August 3, 2025, marks one year since To Lam became General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Central Committee, widely considered the most powerful position in the country.
His rise followed an unprecedented upheaval entailing the removal of two of the “four pillars” of leadership, namely President Vo Van Thuong and Chairman of the National Assembly Vuong Dinh Hue and the death of his long-serving predecessor, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.
Lam’s ascent from the public security sector to the pinnacle of both Party and State is a first in Vietnam’s political history, opening a period of unpredictably. His era has been defined so far by a flurry of reforms described as forceful, unexpected and unprecedented.
One year on, the verdict from experts and observers is sharply divided. Veteran analyst Carlyle Thayer has lauded him as a bold and admirable leader, even surpassing his predecessor.
In contrast, Professor Vu Tuong from the University of Oregon, Eugene, has voiced doubts, suggesting the reforms are more form than substance. Other researchers have warned of a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of one leader.
So after a year of dramatic change, what has Lam achieved, what remains unresolved and what do his actions signal for the future of Vietnam?
Rearranging the realm
The so-called “streamlining revolution” has become the defining political slogan of Lam’s first year, symbolizing a leadership style seen as decisive and willing to challenge entrenched interests.
While the spirit of reform is not new—a 2017 resolution under his predecessor Trong had a similar goal but soon stagnated—Lam has translated the slogan into concrete action.
Beyond streamlining and consolidating government agencies, his reforms have reached the highest administrative level: merging provinces and municipalities.
This is not a scattering of proposals but a full-scale restructuring of the national map, with the number of provinces and centrally-run cities set to drop from 63 to just 34. It is an unprecedented move with far-reaching effects on the balance of power, budget allocation and local governance.
Unlike past reforms, often criticized as “old wine in new bottles,” Lam has chosen a more direct and sweeping approach, risking pushback from vested interests for the sake of long-term benefits like optimizing resources and downsizing the bureaucracy.
The speed and audacity of the move have surprised many observers. As Professor Vu Tuong told BBC News Vietnamese, “In terms of spirit and method, it’s quite bold and fast. It’s surprising to observers that To Lam could do this.”
Lam himself has framed the decision as “a historic step of strategic significance,” and “a precious opportunity for us to renew our leadership mindset, innovate state management methods… and enhance public service effectiveness.”
Policy launchpads
Alongside administrative reform, a prominent hallmark of Lam’s first year has been the introduction of a series of Central Committee resolutions covering the key pillars of national development.
These were not scattered, ad-hoc policies, but were systematically designed to support each other, suggesting they were pre-planned with long-term calculations.
The four major resolutions include:
Resolution 57-NQ/TW (2024): On breakthroughs in science, technology, innovation and national digital transformation.
Resolution 59-NQ/TW (2025): On international integration in the new context.
Resolution 66-NQ/TW (2025): On reforming the development and implementation of laws to meet new national development needs.
Resolution 68-NQ/TW (2025): On developing the private economy, recognizing it as a main driver of the national economy.
Taken together, these can be seen as four launchpads for development, corresponding to the four pillars of science and technology, global integration, modern rule of law and a market economy.
Their issuance signals a more systematic policy approach, marking a departure from the “crossing the river by feeling for stones” mindset of earlier reforms.
Among them, Resolution 68 drew particular attention. For the first time, a high-level Party document openly acknowledged the private sector as “one of the most important driving forces of the national economy,” a significant shift from its traditional “supplementary” role.
While this signals a more open economic mindset, it also presents foreseeable challenges, as the legal and regulatory frameworks have yet to keep pace. By advancing all these reforms in a short timeframe, Lam appears to be pursuing a more comprehensive strategy for national restructuring.
Veneer of reform
However, not all developments under Lam have been viewed positively. While seen as a forceful reformer on one hand, his first year as General Secretary has also raised hard questions about his governing style and power restructuring.
Controversial personnel decisions, the visible expansion of the Ministry of Public Security’s power and the speed at which major policies—including constitutional amendments—have been pushed through with limited public input have all fueled concern.
The fear is that behind these sweeping reforms lies a deliberate process of concentrating power into the hands of a small minority of cadres. In that direction, immediately after taking office, Lam carried out a series of controversial senior personnel moves.
Most notable was the elevation of two of his known close associates—Luong Tam Quang and Nguyen Duy Ngọc—to the Politburo. Both served as his deputies at the Ministry of Public Security and hail from his home province of Hung Yen.
Crucially, neither Quang nor Ngoc met the standard formal criteria to become Politburo members, which typically require a full term on the Central Committee and experience leading a major province or central ministry.
Beyond these two, various other senior appointments have involved figures with close personal or regional ties to Lam.
They include Vu Hong Van’s appointment as Dong Nai People’s Committee chairman, Nguyen Hai Ninh as Minister of Justice, Nguyen Thanh Tung as Hanoi police chief and To Long— Lam’s own son—as head of the Ministry of Public Security’s influential Department of External Security (A01).
This rapid concentration of key Party, government and state posts among a network of close associates has stoked concerns about a rise in cronyism, parochialism and a growing regional imbalance inside the central power structure.
Rise of a super-ministry
The Ministry of Public Security began evolving into a “super-ministry” with unprecedented authority while Lam was still its head. And the trend has only accelerated since he became General Secretary.
New laws have expanded the ministry’s scope across a wide range of civil, social and political issues. The ministry has begun absorbing functions previously held by other ministries, including driver testing and aviation security (from the Transport Ministry), drug rehabilitation (from Labor), judicial record management (from Justice), and cybersecurity (from Information and Communications).
This expansion is also evident in personnel and economics. There has been a striking rise of police officers appointed to senior civilian government posts, such as the promotion of Ha Giang’s police chief, Phan Huy Ngoc, to chairman of the provincial People’s Committee, and the appointment of Nguyen Hai Trung as Deputy Minister of Ethnic and Religious Affairs.
Simultaneously, the ministry’s power is expanding into the economic sphere. It now directly manages enterprises like MobiFone and holds stakes in FPT Telecom, blurring the line between public security and private business.
Lam’s transition from public security minister to General Secretary marked a critical turning point. Although no longer formally leading the ministry, his experience and extensive network are believed to give him the ability to steer its activities.
This creates a special linkage between the nation’s highest political office and one of its most powerful armed forces—a combination with potentially profound implications for Vietnam’s power structure.
Lightning speed rule
Lam’s governing style is striking by the speed with which major decisions are taken and implemented. These are often watershed moves with the potential to reshape Vietnam’s political and social structures, yet they are pushed through in remarkably short time.
The provincial merger campaign, for example, went from announcement to implementation in just four months. Other major policies, including key Central Committee resolutions and even constitutional amendments, have been enacted at a similar record pace.
This urgency prompts a critical question: Does it stem from a desire to create breakthroughs for the country, or is it a strategic move to consolidate power ahead of the crucial next Party Congress in early 2026?
The suspicion is not unfounded, particularly given Lam’s history of receiving low confidence votes in the National Assembly during his tenure as Minister of Public Security.
While he can be seen as a decisive reformer, it is difficult to expect that he will become a leader who meaningfully broadens rights and champions any move toward democracy.
Indeed, over the past year, the gap between citizens and the legislative process appears to have widened, with public voices almost absent from the major decisions that will directly affect their daily lives.
This article was published in English by The Vietnamese and originally published in Vietnamese by Luat Khoa Magazine. It is republished here with kind permission.