As discussions progress between Armenia and the United States on the technical design and cooperative implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), Iran has said that it views the project as the functional successor to the earlier “Zangezur corridor,” and as a US-backed encroachment in Armenia’s Syunik border region.
Since late December 2025, however, Iran has faced nationwide protests and a violent crackdown, with rights groups reporting large-scale casualties and arrests. That domestic crisis raises a practical question about how much sustained attention Tehran can devote to obstructing external infrastructure beyond declaratory threats, especially amid sharper US rhetoric following President Donald Trump’s public statements in support of the protestors.
TRIPP’s significance lies not only in its role as a South Caucasus transit project but also as a link enhancing the geoeconomic weight of the Middle Corridor running from Central Asia through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus into Europe. A recent cycle of US–Kazakhstan commercial and technology initiatives highlights its relevance to westbound rail reliability and digital connectivity.
Kazakhstan’s export and transit strategy depends on having more than one viable path to Turkey and Europe, and relatively small segments in the South Caucasus can determine whether larger east–west supply chains function smoothly or break down.
An operational Syunik segment would help bind Central Asia more tightly to European markets and networks, increasing the strategic weight of the South Caucasus — and Azerbaijan in particular — with Kazakhstan best positioned to convert that Middle Corridor link into durable rail and digital gains.
From slogan to infrastructure math
TRIPP proposes a through link between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave across Armenian territory, with onward connection to Turkey.
In August 2025, a Washington-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan framework put this segment on a new footing by pairing the transit idea with exclusive US development rights and a sublease arrangement under Armenian law.
Current discussions proceed during the preconstruction phase, focusing on route configuration, border delimitation work and the legal setup of an operating company, with construction still presented as a 2026 objective.
Earlier disputes over how the trans-Armenian connector should be labelled illustrate its sensitivity. “Zangezur” is a pre-Soviet regional term covering districts that later fell on both sides of the Armenian SSR-Azerbaijani boundary.
In Armenian debate, the word “corridor” is sometimes incorrectly read as implying extraterritoriality or a special regime weakening Armenian state control, even though in international usage it can also refer more narrowly to a right of transit without sovereign transfer.
Armenia’s preference for “Syunik road” and similar wording reflects this concern. The TRIPP branding eludes the issue by defining the route as a managed infrastructure package without explicit geographical reference, explicitly encompassing rail and road links alongside energy and fiber-optic lines.
Public reporting has converged on a basic throughput estimate: The planned route is commonly described as having an initial annual freight capacity of about 15 million metric tons. Cost figures are reported in components rather than as a single corridorwide total.
On the western rail approach in Turkey, the 224-kilometer Kars–Dilucu line has been listed in Turkey’s investment program at an estimated $3.4 billion, with $2.7 billion expected from external credit. Ankara later announced a 2.4 billion euro ($2.8 billion) external financing package.
On the Armenian side, earlier official estimates for restoring the Yeraskh–Julfa–Ordubad–Meghri–Horadiz railway have been reported at about $1.2 billion, including about $200 million for the 43-kilometer segment through Meghri. According to another report, Washington has separately earmarked $145 million for rail rehabilitation.
A functioning trans-Armenian connector would generate transit fees, expand forwarding and warehousing services, and reduce time and uncertainty costs for shippers by tightening schedules across the South Caucasus segment.
It would also strengthen the commercial case for routing additional Middle Corridor volume through the region as capacity expands elsewhere. Only Iran and some voices in Russia, however, frame the route primarily as a vehicle for geopolitical rivalry rather than a broadly usable commercial link.
Iranian resistance
Iran’s opposition is sharpened by the fact that Azerbaijan has relied since the 1990s on the so-called Aras route, running through Iranian territory along Armenia’s border, to maintain links with Nakhchivan. Tehran and Baku agreed to expand it into a higher-capacity road and rail package, but implementation has been slow.
In 2025 construction of the Aghband–Kalaleh bridge over the Araz River was underway, along with related border and customs infrastructure. Road expansion from the crossing toward Julfa on the Iranian side, including tunnels and additional bridges, still requires significant work.
In mid-October last year, Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh said she did not foresee the expanded route opening before the end of 2027. Tehran nevertheless insists it remains an indispensable transit path while opposing any Syunik arrangement involving a US role.
In practice, TRIPP would divert transit fees and dilute Iran’s position in regional connectivity and energy-routing competition, benefiting both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Iran’s preference for routing regional transit through its own territory collides with the broader interest in giving the Syunik link a long-term operating and investment framework that concentrates implementation and operational responsibility, thus increasing reliability and lowering commercial uncertainty.
Turkey, which borders Nakhchivan directly, views the prospective arrangement as a strategic gain because any workable connector strengthens Turkey’s role as the western gateway for additional east–west trade and associated services, complementing Ankara’s own rail buildout toward the frontier.
European officials have framed the Middle Corridor as a strategic alternative to the Northern route through Russia and have encouraged investment in transport, digital, and energy connectivity along it. Funding, however, has lagged that rhetoric. A joint EU Commission-EBRD study estimated roughly 18.5 billion euros would be required to upgrade Central Asia’s corridor system to higher-performance standards.
At a January 2024 investors forum in Brussels, the European Commission presented a 10 billion euro “commitment” as a blend of ongoing and planned investments rather than new funding dedicated to a single corridor buildout.
The EU presented the figure as available or raisable across a portfolio of projects, not as a single check written for one corridor. By late 2025, reporting on implementation in Kazakhstan pointed to a narrower set of signed financings, including about $800 million in ERBD loans and a 200 million euro European Investment Bank loan to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan.
Russia has signaled adaptation rather than outright obstruction. After the August 2025 US-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan agreement, Moscow welcomed the deal while warning that foreign (read: American) involvement should not create new divisions.
This stance allows it to continue to seek a presence in the process. Yerevan, however, has signaled a fallback: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Armenia could withdraw the relevant rail sections from the Russian concession and finance restoration from the state budget if the Russian side cannot deliver within a reasonable timeframe.
South Caucasus targets its peace dividend
Despite external branding and third-party positioning, the decisive regional actor remains Azerbaijan, which can convert east–west transit across the South Caucasus from episodic movement into routine practice. A durable Armenia–Azerbaijan settlement would recast Armenia from a blocked frontier into a functioning transit state, governed by predictable rules and reduced incentives for either side to treat transport as a bargaining chip.
If the settlement holds and TRIPP becomes predictable transit, the South Caucasus would emerge not only as a bridge to Turkey and Europe but as a routing choice shaping Eurasian trade and data connectivity over the next decade.
Rail expansion in Central Asia — including Kazakhstan’s Wabtec locomotive program — points toward a Middle Corridor competing on reliability and capacity. Parallel investments in data centers, supercomputing and fiber-optic links suggest a westbound digital layer equally dependent on stable western onward connections.
TRIPP could thus reduce uncertainties on the western approach without routing all traffic through Iran or Russia. Azerbaijan’s role is operational and central, having already taken steps to enable routine access to Turkey while keeping Caspian-facing integration aligned with Kazakhstan’s scaling plans.
Armenia’s gains are equally practical: Improved investment conditions would allow it to monetize its geography while reinforcing sovereignty. Over time, the combined effect supports a Eurasian connectivity pattern less dependent on any single axis and more shaped by performance and durable political cooperation.
Robert M Cutler is director and senior research fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada, and senior fellow in geoeconomics and strategic negotiations at Strategy International. He was previously for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.