The Maduro regime was always likely to end abruptly. Reports that US forces encountered little resistance—and that Venezuela’s president had come to rely on Cuban security rather than his own military—say less about American might than about how completely Nicolas Maduro had lost confidence in his own state. Dictators often fall quickly once loyalty evaporates.
What matters now is not how easily Maduro was removed, but what his capture reveals about how the United States intends to wield power going forward. President Donald Trump’s decision to act decisively in Venezuela signals the consolidation of a foreign-policy doctrine that is blunt, transactional and unapologetic about the use of force.
Five hard truths stand out.
1. American foreign policy has become binary
The Venezuela operation reflects a worldview that divides countries into two categories: those aligned with US interests and those treated as adversaries. Diplomacy is conditional. Force is credible. Iran is warned. Venezuela is acted upon.
This clarity has advantages. It deters regimes that once relied on ambiguity. But it also exposes the doctrine’s limits. Most countries do not fit neatly into “friend” or “foe.”
India buys Russian oil yet courts American capital. Taiwan is a strategic partner—but how far is Washington prepared to go when that partnership is tested militarily?
Binary strategies work best against isolated regimes with few defenders. Applied broadly, they risk alienating partners and forcing premature confrontations.
Power works best when it distinguishes among adversaries, competitors, and allies. Collapsing those distinctions may feel decisive, but it is rarely sustainable.
2. Two narratives—and a hemispheric signal
Domestically, the case against Maduro has been framed around drug trafficking and criminality: a narco-state poisoning American communities. It is a politically potent narrative.
Internationally, the message is strategic. Venezuela was the last openly defiant regime in a region Washington still views as its sphere of influence.
While other Latin American countries have shifted through elections—including recent right-leaning victories in Chile and Honduras—Maduro’s rule endured through repression and fraud. His removal sends a signal not only to Caracas, but to Havana and beyond.
Brazil now looms large. With presidential elections approaching, questions will circulate about whether Washington will remain formally neutral or quietly favor a political direction more aligned with its interests.
Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, the 44-year-old son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, has cultivated connections in Washington as President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, now 80, faces mounting political and economic strain. In a region long shaped by US preferences, perception alone can matter.
The distinguishing feature of this moment is the lack of restraint. The United States is no longer disguising hemispheric dominance behind multilateral language. It is asserting it openly.
3. Regime change politics, globalized
The Venezuela operation raises an uncomfortable question: Is the United States back in the business of deciding which governments should stand?
The implications extend beyond Latin America. In the Middle East, the question is whether Washington would support—or tolerate—efforts to topple Iran’s regime. The history of 1979 urges caution, even as Israel’s campaign against Iranian proxies suggests a growing willingness to test old assumptions.
In Europe, the signals are subtler but consequential. Washington’s rhetoric toward the European Union has grown more combative, and its comfort engaging nationalist leaders more apparent. The United States has been receptive to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni.
The harder questions lie elsewhere: whether Washington continues flirting with Germany’s AfD, or how it would respond to a French election elevating Jordan Bardella. This is where American influence becomes most dangerous. Signaling toward nationalist movements can quickly turn America from partner to provocateur.
4. Power is applied where resistance is weakest
Critics will point to the contrast between swift action in Venezuela and caution toward Russia. The disparity underscores a truth often left unstated: American power is exercised most decisively where escalation risks are limited.
Venezuela, hollowed out by economic collapse and isolation, presented a manageable target. Russia, armed with nuclear weapons and a willingness to escalate, does not. This selectivity does not negate opposition to authoritarianism—but it reveals the doctrine’s hierarchy: feasibility before principle.
The result is a foreign policy that looks less moral than transactional, and one that invites skepticism rather than trust.
5. When foreign policy becomes domestic politics
The political effects of Maduro’s fall will be felt not only in Caracas, but also in American electoral politics—particularly in Florida, where Cuban- and Venezuelan-American communities have long shaped Republican fortunes. For many, Maduro’s removal represents long-awaited vindication.
Some Republicans are clearly attentive to that reaction. Within Trump’s political orbit, Venezuela is increasingly viewed not just as a foreign-policy challenge, but as a domestic political asset—evidence of toughness against left-wing authoritarianism that resonates with voters who have lived under it.
But this blending of foreign policy and electoral strategy carries risks. Support among Venezuelan- and Cuban-Americans is not unconditional. Many of the same voters who welcome action against Caracas have also been affected by hardline immigration policies. What appears politically advantageous in Washington can feel more conflicted on the ground.
More importantly, pursuing regime change with one eye on electoral dividends raises the cost of failure. If Maduro’s removal is meant to deliver votes as well as victory, what follows must be demonstrably better. Leadership change alone will not suffice. Institutions must function. The economy must stabilize. Daily life must improve.
America’s record here is uneven. Removing governments is often easier than helping societies rebuild. If the post-Maduro transition falls to Secretary of State Marco Rubio under Trump’s oversight, success will depend less on force than on restraint—on allowing Venezuelan civil society the space to rebuild itself.
The ease with which Maduro fell should not obscure the difficulty of what comes next. Military operations end quickly. Nation-building does not.
Whether Maduro’s capture is remembered as realism or recklessness will depend not on the speed of his removal, but on whether Venezuela emerges more legitimate, more stable, and more free than it was before.
Kurt Davis Jr is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is also an advisor to private, public and state-owned companies and their boards as well as creditors across the globe on a range of transactions.
I am old enough to remember 911 and Iraq war.
I read all of these things 24 years ago.
This is joke.