Fujian carrier a flashy flex but not a game-changer

China’s new Fujian aircraft carrier has sailed into service, vaulting its blue-water ambitions toward the Second Island Chain and testing US naval primacy from Taiwan to the South China Sea.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China’s Fujian aircraft carrier has entered service at Hainan’s Sanya naval base, underscoring Chinese President Xi Jinping’s drive to build a blue water navy.

The 80,000-ton Fujian, China’s first fully indigenous carrier and third overall, features electromagnetic catapults that can launch J-35 stealth fighters, J-15T strike aircraft and KJ-600 early-warning planes with heavier loads and at longer ranges, narrowing the qualitative gap with the US’s nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Commissioning Fujian strengthens China’s ability to project air and sea power, extend surveillance and pressure Taiwan and rival claimants in regional maritime disputes, while supporting operations and logistics sites farther afield.

China’s carrier force still lags the US in numbers, having only three carriers versus America’s 11 nuclear-powered ships. And it will likely take years for China to master carrier-based vertical launches, basing, sophisticated systems and combat operations.

At the same time, satellite imagery and official statements suggest work is advancing on a larger, likely nuclear-powered, Type 004 carrier, highlighting a sustained buildup that alarms Japan and other US allies and reinforces US Department of Defense (DoD) assessments that China is rapidly improving capabilities to contest the regional and, eventually, global order.

China’s Fujian may be viewed as a continuing evolution of its carrier program, which started with refurbishing the former Soviet Varyag into the Liaoning, building an improved version with the Shandong and then innovating by building a substantially more capable design – starting with conventional power, then moving on to nuclear power.

It is unlikely that China will stop at four carriers, as a three-carrier force could be considered the minimum for sustained carrier operations – one carrier at sea, one undergoing training, and one in refit and maintenance. A six-carrier navy would allow China to keep two carriers at sea, have two carriers undergoing training, and two under refit and maintenance.

At a minimum, two carriers would also be needed to flank Taiwan from the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel – completing a possible blockade of the self-governing island. Two carriers at sea could provide China with an immediate replacement should it lose one in combat. It would also allow for simultaneous power projection in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Still, despite China’s impressive developments in its carrier program, it needs the manpower to operate those ships. In response to a perceived shortage of carrier-qualified pilots, China has trimmed one year off its pilot training program, while lowering vision standards to accept those who have undergone LASIK surgery and refocusing recruitment to include bachelor’s and master’s degree holders.

However, China’s military still has to compete with civilian employers in terms of career growth and salaries, with the hardships of military life being a strong disincentive. But even with those possible personnel recruitment problems, Fujian represents a significant capability upgrade for China in a Taiwan Strait and South China Sea contingency.

In the Taiwan Strait, Fujian can contribute to localized air superiority over Taiwan while operating as the center of a carrier battlegroup or provide fleet air defense to China’s surface action groups, with the latter formation conducting missile and drone strikes as part of a possible leadership decapitation operation.

Both modes of employment could be conducted under an umbrella of long-range missiles, such as the DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, to deter US and allied intervention.

In the South China Sea, the Fujian and its successors, along with China’s older carriers, represent an overmatch for rival claimant states. Regional navies such as those of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are small, underfunded and weak relative to China’s, with the Fujian further cementing its already substantial lead.

China could employ the Fujian in gunboat diplomacy to intimidate and pressure rival claimant states to stand down in asserting their claims in the disputed waters.

However, Fujian’s introduction is likely to elicit asymmetric responses from Taiwan and rival claimant states in the South China Sea. Such responses may include Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program, which may have drawn inspiration from a 2005 US naval exercise showing that conventional submarines can threaten carriers.

Apart from that, the Philippines has been expanding its network of defense partners beyond the US, signing Visiting Forces Agreements (VFAs) with Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with the possible goal of maintaining a high tempo of international naval exercises in waters disputed with China to keep it at bay.

Beyond the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, Fujian and its successors may have an impact on the Second Island Chain spanning the Bonin Islands, Guam and Papua New Guinea and into the Indian Ocean. Fujian’s larger size may equate to significantly more endurance – crucial for power projection into those far-flung regions.

However, geography may not be on China’s side when it comes to force projection. To get to the open waters of the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean, China has to traverse several maritime chokepoints, including the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel in the First Island Chain, and the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits leading into the Indian Ocean.

Fujian’s passage through those chokepoints will depend on how China addresses the challenge that the US and its allies, along with India, pose. While the US has been fortifying the First Island Chain by stationing strategic bombers and long-range missiles to prevent China from breaking out into the open Pacific, India has a homefield advantage in the Indian Ocean in terms of numerical superiority, ready access to basing and shorter logistics lines.

Furthermore, Fujian’s conventional power, combined with China’s lack of overseas bases for resupply aside from a small, isolated facility in Djibouti, implies that it would need a substantial chain of tankers and logistics ships – a potential critical vulnerability in a conflict scenario.

Fujian’s debut marks both a milestone and a mirror—revealing how far China’s navy has come and how far it still must go to rival US naval power.

In sum, the Fujian signals a step-change in China’s capacity for force projection. Yet, its impact will hinge on crew proficiency, logistics and how China addresses the problem of geography.

In the near term, Fujian’s value is coercive—thickening air cover for blockade or “presence” operations from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea—while inviting asymmetric counters from Taiwan, the Philippines and other US allies.

Over time, a larger, possibly nuclear-powered follow-on and more robust replenishment and foreign basing could widen China’s options. Until then, the carrier tilts perceptions more than potential war outcomes, sharpening a regional arms-race dynamic without settling it.