N Korea’s expanding nuclear reach testing China and Russia

A newly exposed North Korean missile base near the Chinese border underscores the former’s expanding nuclear reach and the uneasy fault lines in its ties with Russia, China, and the US.

This month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report confirming the existence of North Korea’s undeclared Sinpung-dong Missile Operating Base, a facility located 27 kilometers from the Chinese border in North Pyongan Province and about 146 kilometers northwest of Pyongyang.

Built between 2004 and 2014 and still being developed, the base is believed to house a brigade-sized unit with 6–9 nuclear-capable Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their mobile launchers, posing a potential threat to East Asia and the US mainland.

Satellite imagery shows hardened missile checkout facilities, underground tunnels, support structures, and housing, spread across 22 square kilometers in a remote mountain valley. During crises or war, the missiles are expected to disperse from the base, rendezvous with warhead transport units, and launch from pre-surveyed sites.

The site forms part of North Korea’s strategic missile belt, alongside other undeclared bases, and is under the control of the Strategic Force, a 10,000-strong Korean People’s Army (KPA) unit responsible for missile operations.

Analysts note that the base has never been acknowledged by North Korea nor included in denuclearization negotiations with the US, underscoring the opacity of North Korea’s missile strategy and its continued efforts to expand nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Delving into North Korea’s missile deployments, Joseph Bermudez Jr. and other writers mention in a November 2018 CSIS report that facilities such as the Yongnim and  Sinpung-dong Missile Operating Bases are part of a larger North Korean “missile belt” strategy that aims to ensure survivability and strike capability across varying ranges.

According to Bermudez and others, North Korea maintains a three-layered missile belt:

• Tactical Belt: 50-90 kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), housing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) targeting South Korea’s northern sectors.
• Operational Belt: 90-150 kilometers north, fields Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of striking all of South Korea and Japan.
• Strategic Belt: over 150 kilometers from the DMZ, likely housing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the Hwasong-14, aimed at intercontinental targets such as the US mainland.

Bermudez Jr. and others note that these dispersed, concealed bases, often in mountainous terrain, enable rapid TEL/mobile erector launcher (MEL) operations, minimizing vulnerability to preemptive strikes, and reflecting North Korea’s war-readiness doctrine.

Assessing North Korea’s ICBM capabilities, Van H Van Diepen mentions in a July 2025 article for 38North that North Korea’s ICBM force boasts three deployed systems—liquid-fueled Hwasong-15 and -17, and solid-fueled Hwasong-18—supported by at least 17–21 road-mobile TELs and ongoing production of 27 more, enabling survivable, dispersed launch capability.

Van Diepen says that while North Korea’s ICBMs can reportedly reach the US mainland with drills suggesting operational readiness, weaknesses persist, such as warhead production may be lagging behind launcher availability, deployment timelines are opaque, and some parade units may be non-operational mock-ups.

He notes that US intelligence estimates only “10 or fewer” deployed ICBMs, citing possible production bottlenecks and strict deployment criteria. However, he points out that despite current limitations, North Korea can field over 50 ICBMs by 2035 if strategic intent aligns with capacity.

Although North Korea may be operating under the assumption that its conventional and nuclear forces are enough to deter a US and allied attack, its strategic deterrence depends on Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s willingness to use nuclear weapons.

While North Korea has doubled down on nuclear weapons, with Kim stressing North Korea’s “irreversible” status as a nuclear state, the June 2025 US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have forced North Korea to rethink its deterrent posture.

While it remains uncertain whether the US strikes destroyed or just delayed Iran’s nuclear efforts, it raises crucial questions about the resilience of North Korea’s nuclear program, which shares survivability features with that of Iran – being deeply buried, heavily dispersed, and carefully concealed.

Also, Russia and China’s relatively muted reactions to US strikes on Iran may give pause for North Korea to reflect on the viability of its partnerships that supposedly have a stake in the continuity of the Kim regime.

Iran sought to make itself indispensable to Russia’s war in Ukraine by supplying tactical gear, artillery ammunition, and Shahed drones in hopes of revenue, sanctions relief, and Russian backing for the North-South Corridor (NSC) trade route. Yet Russia’s expanded wartime production and domestic drone capacity appeared to reduce Iran’s importance, with North Korean troops and munitions gradually supplanting Iranian supplies.

The pattern suggests that secondary partners who overestimate their strategic weight risk being sidelined once Russia no longer requires their support. North Korea could face a similar outcome.

While North Korea has supported Russia’s war effort and may have received military modernization in return, a potential Russian victory in Ukraine could lessen reliance on North Korean weapons and manpower, potentially turning the relationship from asset to liability — and complicating Russia’s balancing act with China in the Far East.

North Korea-China relations present a similar picture. North Korea seeks to break overdependence on China as its main economic lifeline and assert its autonomy, but the latter is concerned that the former’s belligerent behavior may drag it into a larger conflict with the US.

While North Korea’s role as a buffer state between Russia, China, South Korea, and the US helps preserve regional stability in Northeast Asia, a rogue nuclear state at the center of it all is not in China’s interest.

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could become a strategic liability for China in several ways. If the Kim regime were to collapse, a successor leadership might prove more belligerent and adopt a lower threshold for nuclear weapons use.

It is also doubtful that North Korea will defer to China regarding matters concerning its nuclear weapons program, as it plays a huge role in guaranteeing the former’s autonomy. If the Kim regime collapses without a clear successor, control of its nuclear arsenal would become dangerously uncertain.

In addition, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is one of the significant catalysts bringing together the US, South Korea, and Japan on China’s doorstep in the Korean Peninsula. But as with Russia using North Korea to distract the US from Europe, China could see North Korea as a convenient distraction for the US in Taiwan, but how much provocation it is willing to tolerate for that purpose remains uncertain.

While North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs grab headlines, it is essential to note that its ties with key stakeholders such as Russia and China play a significant role in determining its behavior, leaving it more dependent on external security guarantees than its saber-rattling implies.