Dated November 2025 and released publicly in early December, the US National Security Strategy links overseas trade and investment – but overlooks Central Asia as a target region for critical minerals. This oversight merits reconsideration in the NSS’s next iteration, given the region’s known natural resource base, openness to foreign investment, proficiency in mining operations, low processing costs and manageable geopolitical risks.
As governments and businesses review supply-chain resilience for critical minerals, vanadium – not one of the 17 rare-earth metals – has increasingly become a strategically relevant rather than optional or cyclical commodity. It is widely used in high-strength steel, grid-scale energy storage functions such as redox flow batteries and infrastructure with defense and industrial applications.
A recent letter from the US Congress highlights a critical shortfall of vanadium in the United States: with 14,000 metric tons consumed in 2024, only 3,800 tons were produced domestically. Imports, mainly from Brazil and South Africa, are at risk due to shifting market conditions, meaning the US needs a more structured and focused industrial-like approach to counter unnecessary import dependencies and geopolitical stresses.
US supply is secured solely through imports and recycling, given that the mining of vanadium-bearing mineral precursors is minimal to non-existent in the United States. With mining dominated by China and Russia, and with South African production in decline, today’s need to secure primary materials and supply chains means the US must invest overseas until domestic mining is viable. What is needed is vertical integration from mine to the final products – vanadium pentoxide (V205), vanadium trioxide (V2O3), and vanadium sulfate (VOSO₄ / V₂(SO₄)₃) for batteries.
In an October Development Finance Corporation media release, CEO Ben Black said, “Securing critical minerals is a paramount matter of US strategic interest and economic prosperity.” That’s clearly beyond dispute.
Central Asia and vanadium
Central Asia as a region fits within the United States’ broader geostrategic goals and geographic diversification plans aimed at building solid asset-based partnerships that go beyond raw material extraction and precarious trading arrangements. Last November’s gathering of five presidents of Central Asian countries at the White House finally placed the region firmly on the global map.
US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur has also been clear: “Under President Trump’s and Secretary Rubio’s leadership, we’re elevating the C5+1 partnership as a priority — a strategic priority and an economic priority.” Here, among critical minerals, vanadium surely emerges as a priority commodity, given the near absence of US domestic mining.
Kazakhstan leads Central Asia in vanadium mining and production, hosting the region’s most productive deposits. Established operations, strong infrastructure, cost advantages, supportive laws, tax incentives and a free foreign-exchange regime make the country highly attractive to investors. Kazakhstan has three vanadium assets: Balasausqandiq in advanced production and Lisakovsk and Kurumsak in exploration. Those are attractive targets for miners or funds with long horizons and low-cost capital.
Kyrgyzstan has scattered, under-explored vanadium deposits, including in the Jetim Mountain Range. Uzbekistan is expanding exploration, but the value is yet to be proven. Tajikistan reported new vanadium occurrences in 2024, with the results still unclear. Turkmenistan and Mongolia, meanwhile, have limited, early-stage vanadium indications.
Kazakhstan
With decades of operations by major mining companies such as Chevron-ExxonMobil, Glencore and Eurasian Resources Group, Kazakhstan has an established record of foreign investment. One notable company operating in Kazakhstan for over two decades is British Ferro-Alloy Resources Limited (FAR), which is listed on the London and Astana exchanges. It controls the exploration and development rights to the Balasausqandiq vanadium deposit, which is in production and, according to the company, ready for scale-up.
Under Kazakhstan’s reserve estimation system, the most recent mineral resource estimate at Balasausqandiq is 32.9 million tons at a mean grade of 0.62% vanadium pentoxide (“V2O5“) – consistent with the global average for vanadium deposits.
But, according to FAR CEO Nick Bridgen, “What makes Balasausqandiq specially interesting is that it is different from most other deposits in not being vanadiferous titano-magnetite, which requires roasting,” he told The Times of Central Asia. “Ours is a shale deposit amenable to whole-ore acid leaching – far cheaper – so our costs are the lowest of all current and planned deposits in the world. When yet-to-be confirmed deposits are explored, minimum estimated reserves alone exceed 70 million tons over open terrain with a 20-year life.”
Bridgen affirmed that “Kazakhstan offers a supportive and stable operating environment – I should know, having operated for over 20 years in-country. The Balasausqandiq project is valued at a US$748m NPV with a 22% IRR, based on conservative assumptions, leading to our recent equity raise. In fact, on December 5, FAR issued ordinary shares, raising gross proceeds of £1,549,886 for further operations.”
Bridgen dismissed transport concerns, stating vanadium export is feasible via proven overland routes, similar to Kazakhstan’s uranium and base metal exports.
The strategic long game
Reliable access to critical resources enhances US economic competitiveness and national security. It enables geopolitical influence while mitigating supply disruptions and price volatility. By acquiring a stake in foreign assets, US companies gain a strategic advantage, enhance global economic influence, strengthen ties with partners, check China’s influence in the region and generate profits that contribute to US domestic economic growth.
Solid deals offer a strategic path to unlock economic synergies, advance friend-shoring, engage Congress and align with President Trump’s Critical Minerals Executive Order 14272 (April 2025).
If dependency on foreign sourced critical minerals truly constitutes a “national security emergency” requiring “all hands on deck,” as Secretary Bessent recently argued, then it’s further good news that, on December 23, President Trump held calls with the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, spotlighting critical minerals, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026.
In light of all this, can anyone still question whether the region matters to Washington?
Javier M Piedra is a financial consultant with over 40 years of work experience in private and public sectors, international development, finance, marketing and advisory across multiple disciplines (corporate and retail banking, SMEs, hedge fund management, credit reporting, restructuring and sovereign and corporate risk management). He is former acting Assistant Administrator for Asia at USAID in President Trump’s first administration.
This article was first published by the Times of Central Asia. It is republished with permission.
And this author doesn’t know his geopolitics and geography.
Should be more worried about whether Chump will deport him. Maybe this article is a way of communicating to ICE, I’m still useful.