Despite the high-profile spectacles back in 2019-20 of “Howdy Modi” and “Namaste Trump” showcasing personal camaraderie between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump, Trump’s second term (2025) has been marked by repeated slights against India.
Some analysts speculate that Trump’s ire stems from Modi’s lack of support during the 2024 US presidential election. Others argue that Trump is punishing Modi for publicly dismissing his efforts to avert an India-Pakistan conflict. These are mere symptoms; the root causes lie elsewhere.
India’s fundamental misreading of America’s intentions and its capacity to constrain India has led to a complex and strained relationship. This article examines the consequences of India’s misjudgment, focusing on America’s strategic partnerships, agreements and India’s flawed assumptions about US motives.
A turbulent history of India-US relations
Since the Cold War, India-US relations have been a rollercoaster. After gaining independence in 1947, India was seen by the US as a democratic partner, but its non-aligned stance and proximity to the Soviet Union created a rift.
The 1990s marked a turning point, with a new chapter of strategic partnership emerging in the 2000s. The US sought to position India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific, but this partnership was not one of equals – it was driven by American interests. India, however, misjudged the US’s long-term strategy, viewing it as a benevolent ally rather than a power seeking influence over its autonomy.
A series of agreements solidified the India-US strategic partnership but also revealed America’s intent to bind India to its geopolitical agenda. Below is a chronological overview of these agreements and their implications:
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Exemption, 2005: The US facilitated India’s exemption from NSG restrictions, enabling access to nuclear technology and fuel. While presenting this as support for India’s energy needs, the US expected access for its companies to India’s nuclear market.
Impact: India advanced its nuclear energy sector but paid a premium for outdated US technology compared with cheaper, fourth-generation Russian and Chinese alternatives, compromising cost-effectiveness.
India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, 2008: This deal integrated India into global nuclear trade, ostensibly bolstering energy security. However, it allowed US defense and technology firms to penetrate India’s market, subtly curbing India’s strategic autonomy.
Impact: India gained energy security but became entangled in US commercial and strategic interests.
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), 2016: This agreement enabled logistical cooperation between the two nations’ militaries, positioning India as a key US partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Impact: Indian strategists and politicians thought that India’s military capabilities grew, but the US gained leverage over India’s defense strategy, with no tangible deterrence against China. For example, the Doklam standoff depicts this fact.
Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), 2018: This provided India access to advanced US defense technology, but with the intent of fostering dependence on American systems.
Impact: Indian planners believed that they acquired cutting-edge technology but at the cost of increased reliance on the US, limiting its independence.
Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), 2020: This facilitated geospatial intelligence sharing, aligning India closer to US anti-China strategies.
Impact: Indian strategists believed it strengthened its ability to counter China, but events like India’s Operation Sindoor against Pakistan revealed no strategic gains, only deeper US influence over India’s regional policies.
India viewed these agreements as partnerships of equals, expecting to bolster its ability to deter China. In reality, the US used them to tether India to its geopolitical framework, eroding its autonomy while offering minimal strategic benefits.
America’s strategy to entice India
The US employed a multifaceted approach to draw India into its orbit.
- First, it positioned India as a “major strategic partner” in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia), framing India as a bulwark against China.
- Second, it dangled advanced defense technologies– drones, missile systems, and military hardware – as bait.
- Third, the US promised economic support through trade deals and investment opportunities. Diplomatic gestures, such as inviting Indian leaders to the US and leveraging the influential Indian diaspora, further sweetened the deal.
These moves made the partnership appear attractive, but India failed to see the underlying agenda of control.
India’s misjudgment of US-led globalization and market access
India’s strategic missteps began with a misreading of globalization trends since 2014.
The net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing nations to the US surpassed US outflows, signaling a reversal of globalization. Yet, India clung to the belief that Western-led globalization persisted during Trump’s first term (2017–2021), despite his deglobalization policies, such as high tariffs.
The Biden administration (2021–2025) pursued partial re-globalization through subsidies and a “bring manufacturing back to America” policy, but its “friendshoring” strategy excluded India, favoring allies like Japan and South Korea.
Trump’s return in 2025 doubled down on deglobalization, catching India off guard. India expected preferential access to US markets, akin to China’s privileges in the 1990s via WTO entry and trade concessions. Instead, the US revoked India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status in 2019, dealing a blow to Indian exports.
This exposed India’s naivety in viewing the US as an economic partner rather than a power seeking to subordinate India to its strategic goals. The resulting trade tensions and diplomatic friction underscored India’s miscalculation.
Indian strategists’ delusion and China relations
Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar once argued that India’s “the West is a bad guy” syndrome needed to change, believing a US partnership served India’s interests. This was a delusion.
