Tokyo, Manila moves arouse Chinese concerns about Asian mini NATO

Manila’s adoption of Japan’s “one theater concept” has further escalated tensions with China. Proposed in March this year, the concept breaks from Tokyo’s traditional security outlook and views the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula as a “single theater.”

Analysts in Chinese news media were quick to read it as a formation of a Washington-led “Mini NATO in the Asia-Pacific” aimed at “containing China.”

A commentary noted how President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s attempts at a thaw with Beijing in early 2025 were derailed within a week when the US promised $50 million in military aid that “thoroughly exposed” Marcos’s “profiteering tendency.”

Another analysis related the situation to the Reciprocal Access Agreement signed between Manila and Tokyo in July last year. Many defined the concept as an “absurd” one that “deliberately confuses” distinct geographical regions, solely to build a case for foreign intervention. The continued stationing of US military’s advanced missile systems,  Typhon and NMESIS, in Manila is similarly viewed as a way of targeting China.

While Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr.’s moves are broadly described as “unacceptable,” some in China believe he is still “pragmatic” in finding common strategic ground with Japan when compared with Lithuania, which expressed concerns over the “axis” formed by “China, Russia and North Korea” that must be opposed through an “alliance of democracies.” 

Others describe the concept as Japan’s attempts to “blur” the boundaries of the “hot spots” by linking the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea to its “surrounding areas,” hence using it as an “excuse” to break free from restrictions placed by its peace constitution.

Highlighting Manila’s intentions of “controlling the entire Bashi Channel,” some Chinese analysts have pointed to several hindrances in this “plan” – particularly differing defense interests of the members of the informal SQUAD alliance (QUAD, with an S for “security” added) and Trump’s insistence that allies expand their military expenditures, which many, including Tokyo and Manila, are unable to do.

Many also flagged Washington’s “unreliability” to its allies, particularly the imposition of tariffs that pushed Tokyo and Seoul towards Beijing. Describing Manila as a “pawn” for “big brothers,” a commentary noted that Washington’s “abandonment and looting” of war-torn Ukraine serve as a lesson for the Philippines.

Some link the situation to the internal political turmoil brewing in Manila. Ruptures between the “pro-US” Marcos family and the “pro-China” Duterte family, particularly the latter’s better performance in the mid-term elections and their possibility of sweeping off the former in the 2028 general elections, are emphasized.

Chinese analysts believe that the concept will nevertheless receive little support from ASEAN nations or the Pacific Islands which have refrained from choosing sides between Beijing and Washington.

Faultlines do exist. Many in Japan worry that an unclear delimitation of the theater carries the threat of embroiling Tokyo in conflicts of regional allies. South Korea, too, is unhappy, particularly with the concept seen as “unnecessarily stoking conflict with China.” Differing security perceptions are similarly highlighted by Teodoro’s statement that the Korean Peninsula will not form a part of Manila’s adaptation.

While most Chinese analysts favor dialogue, their confidence in the PLA’s ability to launch a crushing defeat on the Philippines remains unabashed. The question, however, remains: Is China ready to take up arms?

Though it cannot be denied that the concept’s focus on Taiwan presents a fragile security situation given the Chinese maritime strategy’s core being anti-access/area denial in the “first island chain,”  the few episodes of intense confrontation in the past years have not escalated into a war – yet.

The PLA Southern Theater Command’s response included a joint sea and air patrol in the “second island command” with its advanced H-6K bombers equipped with Eagle Strike-12 anti-ship missiles, capable of launching an attack on targets as far as 4000 km from the Chinese mainland. While an intense move, it broadly falls in line with Beijing’s previous response to Manila’s unilateral and bilateral military exercises with Washington in January.

Chinese commentators have also highlighted how NATO’s short and narrowly-focused The Hague Summit Declaration’s silence on China points to Trump “changing his mind” on a conflict with Beijing. 

But mounting tensions are hard to overlook.

China’s latest white paper on national security noted  “gross interference” in the South China Sea issue from external powers. The paper clearly underscores a growing pessimism as it notes how “Western anti-China forces” are “leaving no stones unturned” to “encircle, suppress and contain” Beijing.

China’s sanctions against former Senator Francis Tolentino for his “malicious remarks and moves” are similarly seen as a strong move. This is the first time a senior official has been sanctioned since bilateral relations deteriorated in 2023, further elevating tensions as Manila summoned the Chinese ambassador to express its concerns. Despite the intensity, it must be noted that Beijing refrained from sanctioning Tolentino while he was in office, reflecting a cautious approach.

Manila too has been prudent in not pushing the boundary too far. Hence, while the 38-year travel ban on Filipino officials traveling to Taiwan was lifted in April, restrictions remain on visits by the president and vice president and the foreign and defense secretaries.

Despite its 2023 National Security Policy describing cross-strait relations as a “major concern,” the Philippines has clarified it has no intentions of ever participating if a conflict erupts over Taiwan. The clarification came as part of a statement at a press conference for the Balikatan annual military exercises in April 2025, the largest between Manila and Washington.

Manila favored reaching a provisional understanding with Beijing over invoking its Mutual Defense Treaty with Washington as tensions escalated in June last year.

The situation, for now,  can best be understood as a game of brinkmanship. Moreover, despite China’s growing naval strength, its warships remain untested in warfare. While this acts as a deterrent to Beijing, China’s advanced defense technologies and their ability to cause irreparable losses deter Washington and Manila.

Nevertheless, a lack of a consistent high level military-to-military communication between both Beijing and Washington, and Beijing and Manila, as well as the complete absence of a reliable crisis management mechanism do exacerbate uncertainties.

While all eyes remain fixed on military muscle flexing, the South China Sea faces a critical challenge. Sea levels have risen by 3.75mm per year since 1993, and microplastic pollution has reached an alarming level. While a war seems unlikely, peace remains elusive. Such pressing concerns urgently demand cooperation on all sides.

Cherry Hitkari is a doctoral fellow with the Institute of Chinese Studies Delhi and the Harvard-Yenching Institute, currently pursuing a PhD in Chinese Studies at University of Delhi.