Putin-Modi optics steal the show at China’s SCO summit

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin concluded on September 1 with a defining image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi warmly engaging with Russian President Vladimir Putin and host Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The symbolism was unmistakable – three leaders, each navigating fraught relations with the US, projecting unity at a pivotal geopolitical juncture.

The summit underscored the interplay of geopolitics, optics and strategic signaling, with Russia taking particular care to highlight its partnership with India. Putin’s gestures went beyond cordiality—he reportedly insisted on traveling with Modi, waiting nearly ten minutes for him before their joint departure in the Russian leader’s armoured Aurus limousine. Modi later amplified the moment on social media.

These deliberate optics and signaling reflected Moscow’s effort to foreground its closeness with New Delhi at a time of heightened international isolation over the Ukraine conflict. They also intersected with broader narratives: While Washington continues to allege that India’s energy trade indirectly sustains Russia’s war effort, Moscow’s actions at Tianjin simultaneously reinforced India’s role as an indispensable partner and highlighted New Delhi’s determination to pursue diplomacy firmly grounded in national interest.

Putin referred to Modi as a “dear friend” and described Russia’s ties with India as special and trusting. The two leaders spoke privately for nearly an hour. According to his foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov, Putin is scheduled to visit India in December for the 23rd Annual Summit.

This deepening personal diplomacy underscores a broader strategic calculus. At a time when Russia is increasingly dependent on China due to the Ukraine war, why did Moscow so visibly highlight its ties with India at a gathering where Beijing loomed large?

China-centric SCO

Founded in 2001, the SCO has expanded from six to 10 members, with additional observers and dialogue partners spanning three continents. Today, it represents 26 countries covering over 65% of Eurasia and 42% of the world’s population, making it the largest transregional organization by territory and population.

While India is a full member, China and Russia dominate the SCO. For China, the organization serves as both a diplomatic platform and a mechanism to balance global power dynamics.

Beijing blends security cooperation, economic assistance and soft diplomacy — most visibly through the Belt and Road Initiative — to safeguard domestic security, secure energy and shape a favorable regional order.

This approach has expanded China’s influence and, together with strong ties to Russia, enabled it to counter external pressures and challenge Western dominance.

Russia’s evolving ties with China have become central to global geopolitics – driven by China’s economic ascent and, more decisively, by Western sanctions following the 2022 Ukraine invasion. The war and its upshots have pushed Moscow to rely heavily on Beijing for energy, finance and diplomatic support.

At the SCO summit, the principle of multipolarity was projected as a positive alternative to Western hegemony. The organization’s consensual, non-interventionist approach allows member states to pursue their core national interests. However, the 2023 SCO summit in Astana highlighted an evolving asymmetry.

While Putin and Xi publicly reaffirmed the strength of their partnership, the reality is that China’s influence increasingly eclipses Russia’s. Although Moscow continues to occupy a central political role within the SCO, Beijing has consolidated its position as the leading economic partner of all five Central Asian states, four of which are SCO members.

Russia’s reliance on China makes the SCO more conducive to Beijing’s rise, widening the inequality in their “limitless” partnership. Though Russia’s dominance has not collapsed, its unease with China’s expanding role in Central Asia is evident.

With the war in Ukraine intensifying Moscow’s dependence, the Kremlin may be seeking ways to quietly counter China’s growing authority.

India as balancing card

Faced with a growing imbalance in its partnership with China, Moscow appears eager to cultivate alternative alliances. In this context, India stands out as a strategic hedge by refusing to toe China’s line. By spotlighting its closeness to New Delhi, Moscow signaled that the Eurasian space—and by extension the SCO—is not Beijing’s exclusive domain.

Russia supported India’s entry into the SCO despite China’s reluctance. To offset this, China pushed for Pakistan’s inclusion. India later resisted the BRI, criticizing its lack of transparency, while backing Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) over Beijing’s initiative.

Likewise, Moscow encouraged China to invest in the Russian-led Eurasian Development Bank, reflecting its skepticism about China’s dominance in the SCO’s Interbank Consortium (IBC). Russia’s “Greater Eurasia” vision is advanced through deeper SCO cooperation, with India seen as vital partner for regional security and balance.

Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept places India at the core of a multipolar, sovereign-equal order. India’s own Eurasian outreach, highlighted by the 2022 India–Central Asia Summit, reflects shared goals of peace and inclusive development. For India, Central Asia is seen as its “extended neighborhood” and is at the heart of its Eurasian strategy.

Russia’s message is thus multifaceted: a signal to Beijing of its diversified partnerships, an assurance to India of its enduring relevance, and a reminder to the world that it is not entirely isolated.

Strategic weight

Russia’s ties with India, rooted in the Cold War, have deepened since the Ukraine war, with New Delhi emerging as a crucial trading partner.

As Western sanctions isolated Moscow, India and China emerged as major buyers of Russian oil. Indo-Russian trade has surged, hitting a record $68.7 billion in 2024–25. Moscow expects to continue supplying oil to New Delhi despite warnings from Washington.

Russia is also expanding defense cooperation, signing new arms deals to maintain its edge in a key bilateral domain. Simultaneously, it is reviving the (RIC) dialogue as a strategic forum to counter Western influence.

True to its doctrine of “strategic autonomy,” India has not imposed sanctions on Russia and, while strengthening ties with Western democracies, continues to balance rather than fully align.

With India–China engagement gaining cautious momentum, Russia risks losing its remaining leverage over the regional rivals and becoming increasingly isolated from the international community.

This looming marginalization helps explain Moscow’s deliberate elevation of New Delhi at a China-heavy Eurasian gathering. As the two Asian powers strengthen their rapport, a new multipolar order is taking shape—one that could sideline Moscow if it fails to maintain visibility in Eurasian affairs.

Furthermore, the Primakov Triangle, championed in the late 1990s by Yevgeny Primakov, envisioned a trilateral Russia–China–India alignment to counterbalance US influence. Historically, India relied on Russia to check Beijing’s expansionist ambitions; however, following the Ukraine war, sanctions have constrained Moscow’s options, effectively positioning it as a junior partner in its “no limits” framework with China.

This erosion of Russia’s credibility as a guarantor of regional stability highlights why the goodwill it cultivated as a mediator over the past five years is no longer sufficient, prompting Moscow to pursue alternative avenues—such as closer engagement with New Delhi in Eurasian forums—to maintain its regional relevance.

Geopolitics meets optics

For Russia, the SCO remains a key stabilizing force in Eurasia, reflecting Moscow’s aim to preserve the region as a multipolar chessboard. The organization has become a key pillar of this order, allowing Moscow to accommodate China’s growing clout while preserving a semblance of multipolarity.

Yet experts note potential friction, as China’s growing economic dominance in Central Asia—historically Moscow’s sphere of influence—erodes Russia’s standing.

At the SCO summit, India stood out as the only member to withhold support for China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. This stance reminded the world—China included—that its agency in Asia remains intact.  

For India, the summit offered both visibility and reassurance. Modi and Putin’s camaraderie overshadowed the summit’s formal proceedings, as images of their warm interactions went viral on Chinese social media.

On Baidu, China’s largest search engine, the top trending story read: “Modi and Putin hugged and chatted hand-in-hand.” As one Weibo user remarked: “Modi rides in Putin’s car—more meaningful than any summit declaration.” The surge of online reactions highlighted a wider perception that symbolic gestures can outweigh official speeches.

The Tianjin tableau wasn’t theater for its own sake—it was a calibrated message about balance. For Moscow, highlighting India signaled that Eurasia remains a multipolar chessboard rather than Beijing’s exclusive domain. Russia sought to remind both China and the wider world that it still retains agency in shaping the region’s balance.

For India, the optics offered reassurance of continued relevance, even as it navigates its own complex equation with China and the West. Yet beneath the optics lies a deeper question: Can Russia preserve its leverage in a shifting order increasingly shaped by China’s economic power and India’s diplomatic agility?

As multipolarity accelerates, the SCO’s future—and Moscow’s role within it—will hinge on whether symbolic gestures can translate into substantive influence.

Nalinie Sharma is a PhD scholar at Guru Nanak Dev University, Punjab, India and a risk analyst at Indo-Pacific Studies Center, Melbourne