The US aimed to sever India’s cooperation with China, a strategy that gained traction after Jaishankar became Foreign Secretary in 2015. India-China relations deteriorated, escalating from the 2016 Doklam standoff to the 2020 Galwan clash, which pushed bilateral ties to a historic low.
The US used India to counter China in the short and medium term but planned to contain India in the long term.
When the Quad failed to restrain China, the US turned its pressure on India, criticizing its oil purchases and defense deals with Russia. India’s failure to recognize this dual strategy left it geopolitically and economically vulnerable, squandering resources on an avoidable confrontation with China.
India’s failure in strategic deception
Unlike China, India has shown a glaring inability to employ strategic deception. China masterfully uses initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative to create economic dependencies while masking its geopolitical ambitions through diplomatic finesse. India, by contrast, has been outmaneuvered, treating US partnerships as equitable while failing to safeguard its autonomy.
China’s ability to anticipate and counter US strategies has kept it ahead in the geopolitical game, while India’s trust in American goodwill has left it exposed.
Consequences of India’s missteps
India’s misjudgments have exacted a heavy toll. Economically, the US offered no concessions, instead imposing trade barriers such as the Generalized System of Preference withdrawal and high tariffs.
Strategically, India’s reliance on US defense systems weakened its autonomy without delivering the anticipated deterrence against China. Diplomatically, the souring of India-China relations destabilized the region, diverting India’s priority and squandered resources to a futile rivalry.
India’s naivety – or outright strategic blunder – in misreading US intentions has left it in a precarious position, used as a pawn in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy while facing long-term containment.
India now finds itself in a bind, unable to fully embrace or abandon its US partnership. This relationship resembles an oversized suitcase without a handle – too heavy to carry, too valuable to leave behind.
India’s missteps have squandered time and resources, leaving it geopolitically isolated and economically strained. To recover, India must recalibrate its strategy, prioritizing autonomy and a balanced approach to global powers. Only by learning from its past mistakes can India navigate this treacherous landscape and safeguard its national interests in the days to come.
laser eyed jaishankar is a total flop like modi.
India’s economy is roughly 1/5 the size of China’s, its poverty rampant, and its military comparatively weak. Yet, it believes the western-fed delusion it’s some sort of counterweight to China in the East. It’s not. China can afford to defy the US, whereas India cannot, or, at least, not for long.
Bhim Bhurtel’s comments are on point. When India’s GSP was revoked in 2019, India should have pivoted away from the US and, at least, sent signals by threatening to leave the Quad. It appears Modi and Jaishanker underestimate or are unaware of the lobbying influence of the Islamic Republics of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in driving the US away from India, keeping Pakistani interests in mind. Modi is in a bad situation because Russia is not a strong and stable economy and China can never be trusted as an ally because of the border dispute and It’s closeness to Pakistan. India has no choice but to return to the days of the Brezhnev-Indira Gandhi friendship with Russia, much as I dislike it, simply because the US “deep state” is deeply pro-Pakistani.
India as a whole does not misread anything. There are several factions: (1) Anglophiles from the British days who benefited immensely from the British largesse; (2) Russophiles who were inspired by Lenin and Stalin; (3) pro-American groups who benefit from exports to America. Jaishankar is from a family (clan or caste) of people who faithfully served the British interests and continues with the traditional allegiance to Anglo-American groups. Modi represents the Gujarati Bania group and Marwari moneylenders who benefit from exporting Indian products to the US market and laundering profits to US and Britain with some Swiss banks. He will lose the support of the Brahmins and Rajputs of the North, who are very sympthetic to the USSR and very nationalistic in their outlook, though I doubt if they support Putin personally or his kleptocracy. Everyone was fully aware that an embrace of the US turns into a death grip. Such is the result of the collapse of the USSR on India, that the pro-USSR faction was overpowered in favor of pro-Anglo-American faction. The Trump tariffs hit hard the export-oriented faction, and they lost the argument. Now that the well known Anglo-American treachery is out in the open, Modi is scurrying back to Russia, and via Russia, to China. This was anticipated a long time ago, but it takes time for an external contradiction manifests itself into an internal one. Soon, a different dispensation will undo all these “security” agreements with the USA, and kick them out of India, just as they kicked out Coca-Cola in 1977. The US helped ease upper caste (Brahmin) unemployment somewhat by giving H1B visas to their children who lost out in the DEI policies of the successive governments. But when it comes to sovereignty, the visa inducement does not work for those in India. South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar) is sitting on a powder keg, and can explode anytime.
I’m sorry, I don’t understand your commentary. Why can’t you be more specific?
He simply saying India’s (Indians) fondness over western country(s) made itself weak and couldn’t see how geopolitics plays out.