Concept art of a Ukrainian Magura V5 USV attacking a Russian warship. Photo: OpenIV

Ukraine’s proposed drone pact with the Philippines tests whether Manila can leverage its fledgling drone boat capability and robust boatyards into a real deterrent against China.

This month, multiple media sources reported that Ukraine is moving to expand defense ties with the Philippines through a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that could lead to joint drone production, with both sides targeting an October signing.

Ukrainian Ambassador Yuliia Fediv confirmed that a draft agreement has already been submitted to the Philippines’ Department of National Defense (DND). At the same time, a high-level delegation from Kyiv’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is set to visit for talks.

Ukraine’s first non-resident defense attache to Manila, Colonel Andrii Bilenkyi, has also begun outreach with the Philippine Army, Navy and Air Force, focusing on training, technology and capability development.

Ukraine, which has pioneered the combat use of maritime drones against Russia’s Black Sea fleet, is offering the Philippines expertise in unmanned platforms that naval expert H I Sutton says could give the Philippines an asymmetric edge against China in the South China Sea.

Despite recent acquisitions, Philippine forces remain outnumbered by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr has flagged drones and unmanned systems as stop-gap substitutes for costly submarines.

Ukraine’s battlefield experience has global relevance, with unmanned vessels showing potential to offset conventional naval power. The prospective deal comes as the Philippines also deepens defense links with other partners, giving the former a much-needed boost.

Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel (USV) operations in the Black Sea may have underscored the effectiveness of these assets in a relatively small, semi-enclosed body of water – an operating environment similar to the South China Sea.

This development builds on the Philippines’ nascent experience in USV operations. Last year, the US provided the Philippines with four MANTAS T-12 and one Devil Ray USV, models that complement manned assets and could be used for surveillance, electronic warfare, swarming operations and possible resupply to the latter’s beleaguered outposts in the South China Sea.

These early donations indicate that the US is seeding a USV ecosystem in the Philippines, one that Ukraine now seeks to integrate into.

These USVs have also been incorporated in US Special Forces exercises in the Philippines, complementing US Typhon and Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile deployments on Philippine territory.

The USVs are likely to operate from a US-built drone boat base in Palawan, roughly 250 kilometers away from the Second Thomas Shoal, which Manila disputes with Beijing.

Operating from both Palawan and Philippine-occupied features in the South China Sea, these USVs could provide overlapping coverage for surveillance and swarming attacks.

Yet USVs lack the endurance, magazine depth and presence of large warships, while their datalinks remain vulnerable to electronic warfare. Autonomy may reduce these risks, but the technology is nascent, and a captured unit could compromise cryptographic security.

The Philippines’ USV capability remains at a minimum level, with only a handful of US-donated units. The capability may be too small for a meaningful effect and dependent on US sustainment, an uneasy position for a country wary of US abandonment.

Nevertheless, Ukraine’s USV offer may enable the Philippines to diversify its defense suppliers for that capability and capitalize on its latent strengths in small boat production, reducing its dependence on US security guarantees.

This trend follows the Philippines’ established pattern of relying on alternative defense suppliers for sophisticated systems, such as India, Israel and South Korea. The Philippines has a significant boat industry that could serve as the foundation for indigenous USV production.

According to a 2022 report by the Philippine Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), the country has 186 main yard facilities, many of which are “Class C” yards suitable for smaller craft. The report also states that, in 2022, the country built 411 ships, 96 of which were recreational boats.

That industrial base, if weaponized, could boost Philippine USV numbers enough to become a force multiplier in a hybrid navy of manned and unmanned assets.

The Philippines has also shown interest in building indigenous USVs, as demonstrated by its Palid USV concept. This design can leverage the Philippines’ small boat industry, commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS) and repurposed munitions, such as aerial bombs.

Budget pressures could still deprioritize USVs, given the Philippines’ modest defense industry, which primarily produces small arms and body armor, while importing larger munitions and complex systems.

Chronic underfunding discourages R&D, while small government orders deter local and foreign firms alike. Capitalizing on the Philippines’ potential for USV production will thus require consolidating the country’s fragmented boat industry into a viable production base, securing multi-year production contracts and investing in other critical sectors, such as explosives manufacturing and the production of military-grade electronics.

It will also require sustained investment and enduring partnerships with international partners such as Ukraine.

Without significant indigenous scaling, the Philippines’ USV program may remain a small pilot project retained as a limited demonstrator—or a high-visibility showcase to impress subsequent Philippine administrations into aligning with US interests.

Meanwhile, shifting political winds in the Philippines could blow Ukraine’s USV outreach to the Philippines off course. This is possible if Vice President Sara Duterte wins the 2028 presidential elections, absent a credible competitor aligned with the pro-US Marcos Jr administration.

Sara Duterte may continue the foreign policy of her father, former President Rodrigo Duterte, who vacillated between neutrality and accommodation with China.

Her victory could scale back US access to Philippine military facilities, sideline South China Sea disputes and stall military modernization — including the USV program — in favor of closer economic ties with China.

While the US has laid the foundations for the Philippines’ USV capability, with Ukraine offering to assist in domestic production, it remains to be seen whether the Philippines will take the first step and continue to move forward.

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9 Comments

  1. Now if the Ukraine could only export them now that the Russians have just blown up another port and is putting troops in Odessa. Just saying…..

  2. Ukraine and the Philippines are irrelevant powers. Both poor and militarily weak nations. It like trying to suggest that Jamaica is some sort of a military threat to the US because they just bought a new boat. No amount of innovation or armament in the Philippines will make it a threat to the Tyrannosaurus that is China. Absurd article written by an absurd man.

  3. “Ukraine” is the body through which NATO acts. “Ukraine” is not a sovereign country. They are an extension of the evil Anglo American empire.

    1. Wow your understanding of global politics is not even at the level of LEGO play but Duplo brics… Read some history of Central-Eastern Europe before you start taking nonsense…