When Beijing staged its largest military parade in a decade on Wednesday to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the pageantry was carefully choreographed. DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles and J-20 stealth fighters in a flex of military confidence abroad and reassurance at home.
Once reliant on Soviet imports and fragmented production, China has consolidated its capabilities into vertically integrated conglomerates: AVIC in aviation, CASIC in missiles and space, CSSC in shipbuilding and CETC in electronics.
These state-owned enterprises now sustain a PLA Rocket Force with “survivable” ICBMs, a PLA Air Force with fifth-generation fighters and a PLA Navy boasting over 370 hulls, the largest by count worldwide.
This industrial base has powered cycles of modernization that closed historic gaps in land-based deterrence, as the parade clearly showcased. The question now is whether such an industrial scale can deliver a durable geopolitical advantage.
From vulnerability to primacy
For much of its history, China’s greatest threats came over land, from nomadic incursions to imperial rivals. Today, it has turned centuries of land-based insecurity into continental primacy.
Mongolia now sends a majority of its coal and mineral exports to China. The 2023 opening of the Tavan Tolgoi–Gashuunsukhait rail line – built to Chinese gauge standards – further deepened dependence by giving Beijing control over volumes and pricing.
Across Central Asia, Chinese-built infrastructure underpins transport and energy corridors. CNPC pipelines push hydrocarbons eastward, Digital Silk Road technologies embed surveillance into governance and Chinese finance sustains large shares of Kyrgyz and Tajik debt.
After clashes such as the 1969 Ussuri River conflict, Russia once held the upper hand, supplying weapons to a weaker China. That balance has since reversed. Since the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness – and especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – Russia has leaned heavily on Chinese markets, capital and technology. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine entrenched this reliance, leaving Moscow bound to Beijing’s leverage.
Vietnam, once a battlefield adversary and still a claimant in the South China Sea, has become a “comprehensive strategic partner.” Bilateral trade reached a record US$200 billion in 2024, with imports from China rising by more than 30% and Vietnam’s deficit widening to $82.8 billion.
Even India, despite persistent border disputes, has found renewed pragmatic value in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, especially after the US imposed punitive 50% tariffs over New Delhi’s purchases of sanctioned Russian oil.
Indo-Pacific inverse dynamic
At sea, the current runs differently. Sebastian Strangio, in his “In the Dragon’s Shadow”, noted how ASEAN states, through long histories and cultural familiarity, have learned to live with China’s rise.
While the weight of power leans heavily against them, no Indo-Pacific nation would willingly accept unipolar dominance, least of all one that entrenches asymmetric dependence across the continent.
The natural response, therefore, is to reach outward for ballast. And for now, only the American-led security architecture – anchored by alliances, forward presence, and interoperability – offers a credible counterweight.
As a result, China’s show of military force and continental dominance has unintendedly produced the opposite effect. Four indicators highlight this paradox.
First, bilateral and minilateral arrangements expanded significantly in 2024. According to Australia’s Lowy Institute, the United States conducted more than 60 major exercises that year, from Balikatan in the Philippines to Talisman Sabre in Australia and Malabar with India and Japan.
Confidence also climbed. The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2025 survey found that 52.3% of ASEAN respondents preferred Washington when asked to choose sides.
Second, Chinese operational behavior sharpened regional anxiety. Taiwan recorded over 3,600 PLA sorties into its ADIZ in 2024, double the 1,727 logged in 2023 and nearly triple from 2019. Median-line crossings surged to 3,070 in 2024, compared to 1,703 two years earlier.
By early 2025, PLA aircraft were averaging 245 sorties per month, making near-daily violations routine. Philippine vessels documented 10 confrontations with the Chinese in 2024, including two near collisions.
Meanwhile, Beijing entrenched control over 27 artificial islands in the South China Sea, outfitting them with runways, radar, and missile batteries – moves broadly read as coercive attempts to change the status quo.
Third, regional defense responses accelerated. Japan approved a record $46 billion budget in 2024, funding counterstrike missiles, F-35s and Aegis air defense upgrades. Australia earmarked roughly $70 billion under AUKUS for nuclear-powered submarines and frigates.
The Philippines expanded American military access under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement from two bases to nine, including sites near Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan raised defense spending by 14% to nearly $19 billion, emphasizing drones, mines and mobile missile systems.
Fourth, even with record budgets, most littoral states remain wedded to non-Chinese military platforms, prioritizing interoperability within the US-led security architecture.
China is the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, with about 6% of global sales, yet its market remains largely confined to Pakistan. Despite dominating global commercial shipbuilding – 55.7% of completions, 74.1% of new orders and 63.1% of the order book in 2024 – this production capacity has not translated into defense-related sales.
