The question of European strategic autonomy has become fashionable again in Brussels and various European capitals.
Between Donald Trump’s return to the White House, ongoing concerns about American commitment to NATO and the grinding war in Ukraine, European leaders are once again discovering that depending on Washington for their security might have its drawbacks.
We’ve heard this song before. After the Suez Crisis, after the Iraq War, after Trump’s first term—each time, European leaders proclaim their determination to chart an independent course. And each time, reality intrudes.
The fundamental problem is straightforward: Europe lacks the political will, economic capacity, and strategic coherence to act as a unified geopolitical force.
The European Union remains a collection of nation-states with diverging threat perceptions, competing economic interests, and fundamentally different views about how to engage with the rest of the world.
Consider the structural obstacles. Germany’s export-dependent economy has made it reluctant to antagonize China or Russia—at least until circumstances forced its hand. France envisions itself as a global power with interests in Africa and the Indo-Pacific.
Poland and the Baltic states view Russian containment as the singular priority. Southern European states focus on migration and Mediterranean stability. These aren’t minor differences to be papered over with Brussels communiqués.
Then there’s the defense spending question. For decades, European NATO members have free-ridden on American security guarantees, allowing them to build generous welfare states while letting their militaries atrophy.
The idea that they’ll suddenly reverse course and develop the kind of military-industrial capacity required for true strategic independence is fanciful. We’re talking about decades of investment, political capital and economic restructuring.
The Ukraine war has revealed both the possibilities and the limits of European action. Yes, Europeans have provided substantial support to Kyiv.
But the fundamental reality remains: without American intelligence, logistics and the implicit nuclear umbrella, Europe’s ability to shape outcomes remains constrained. And as the war drags on, we’re already seeing European unity begin to fray.
This doesn’t mean Europe is irrelevant or that the transatlantic relationship is obsolete. It means we should be realistic about what European strategic autonomy actually means in practice.
Europe can—and should—take greater responsibility for its neighborhood, develop more robust defense capabilities, and reduce its dependencies on both Washington and Beijing.
But the notion of Europe as an independent pole in a multipolar world, capable of projecting power globally and defending itself without American involvement, remains largely aspirational.
The real question isn’t whether Europe can achieve full strategic independence—it can’t, at least not in any foreseeable timeframe.
The question is whether Europeans can develop enough capacity to be more credible partners and less vulnerable clients. That’s a more modest goal, but also a more achievable one.
For Washington, the policy implications are clear: pushing Europe toward greater self-reliance makes sense, but expecting miracles doesn’t.
American interests are still served by a stable, prosperous Europe, even if that Europe remains dependent on American power for ultimate security guarantees.
Managing that relationship realistically—without either paternalistic overreach or irresponsible abandonment—requires acknowledging what Europe can and cannot do.
The alternative is a cycle of American recrimination and European resentment, with neither side willing to acknowledge the fundamental asymmetries that define the transatlantic relationship. That serves no one’s interests.
This article was originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.