From pariah to partner: Trump’s puzzling Pakistan pivot

The scene in the Oval Office on September 25 would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. There sat Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and, more importantly, the country’s powerful army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir.

Across from them was US Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump, who hailed his guests as “very great guys.”

For Munir, it was his second intimate meeting at the White House this year, a level of access no Pakistani military leader has enjoyed in decades. The meeting was a symbol of one of the most unexpected and consequential resets of Trump’s second term: the rehabilitation of Pakistan from a duplicitous pariah into a favored regional partner.

This was the same president who, in his previous term, had publicly castigated Islamabad for giving Washington “nothing but lies and deceit” and cancelled security aid.

The speed of the rapprochement has been dizzying. After years of being cold-shouldered by the Biden administration, Pakistan’s military leadership has found a direct and receptive line to the Trump White House.

But the shift is not based on a newfound convergence of values or a grand strategic design. Instead, it is built on a series of tangible deliverables that appeal directly to the core tenets of Trump’s “America First” worldview.

First and foremost was the arrest of Mohammad Sharifullah, the alleged mastermind of the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing that killed 13 US service members. In March, acting on CIA intelligence, Pakistani forces apprehended the high-value target.

For Trump, this was a clear, unambiguous victory he could present to the American people—a contrast to the failures of the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal, in which his administration was implicated. It was a debt paid in a currency Trump understands: decisive action against those who have harmed Americans.

Second was the savvy appeal to the president’s ego. Following the brief but intense India-Pakistan conflict in May, Islamabad enthusiastically credited Trump’s personal intervention with brokering a ceasefire.

While New Delhi rejected the claim, Pakistan leaned in, shrewdly nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. For a leader who personalizes foreign policy, such flattery is game-changing.

And third, there are the economic sweeteners. Deals are being cut on everything from critical minerals and oil exploration to cryptocurrency ventures linked to Trump’s own family associates.

Trump’s own statements about developing Pakistan’s “massive oil reserves”—a claim that baffled industry experts—were less about geology and more about signaling a new era of economic partnership.

The US has rewarded Islamabad with a comparably favorable 19% tariff rate—a treat compared to the harsh 50% tariff slapped on India—in exchange for access to Pakistan’s potential resource wealth.

For Pakistan, this American embrace provides the ultimate diplomatic cover. It allows Islamabad to pursue its own assertive, geo-economic agenda without fear of alienating Washington.

The recent mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia, a move that could have been met with deep suspicion by previous US administrations, was undertaken by a Pakistani leadership confident in its standing with the White House.

This newfound elasticity allows Pakistan to simultaneously deepen its partnership with China, making it one of the few countries in the world to successfully navigate the treacherous currents between the two great feuding powers.

But the recent rekindling of ties is, in many ways, a return to the historical mean of US-Pakistan relations. The partnership has always been a rollercoaster of convenience and fallout.

During the Cold War, Pakistan was the “most allied of allies,” as former President Dwight Eisenhower framed it, then seen as a bulwark against Soviet expansion.

In the post-9/11 era, it became a “frontline state” in the war on terror, its cooperation purchased with billions in Coalition Support Funds, even as deep mistrust festered over drone strikes and the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.

The Trump administration’s first term saw the logical conclusion of that souring relationship, with military aid cancelled in 2018. The current warmth is simply the upswing of that same cycle, driven not by shared ideals but by a new set of mutual interests.

The old hands at the Pentagon and Langley have always known that the most durable channel to Islamabad runs through the military General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

Even when political ties were in the deep freeze, the military-to-military relationship endured. Munir’s repeated visits to the US—first for a White House lunch in June, then to meet CENTCOM officials, and most recently to the Oval Office—are an acknowledgment of this reality.

For Washington, dealing directly with the army chief is simply a matter of efficiency; it is an engagement with the country’s true center of power, bypassing the fractious and often fleeting authority of its civilian governments. While this dynamic frustrates advocates for Pakistani democracy, for a deal-oriented administration, it is the most pragmatic path.

This pivot, however, is creating significant blowback. For 20 years, a clear consensus held in Washington: the US would build up India as a democratic, strategic bulwark against a rising China. Trump’s transactional embrace of Pakistan has upended that policy.

By using punitive tariffs to pressure India over its purchase of Russian oil and by openly siding with Pakistan’s narrative on the May conflict, the White House is angering a long-time ally.

The immediate fallout saw an angered New Delhi signal a strategic re-evaluation, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi making a high-profile visit to China for the first time in seven years.

While recent reports suggest that Washington and New Delhi are now quietly attempting to patch things up with a potential trade deal on the horizon, the episode could have fundamentally altered the relationship.

As Eurasia Group analyst Ian Bremmer notes, the personal trust between the leaders has “cooled significantly.” The strategic logic for the partnership remains, but it is now more transactional and fraught with new irritants.

The White House may have its “great guys” in Islamabad for now, but as history shows, on this rollercoaster, the next steep decline is always just around the corner.

Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and political analyst. His work has been featured in Newsweek, Responsible Statecraft , the New Arab, World Politics Review and others.