China’s missile shield outshining Trump’s Golden Dome

China’s leap to field a prototype “Golden Dome” missile shield before the US has finalized its own design signals a new phase in the rivals’ arms race, where the drive for security threatens to heighten nuclear risk.

Last month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China had fielded a working prototype of a “Golden Dome”-style global missile defense system before the US had finalized its own plans, underscoring a widening technological gap in strategic defense.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led by senior engineer Li Xudong of the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology, has deployed a “distributed early warning detection big data platform” reportedly capable of monitoring up to 1,000 real-time missile launches worldwide.

Using an array of space, air, sea and ground-based sensors, the system integrates fragmented data from diverse platforms, identifies warheads versus decoys and transmits information across secure but bandwidth-limited military networks using advanced protocols such as Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC).

Researchers say the platform enables unified global situational awareness by consolidating early-warning data into a single command layer for the PLA.

By contrast, the US Golden Dome, unveiled by US President Donald Trump in May as an integrated missile shield spanning multiple domains, remains without a settled architecture, with US defense officials citing data-flow management as the program’s greatest challenge.

China’s swift deployment of a Golden Dome–style shield signals its drive to expand space defenses and project parity. Yet, it also raises doubts over whether it is investing in the same costly, unproven concept that is now testing the US’s capabilities.

Jacob Mezey states in an August 2024 Atlantic Council report that China’s development of a strategic missile defense system reflects interconnected security, technological and political objectives.

Mezey notes that ballistic missile defense (BMD) development strengthens and legitimizes its anti-satellite (ASAT) program – reflecting dual-use capabilities.

He adds that BMD development shields China’s leadership, command-and-control, nuclear forces and key infrastructure from a US preemptive strike and provides greater protection against India’s advancing missile forces, enabling China to study vulnerabilities in US BMD operations, signal technological parity and reinforce international competitiveness.

Crucially, Mezey says China’s building of required sensor networks supports a possible launch-on-warning posture, deepening strategic resilience while complicating adversary planning and bolstering crisis stability.

Examining China’s missile defense capabilities, Hsiao-Huang Shu notes in a 2021 report for the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) that China has mastered kinetic hit-to-kill technology and conducted early deployments of long-range radars, reportedly with ranges of up to 4,000 kilometers.

Shu emphasizes that these capabilities give China leverage against US medium-range deployments in Asia and help blunt India’s advancing missile threat.

However, Shu points out that China’s BMD system is still limited to defending key areas and infrastructure, such as Beijing, Shanghai, the Bohai Sea Economic Zone and the Three Gorges Dam.

Yet even with those limits, China has showcased a prototype at a time when the US Golden Dome remains more concept than capability.

While much of the US Golden Dome’s details are classified, Time reported in August 2025 that the system comprises a four-layered architecture integrating space-based sensors and interceptors with three terrestrial tiers.

According to the report, the space layer handles early warning and tracking, and the upper land layer deploys Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Aegis systems.

Beneath that, Time reports there is a Limited Area Defense tier that includes Patriot missiles, advanced radars and a new “common” launcher. Time also states that a new missile field in the US Midwest will supplement existing Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) sites in California and Alaska.

However, there are significant questions about the Golden Dome’s feasibility. In a September 2025 Scientific American article, Rami Skibba mentions that critics of the US Golden Dome system cite its opacity, exorbitant cost and strategic instability.

In the same report, David Wright mentions that exempting Golden Dome from “fly before you buy” safeguards risks billions on unproven tech. Wright points out gutted oversight and unrealistic interception expectations, especially against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with decoys and chaff.

Skibba also cites Laura Grego, who says that it is the economics, not the tech, which makes Golden Dome so challenging to implement. Skibba notes that ICBMs are far cheaper to build than any defense system.

The American Physical Society warned in February 2025 that it would take 16,000 interceptors to destroy 10 ICBMs, while the US Department of Defense (DoD) noted in 2024 that China has 400. However, China may also face the same challenge, as the US also has 400 Minuteman III ICBMs.

Skibba adds that Golden Dome’s low earth orbit (LEO) satellites would decay without costly replacements, driving expenses beyond US$1 trillion. Grego warns that one compromised satellite could let a nuclear warhead slip through.

Beyond technical limits, the political implications loom larger. But even as experts debate architectures, the deeper issue lies in perception: each side reads the other’s defenses through a lens of mistrust.

Tong Zhao points out in his June 2020 book, “Narrowing the US-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race”, that US-China perceptions of each other’s missile defense systems are shaped by deep ambiguities and mutual suspicion.

According to Zhao, the US maintains its missile defense targets “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran, not China, which China finds unconvincing. He says China fears a creeping US plan to nullify its nuclear deterrent.

He points out that Chinese experts often conflate technical and geopolitical concerns, warning that US deployments near China—such as the THAAD system—undermine both its conventional strike capability and broader regional influence.

On the other hand, Zhao states that US analysts believe China overstates missile defense threats to justify nuclear modernization, which keeps both sides trapped in a spiraling security dilemma.

In the end, the race to build rival Golden Domes may prove less about perfecting shields than about fueling a dangerous cycle where the pursuit of security only deepens nuclear threats.