a coherent Europe strategy.

This would easily find the support of both the US and Russia. Germany would follow on from the developments of before the First World War, which were originally envisaged by Friedrich List and led to an unprecedented upswing. Strategically, Central Asia’s growing economies and natural resources are thus opening up to European investment and trade via Turkey.

Turkey’s integration into European political and economic structures is also relevant for the stabilization of the Middle East. Turkey has traditionally been a player in the Middle East and maintains resilient contacts with Israel.

A Turkey that is economically integrated into the post-EU economic zone and also looks to Central Asia has no strategic interest in getting into conflicts with Israel in Syria and elsewhere, but will make deals for its own purposes.

From anti-Russia to co-Russia

The paradigm shift that Trump brings is most visible in dealing with Russia. The Biden administration was still dominated by actors who were mentally stuck in the Cold War and wanted to win the fight against the Soviet Union against Russia. To do this, they provoked the Ukraine conflict and Russia did them the favor of falling into the trap.

This Western policy forced Russia to become China’s junior partner in world politics. However, since it is not Russia but China that is challenging the US economically, technologically and politically, the new administration is looking for ways to integrate Russia into the new, post-liberal Pax Americana.

Henry Kissinger once eliminated the Soviet Union when he brought China, then the weakest of the three global powers, to the side of the United States. Trump will play the reciprocal Kissinger: putting pressure on China by winning Russia back as a partner. It is convenient for him that Russia is significantly weakened.

Turkey’s rise has not only driven it out of Syria, but also caused it to fall behind China and Turkey economically in Central Asia. Azerbaijan has moved from the Russian to the Turkish sphere of influence, and even poor Armenia has turned away from Russia. Presumably, Russia will also lose Iran as a partner in the Middle East. Russia suffers from demographic problems similar to those of Western Europe.

It traditionally fears that China could seize Siberia. It lacks money and technology to mine its enormous mineral resources. As part of a renewed partnership with the United States, it can balance China, exploit its natural resources, and reclaim its place in the world.

It is foreseeable that Trump will make Russia such an “offer that cannot be refused.” The losers are Ukraine and the Western Europeans, who have unwittingly embraced the cause of the Kiev government and will therefore now have to bear the costs of reconstruction as well as the corruption that comes with it.

The loser is also Poland, which was able to generate foreign policy strength from its hostility to Russia but will lose its importance in the event of an American-Russian settlement.

For Germany, there is an opportunity to build on the centuries-old German-Russian partnership, which also has a demographic basis due to immigration from the former Soviet Union from the 1990s onwards. In large sections of the German population, there is also an emotional closeness to Russia, its culture and its people, which is also reciprocated by Russia.

A new partnership within the framework of Trump’s Pax Americana can be built on this, which will then also enable the rebuilding of the Nordstream gas pipeline, if necessary with US capital.

From multipolar to bipolar

Liberal, multilateral US hegemony was a threat to anyone who believed in their own path to the future based on local traditions. The “values” that were used to justify power politics worldwide until the end of the Biden years were what Pope John Paul II called the “culture of death.” The neo-con answer to this was a label fraud.

Once again, an alien concept of values was to be implemented forcibly in sometimes proud, grown and complex societies. Defensive reflexes were the natural consequence, and they had a wide variety of ideological justifications. The only thing they had in common was rejection. Governments around the world tried to balance US influence. The concept was the “multipolar world order.”

Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa formed BRICS, conflicting interests notwithstanding. Many states were interested in this project because it promised them protection from the cultural imperialism of the Washington-Brussels tandem at the time. Even Turkey, which is closely tied to the US as a NATO partner, bought Russian anti-aircraft missiles and was interested in becoming a member of BRICS.

As part of this attempt to balance the US, they were also prepared to bear costs and accept disadvantages. This has changed fundamentally with Trump and his Augustan moment. The US is no longer an existential, i.e. cultural and spiritual, threat to most of the relevant states. Offer of US deals can thus be soberly examined – and are usually more attractive than any other due to America’s enormous military, technological, economic and pop-cultural power.

It is therefore foreseeable that almost every country that receives an offer will respond to it, which in turn worsens the position of those who are not yet on board. This applies in particular to the People’s Republic of China, which is seen as the most dangerous rival in the US because it claims dominance in Asia, the most populous and economically strong continent.

The US will thus bind the respective regional powers of the metropolitan areas to itself through deals worldwide, in order to then finally negotiate with China and force it to accept the new Pax Americana: fair export conditions, opening of the Chinese market and acceptance of US influence in Asia, possibly with concessions regarding Taiwan.

Germany’s opportunity

In this plan, Germany has the chance to shape the new, post-EU Europe as America’s best friend. This new Europe will essentially consist of those states and peoples that traditionally regard Germany as the center of Europe and have shaped their own national character in exchange with German culture: Central and Southeastern Europe, including northern Italy, Benelux and, in a second step, France. 

This orientation of Europe to the southeast almost inevitably leads to an integration of Turkey into European structures and thus to the restoration of the historical situation before 1918. Just as the global post-war order ends with Trump, it will also end in Europe. This post-war order was always built to control and limit Germany.

Now something new is emerging that will allow, indeed force, Germany to grow again. Now it is up to us to have the courage to grow and to use newly attained eminence for the benefit of all, so that the “golden era” that Donald Trump establishes will benefit Germany and all of Europe. We react to the Augustan moment in the US: We become Romans!

Dr Maximilian Krah is a German jurist and member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag)