Can India and China move beyond border clashes and trade tensions to find a new path forward?
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, held from August 31 to September 1, and his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping have drawn widespread global attention.
With India-China relations marked by border stand-offs, economic friction and geopolitical rivalry, Modi’s trip signaled a rare moment of diplomatic recalibration. Both New Delhi and Beijing appear keen to test whether dialogue can ease tensions and open space for selective cooperation.
Yet the significance of the visit extends beyond bilateral ties. In an era of great-power competition, closer India–China engagement has the potential to reshape regional dynamics across Asia and beyond. Washington has long sought to position New Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad.
A thaw in India–China relations complicates Washington’s strategy, with ripple effects across economic frameworks, security architectures and alliance calculations in the Indo-Pacific region.
The timing and context of Modi’s outreach are critical. The leader’s trip comes shortly after an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods imposed by Donald Trump administration came into effect, raising the total levy to a punitive 50% over India’s continued purchases of sanctioned Russian oil.
It also follows Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s August visit to India for the 24th round of border talks—a sign that both governments are reopening political channels after a prolonged silence.
And it also follows Modi’s late-August visit to Japan, a key Quad partner, where several cooperation agreements were signed, including a joint declaration on security cooperation.
By choosing to travel to Tianjin while declining Beijing’s invitation to its high-profile parade marking the 80th anniversary of China’s victory against Japanese aggression, Modi struck a careful balance – reaffirming India’s partnership with Tokyo while signaling openness to dialogue with Beijing.
It was Modi’s first visit to China in seven years and since bilateral relations deteriorated badly following deadly border clashes in 2020.
By deepening engagement with China, Modi signals that India will not allow itself to be boxed into a singular alignment with Washington. Instead, New Delhi is seeking to expand its strategic space – balancing partnerships with the US and Japan while pursuing pragmatic outreach to Beijing.
This dual-track diplomacy is consistent with India’s long-time strategic autonomy through a non-aligned foreign policy.
But can Modi’s visit really improve bilateral ties? There are several indications that India-China relations are moving in a more constructive direction. During Foreign Minister Wang’s visit to India, Beijing agreed to lift export restrictions on rare earths, fertilizers and tunnel-boring machines, easing some economic pressure on New Delhi.
Both governments pledged to resume visa issuance and restore direct flights, signaling a willingness to normalize people-to-people and governmental exchanges.
In April, also, China’s foreign ministry announced it would allow Indian pilgrims to visit Hindu and Buddhist sites in Tibet Autonomous Region for the first time in five years, reflecting renewed cultural and religious engagement.
Despite these positive developments, significant structural obstacles remain. Border and territorial disputes continue to be among the thorniest issues. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in casualties on both sides, still weighs heavily on trust.
Nonetheless, ongoing talks between civilian and military leaders aim to ease tensions. Last month, marking a change in tone, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesperson emphasized that the two countries should “respect each other…..and achieve win-win cooperation” while also noting the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and India.
Economic relations are also uneven. China is India’s second-largest trading partner behind the US. Yet India faces a huge trade deficit with China of nearly US$100 billion, while both countries maintain high tariffs and duties across multiple sectors.
Although Chinese investment could support India’s infrastructure ambitions, New Delhi remains cautious about technology dependence on Chinese companies and broader national security risks posed by reliance on China.
Strategic mistrust continues to shape bilateral dynamics. India has consistently opposed China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir – a territory India claims is illegally occupied by Pakistan, as well as Beijing’s rising maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, China maintains strong economic, diplomatic and military support for Pakistan, fueling concerns in India. During the military confrontation in May, Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-made fighter jets, missiles and drones against India.
Islamabad claims Chinese equipment helped Pakistan shoot down six Indian aircraft. New Delhi has denied these claims, stating that it shot down five Pakistani fighter jets and one other military aircraft.
Media reports in July also quoted India’s deputy army chief saying Beijing provided “live inputs” to Pakistan on Indian positions during the border incidents, underscoring ongoing strategic complications.
At the same time, India continues to host the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader. His long-time presence in India is seen by China as a challenge to its sovereignty over Tibet, which it annexed in 1950.
While New Delhi emphasizes religious freedom and humanitarian considerations, Beijing closely monitors interactions between the Dalai Lama and Indian political leaders, adding a persistent layer of complexity to bilateral relations.
Tensions are further compounded by India’s expanding defense cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia. Beijing views the Quad’s joint military exercises, naval deployments and technology partnerships as parts of a regional containment framework.
Meanwhile, New Delhi balances its Quad commitments with its ongoing and now intensifying dialogue with China. India’s role as host of the upcoming Quad summit in New Delhi further illustrates the geopolitical tightrope New Delhi must walk.
Ongoing territorial disputes and strategic competition will continue to challenge sustained political closeness between India and China challenging. Yet, as history has shown, economic engagement remains a resilient pillar of the bilateral relationship, driven by mutual interests in trade, investment and regional stability.
While political mistrust may limit the depth of cooperation, pragmatic economic ties provide a buffer that allows both countries to manage rivalry without escalation, preserving space for dialogue and selective collaboration in areas of shared interest.
Dr Amit Ranjan is a research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Genevieve Donnellon-May is a researcher at Oxford Global Society, a non-resident Vasey fellow at the Pacific Forum and a fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center.

The empire all but gone. All that’s left is the USD house of cards backed by the Navy. Europe is a supplicant being sucked dry to keep the cadaver alive. All spiritual vitality is gone…in its place a pretend democracy increasingly populated by blue haired tattooed women and angry rednecks. The end is nigh as the tent cities mushroom under dilapidated bridges. The desperation is palpable as the Orange Don pisses off friends and foes alike with his tariffs.
India today is where China was 20 years ago, still a developing country plagued with rampant poverty. India’s GDP is roughly 1/5th that of China’s and its military in a pitiful state. We must stop comparing the two countries as if they’re peers. They’re simply not. China is a modern day superpower, India an impoverished nation.
The wobble heads just love the squints…. not
Lowering of tensions as predicted..lol. Weep, little capon.