Taken together, these trends suggest that China’s defense industrial base remains constrained, unable to convert output into maritime influence or strategic leverage.
World minus one
Beijing’s military parade showcased the achievements of its defense-industrial base and affirmed its continental dominance. Yet each show of strength risks pushing China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors further away, inadvertently reinforcing Washington’s indispensability and diminishing the geopolitical returns on Beijing’s vast military-industrial investments.
Most of all, the idea of a “world minus one” – floated by some analysts and leaders in response to recent moves by the Trump administration – must now be judged against China’s continental record, where dominance has proven costly for those drawn into asymmetric dependence.
Extending such a model to the maritime domain, where Indo-Pacific neighbors are likewise expected to acquiesce to Chinese primacy, would create a structural order that is ultimately untenable.
Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. Loh also serves as a director of Temus, a Singapore-based digital services firm, and on the Executive Committee of SGTech’s Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure and digital policy.
A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, Loh has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscapes. He is currently an MA candidate at the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
Article starts off praising China, then devolves into sharp criticisms, with an obvious pro-western objective of claiming the US is great, but China is toxic. This is think tank rhetoric trying to convince Americans they’re still pretty exceptional, and that the MAGA president should be proud of himself, since China is such a loser.
But it was the Nationalists that fought Japan (while the US defeated them).
Mao and the Communists ran away when they saw the size of the Japanese bayonets in Nanking.
Say what you want, but that parade was gansta level flexing. Trump must have been grinding his teeth and telling himself: ‘We’ll have rare earths in 20 years, then we’ll how many parades you can have Xi.’
China does not need to sell arms to make money. China exports all sorts of goods and infrastructure to pay for its imports.
In fact with the control on rare earths, the West will find delivery of weaponry difficult.
It’s a trap though. You make stuff to export and exchange for American dollars. Then you spend those dollars buying energy and raw materials to make more stuff, because the Saudis and your suppliers only accept US dollars. China’s total supremacy over America will occur only after it discards the US money system.
Yes, when rich Ch, Russ and Africans don’t want to park their ill gotten gains in the USA,
In a war, the W will block oil and food stuffs from China. Enjoy eating your REE.
There was another parade in 2015. A few new weapons systems this time. No substantive change in the international situation in SE Asia. Western media is paying more attention this time. Lots of possible reasons why. You guys can guess. I won’t bother listing them.
Just laughing and small CH weapons?
So you are dreaming of the little DF 5C up your posterior after all. How’s the fit?
Luckily all Chinese weapons are very small. It’s why the doe-eyed little ladies prefer something larger.
Full of discrepancies here:
1. In one breath, that China “……defense industrial base remains constrained, unable to convert output into maritime influence or strategic leverage……”, then in another breath, countries are “……to reach outward for ballast….., …..to US primacy……”.
2. US has been backing away to its so called “Second or Third Islands Chain” defense line, and forcing the First Island Chain countries to pick up the defense costs. Not the other way around as the author claimed here.
3. Not long ago, SE Asia countries were suffering from the demons of colonialism and imperialistic wars, all because western countries were reluctant to let go their loots. Have not witnessed any such hegemonic behaviors yet from China, despite the authors concerns and warnings.
4. All these China is bad, is losing, is nothing, and US led-architecture is good, is popular, is the only game in town (albeit faraway and retreating even farther away), is coping. The better China is doing, the more US is winning. Not a bad strategy, except in reality China is still winning.
5. This article reminds me of the common proclamation by the stunning and brave Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “……Russia shows no real wish to end this war……” Then turns around, and claims “……Europe must increase its support for Ukraine through military, diplomatic, and economic means…….” Peace through war, a workable strategy, if winning. Of not, you are screwed.
Good post. These writers are often trying to advertise themselves as rabid China hawks, hoping they’ll get read and eventually get jobs at American think tanks. It happens on youtube as well. Content creators buy subscribers hoping the gov’t will notice them and pay them to push out anti-china rhetoric.
5. ?? If Russia doesn’t want to end the war, then the EU must increase their support for Ukr. Peace could come if Russia goes back to her borders.
The rest of your post is also brainless.
US WAS indispensable. China and Russia are the new power bloc.
A SMO of 3 weeks taken 3yrs. Russ is a failed state
Fighting all of NATO is no walk in the park. But you should know with your BB gun in Pokrovsk.
Russia isn’t fighting NATO, it’s fighting a nation one fourth the size that has been TRAINED by NATO and uses their cast-off weapons.