China’s nuclear restraint rhetoric belied by rapidfire buildup

China’s new arms-control white paper offers a revealing snapshot of how Beijing pairs declaratory restraint with a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal to shape its strategic narrative with the US.

The document, published this month reaffirms China’s “no-first-use” (NFU) pledge and its refusal to deploy nuclear weapons abroad or threaten non-nuclear states, portraying itself as a responsible nuclear power.

It highlights China’s support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also calls for progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty while stressing transparency measures such as missile launch notifications and participation in P5 nuclear dialogues.

At the same time, the paper implicitly criticizes the US, warning that US-led missile defense systems, nuclear-sharing arrangements with allies and expanded deployments erode strategic stability and fuel arms races.

In the paper, China frames its modernization of nuclear forces as defensive and necessary for maintaining deterrence, contrasting this with what it portrays as destabilizing US actions.

By coupling commitments to restraint with pointed criticism of US initiatives, China seeks to position itself as a stabilizing actor in global nuclear governance while casting doubt on US credibility in arms control. The paper reflects China’s broader effort to balance national security imperatives with international obligations, while challenging what it calls Cold War mentalities and double standards.

Against this backdrop, the broader debate over China’s NFU policy—and how it fits within its rapidly expanding nuclear posture—becomes increasingly central to understanding the implications of the 2025 white paper.

NFU now carries greater strategic weight because China’s expanding arsenal and improving missile defenses could give it new leverage, even without abandoning the pledge outright.

NFU has been a longstanding feature of China’s nuclear policy whose value has been debated time and again. Benjamin Hautecouverture mentions in an April 2025 article for the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) that China’s NFU policy serves as a multifaceted strategic instrument, fulfilling signaling, diplomatic and dogmatic purposes.

As a signaling device, Hautecouverture notes that it projects restraint and stability, reassuring adversaries while being at odds with the rapid expansion of its arsenal.

As Hans Kristensen and other writers note in a March 2025 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, China now has 600 nuclear warheads – with that number expected to grow to 1,000 in 2030 according to the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report.

Kristensen and others note China’s diversifying nuclear arsenal – with new silo fields, mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that could reach the US mainland from South China Sea bastions, and a revived strategic bomber capabilities centered on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and aerial refueling capability.

They note that increased warhead production, improved early warning, and preparations for a launch-on-warning posture indicate the fastest nuclear buildup among major powers.

For comparison, Kristensen and others say in a separate report that the US is modernizing its nuclear triad while sustaining a large arsenal of about 5,177 warheads, including 3,700 in the stockpile and 1,770 deployed.

They note that while US warhead numbers have remained relatively constant, new delivery systems such as the Sentinel ICBM, B-21 Raider stealth bomber, and Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) underpin its extensive modernization effort.

In describing China’s NFU as a diplomatic tool, Hautecouverture says it bolsters China’s image in global forums, appealing to non-aligned states by advocating mutual NFU commitments and disarmament credibility.

Hautecouverture points out that, as a dogmatic reality, NFU remains deeply rooted in Mao-era strategic culture, upheld as doctrine despite evolving threats and capabilities. He adds that while this blend of declaratory restraint, diplomatic leverage and cultural entrenchment sustains NFU’s role in China’s nuclear posture, tensions with modernization persist.

Taking a deeper look at China’s 2025 white paper, it defines the parameters of its NFU policy, wherein it “undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones” – effectively excluding the US from its NFU policy.

That phrasing may indicate that China has taken a page from the Russia-Ukraine War, wherein Russia’s constant nuclear threats to the US and Europe may have forced the latter two to limit their security guarantees and assistance to Ukraine.

Russia’s nuclear threats may have been a key factor for the US Trump Administration to declare Ukrainian NATO membership out of the question, induce Ukraine’s European allies to hesitate in stationing troops on its territory, and limit long-range strike capabilities supplied to Ukraine for fear of nuclear retaliation.

Likewise, possible Chinese nuclear threats may at the very least delay, or at most dissuade, US and allied intervention. These threats can span diplomatic actions such as threatening to drop its NFU policy, testing nuclear delivery systems, using dual-capable missiles such as the DF-27 in combat during a Taiwan contingency, or testing a nuclear warhead – all options short of using nuclear weapons against Taiwan, the US, and their allies. 

As for China’s criticism of US missile defense systems, Raymond Wang and Lachlan MacKenzie mention in a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article this month that China views the Golden Dome as a result of the US’s pursuit of “absolute security” – pursuing its interests without considering those of others and undermining strategic stability and second-strike survivability.

Wang and MacKenzie note that China is expected to intensify nuclear modernization, invest in hypersonics and systems like the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) to defeat US missile defenses, and delegitimize Golden Dome diplomatically while reinforcing its deterrent posture.

Despite criticizing the US Golden Dome, China may be building its version of the controversial system, on top of having ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems such as the DN-3 interceptor, akin to the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), which is the only missile system defending the US homeland from ballistic missile threats. These efforts may be founded on the belief that such a system is necessary to counteract US ambitions and forestall political or military coercion.

A larger, more diverse, and resilient Chinese nuclear arsenal, backstopped by BMD for homeland defense, could provide China with greater freedom of action in potential conflict spots such as the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, challenging the US’s ability to escalate when needed. That combination would threaten the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and extended deterrence.

China’s evolving nuclear posture reveals a widening gap between its declaratory commitment to restraint and the capabilities that increasingly enable coercive leverage in great-power competition. As its arsenal grows more diverse, resilient and integrated with emerging missile defenses, the strategic balance with the US will hinge less on stated doctrine and more on the practical effects of its expanding deterrent.