China’s new nuke posture puts US on notice and world on the brink

China’s rapid silo buildup, early-warning push and flirtation with launch-on-warning (LOW) mark a decisive shift from a minimalist deterrent to a hair-trigger nuclear posture that could redefine crisis stability from Taiwan to the continental US.

This month, the US Department of Defense released its annual China Military Power Report (CMPR), which states that China has likely loaded more than 100 solid-propellant DF-31-class intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at three silo fields, most likely across three newly built silo fields close to its border with Mongolia.

The move marks a decisive shift in the scale, readiness and operational logic of its nuclear deterrent. The configuration is closely tied to China’s pursuit of an early-warning counterstrike (EWCS) posture—a concept equivalent to LOW.

In December 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) conducted rapid, successive ICBM launches from a training center, an activity consistent with rehearsing the procedures required to fire multiple silo-based missiles under time pressure, according to the report.

This silo loading effort is reinforced by parallel investments in space-based infrared early-warning satellites and large phased-array radars, which together could allow Chinese command authorities to detect an incoming strike and authorize a retaliatory launch before warheads detonate.

While China’s total nuclear warhead stockpile was reportedly in the low 600s through 2024, the report emphasizes that this silo expansion signals a qualitative transformation rather than simple numerical growth, enabling faster reaction times, higher survivability and a more credible second-strike capability.

Taken together, these developments suggest China is moving away from a small, recessed deterrent toward a posture designed to operate under high-tempo nuclear crisis conditions, fundamentally altering strategic stability dynamics.

According to a March 2025 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists report, China’s DF-31 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile ICBM that provides a survivable nuclear second-strike capability. The report notes that the ICBM, first deployed in the mid-2000s, has an estimated range of about 7,200 kilometers and is believed to carry a single nuclear warhead with a yield in the hundreds of kilotons.

While the report says that the original DF-31 is no longer prominently listed in recent US assessments and is thought to be gradually retired or replaced by improved variants such as the DF-31A and DF-31AG, which offer a more extended range and greater operational flexibility.

However, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) notes that road-mobile DF-31 variants have a circular error probable (CEP) of 300 meters, compared to silo-based variants that have a 150-meter CEP, with the latter enabling more precise strikes.

In line with that, the US Army’s ODIN database notes that the DF-31 variant mentioned by the 2025 CMPR report might be the DF-31BJ, a design optimized for loading into underground silos, in contrast to its road-mobile counterparts.

The DF-31BJ may have multiple independently targetable vehicles (MIRV) capability and a range of 11,200-13,000 kilometers, enabling it to hit most of the continental US, according to the ODIN database.

David Logan and Philip Saunders mention in a July 2025 US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) report that the missile variant would allow China to launch nuclear attacks after detecting an incoming strike but before impact.

Logan and Saunders argue that LOW does not formally abandon China’s no-first-use (NFU) policy, since retaliation still follows detection of an attack. However, they point out that it stretches NFU in practice by compressing decision time, increasing risks of misinterpretation or false alarms and potentially requiring pre-delegation of launch authority—undermining the traditional political restraint associated with NFU.

Parallel with those developments, China is also developing its missile defense capabilities. Alex Richter mentions in an article this month for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that China’s development of LOW capability is closely tied to enabling strategic missile defense rather than solely facilitating faster nuclear retaliation.

Richter notes that effective midcourse interception against long-range ballistic missiles requires the same sophisticated early-warning architecture—infrared satellites and long-range radars—needed for LOW postures. He says that by building this architecture, China is laying the groundwork for a comprehensive, multi-layered missile defense system.

However, he points out that China’s credible missile defense could weaken mutual vulnerability, encourage worst-case planning by adversaries and intensify arms-race dynamics as the US seeks ways to penetrate a future Chinese missile shield.

These developments would have profound implications in a Taiwan Strait crisis. China’s expanding ICBM force strengthens its confidence in a survivable second strike, enabling greater nuclear risk-taking in a Taiwan conflict to deter US intervention and manage intra-war escalation, according to a November 2023 Atlantic Council report.

The report argues that China may increase nuclear readiness, issue veiled nuclear threats or signal stress on its NFU posture under crisis pressure to reinforce deterrence, even if doing so introduces escalation risks.

At the same time, China’s nuclear modernization faces significant challenges. China’s small reserve of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) ~14 tons in May 2025, as per the International Panel on Fissile Materials, pales in comparison with the US’s estimated 481 tons in 2024 and Russia’s 680 tons of unirradiated HEU in 2024.

That relatively small reserve could limit the number of China’s nuclear warheads – a limitation China may seek to offset by improving accuracy or experimenting with alternative delivery concepts, including fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).

China is also grappling with military corruption that could be undermining its nuclear modernization. The US DoD’s 2025 CMPR notes that ongoing corruption allegations since 2022 have affected senior PLA leadership, particularly in areas tied to weapons procurement and equipment development.

The report highlights the removal of former defense minister Li Shangfu over corruption linked to his tenure overseeing the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Equipment Development Department, warning that such disruptions could have short-term effects on readiness and modernization, including strategic deterrence and nuclear-related procurement, even as the PLA presses toward its 2027 goals.

Taken together, China’s silo surge, early-warning push and creeping LOW logic signal not just a bigger arsenal, but a far riskier nuclear posture—one that sharpens deterrence while quietly eroding the guardrails that once kept a great-power crisis from racing toward catastrophe.