China is described as seeking to project global leadership and to fill a leadership vacuum left by the US under Donald Trump. This view, however, originates largely from Western sources.
Chinese official discourse has remained markedly cautious on global leadership. Rather than embracing the concept directly, Beijing has tended to approach it obliquely, signaling a strategic calculation about the costs, risks and responsibilities that leadership entails.
In international politics, global leadership is not merely about power or status. It is a relational process, resting on an exchange in which leaders must offer material incentives, sustained commitments or compelling visions in return for recognition and consent from followers. Leadership, in this sense, is never cost-free.
For a rising China, leadership thus becomes a dilemma. China’s growing power brings demands for greater influence in regional and global affairs, but also exposes Beijing to mounting economic burdens and strategic risks.
These include responsibilities for public goods provision and maintenance and the danger of being pulled further into hegemonic rivalry with the US, deepening tensions with Western coalitions.
This caution was articulated explicitly in 2017. At a time when Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the idea of a “community of shared future for mankind” were gaining momentum, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed that China had no intention of leading or replacing anyone, and that Beijing remained clear-headed in the face of calls for it to play a leadership role.
Later that year, when asked whether China was ready to take on global leadership amid the Trump administration’s America First and increasingly isolationist approach, Wang rejected the notion of dividing countries into leaders and followers, arguing that China would take on international responsibilities commensurate with its national capabilities.
When leadership language appears in Chinese discourse, it is typically directed toward collective institutions rather than individual states. For example, China has emphasized the leadership role of the G20 and APEC, both of which it participates in international economic cooperation.
This suggests that Beijing articulates leadership primarily as an institutional and collective function, rather than a form of unilateral state authority. That said, in recent years, there has been a subtle shift in how China talks about leadership.
Beijing still favors de-hierarchized language, such as “guiding” (引领), “contributing” (贡献), or “play an important role” (发挥重要作用), but it has increasingly been willing to speak of “leadership” where the political costs are manageable.
For example, in December 2025, Wang Yi remarked in a keynote speech that China’s international influence, its capacity to lead new endeavors and its moral appeal have significantly enhanced.
China’s turn toward leadership narratives is not accidental. Trump’s frequent withdrawal from international organizations, conventions and treaties, and the controversy it have generated within Western countries, have opened a window of opportunity for Beijing to advance leadership with greater confidence.
At the same time, this shift aligns with China’s broader diplomatic strategy, particularly its ambition to represent the Global South and to strengthen ties among emerging economies, such as BRICS+.
Notably, China has also sought to redefine global leadership. A recent official report argued that the concept remains unclear and is frequently conflated with great-power dominance and hegemony.
It proposed an alternative understanding of global leadership as a collective process: one in which states, international organizations, regional institutions and non-state actors work together on an equal footing, through consultation and cooperation, to address transnational challenges and reform the international order.
By reframing leadership as diffuse and process-oriented, Beijing seeks to reduce pressure to match US-style leadership commitments while preserving room to expand its influence.
Overall, China is seeking to move beyond a geopolitical narrative centered on leadership competition, and to soften the dilemma such expectations create. Whether this narrative gains broader acceptance, and how it intersects with unpredictable US leadership under Trump, will shape the future dynamics of great-power relations.
Songruowen Ma is a DPhil student at the University of Oxford
These transitions take time to develop. Historical momentum has already turned against the outgoing empire. You cannot win against entropy.
China should sit back and just eat popcorn and continue to do great things, watch the MAGAtards and their Orange Swindler in Chief throw toys across the room and destroy the very system that made them wealthy in the first place. The ones handing the platter to China are the desperate Neocon imbeciles. Chump is a problem that will solve itself in the end.
Americans feel their system is broken. That is what matters. It is vital for Americans to feel the burden of empire as a liability to their living standards so they understand empire is absolutely INCOMPATIBLE with healthy “democracy”. These lessons need to be learnt by Americans.
Vietnam persisted with Social ism after the Vietnam war. Afghanistan rejected “dumbocracy”. Russia’s integration with Europe led to nowhere. Israel’s genocide is making more enemies than friends. The CIA’s attempt in 1989 in Tiananmen to replicate a USSR style end, failed. These are monumental rejections of America’s broken system, which is not fit for export.
The imperial Western imbeciles will continue to vandalize our globe. The key is for everyone else to band together and cooperate and set up alternative systems. They “pretend to be your ally” while you “pretend to invest in their economy”.