Regime change would be unlikely to bring democracy to Iran

The timing and targets of Israel’s attacks on Iran tell us that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s short-term goal is to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities in order to diminish its weapons program severely.

But Netanyahu has made clear another goal: he said the war with Iran “could certainly” lead to regime change in the Islamic republic.

These comments came after an Israeli plan to assassinate the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly rebuffed by United States President Donald Trump.

It’s no secret Israel has wanted to see the current government of Iran fall for some time, as have many government officials in the US.

But what would things look like if the government did topple?

How is power wielded in today’s Iran?

Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic and authoritarian elements to its governing structure.

The founding figure of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law.

As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive and judiciary.

Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president (currently Masoud Pezeshkian). There are regular elections for both.

But while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice it is a “closed loop” that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top.

Khamenei has been in power for more than 35 years, taking office following Khomeini’s death in 1989. The former president of Iran, he was chosen to become supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic jurists.

While members of the assembly are elected by the public, candidates must be vetted by the powerful 12-member Guardian Council (also known as the Constitutional Council). Half of this body is selected by the supreme leader, while the other half is approved by the Majles.

The council also has the power to vet all candidates for president and the parliament.

In last year’s elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates from running for president, as well as for the Majles and the Assembly of Experts. Among those disqualified was a moderate former president, Hassan Rouhani.

As such, the supreme leader is increasingly facing a crisis of legitimacy with the public. Elections routinely have low turnout. Even with a reformist presidential candidate in last year’s field – the eventual winner, Masoud Pezeshkian – turnout was below 40% in the first round.

Freedom House gives Iran a global freedom score of just 11 out of 100.

The supreme leader also directly appoints the leaders in key governance structures, such as the judiciary, the armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The all-powerful IRGC

So, Iran is far from a democracy. But the idea that regime change would lead to a full democracy that is aligned with Israel and the US is very unlikely.

Iranian politics is extremely factional. Ideological factions, such as the reformists, moderates and conservatives, often disagree vehemently on key policy areas. They also jockey for influence with the supreme leader and the rest of the clerical elite. None of these factions is particularly friendly with the US, and especially not with Israel.

There are also institutional factions. The most powerful group in the country is the clerical elite, led by the supreme leader. The next most powerful faction would be the IRGC.

Originally formed as a kind of personal guard for the supreme leader, the IRGC’s fighting strength now rivals that of the regular army.

The IRGC is extremely hardline politically. At times, the IRGC’s influence domestically has outstripped that of presidents, exerting significant pressure on their policies. The guard only vocally supports presidents in lockstep with Islamic revolutionary doctrine.

In addition to its control over military hardware and its political influence, the guard is also entwined with the Iranian economy.

The IRGC is heavily enriched by the status quo, with some describing it as a “kleptocratic” institution. IRGC officials are often awarded state contracts, and are allegedly involved in managing the “black economy” used to evade sanctions.

Given all of this, the IRGC would be the most likely political institution to take control of Iran if the clerical elite were removed from power.

In peacetime, the general consensus is the IRGC would not have the resources to orchestrate a coup if the supreme leader died. But in a time of war against a clear enemy, things could be different.

Possible scenarios post-Khamenei

So, what might happen if Israel were to assassinate the supreme leader?

One scenario would be a martial law state led by the IRGC, formed at least in the short term for the purposes of protecting the revolution.

In the unlikely event the entire clerical leadership were decimated, the IRGC could attempt to reform the Assembly of Experts and choose a new supreme leader itself, perhaps even supporting Khamenei’s son’s candidacy.

Needless to say, this outcome would not lead to a state more friendly to Israel or the US. In fact, it could potentially empower a faction that has long argued for a more militant response to both.

Another scenario is a popular uprising. Netanyahu certainly seems to think this is possible, saying in a recent interview: “The decision to act, to rise up this time, is the decision of the Iranian people.”

Indeed, many Iranians have long been disillusioned with their government – even with more moderate and reformist elements within it. Mass protests have broken out several times in recent decades – most recently in 2022 – despite heavy retaliation from law enforcement.

We’ve seen enough revolutions to know this is possible. After all, modern Iran was formed out of one. But once again, new political leadership being more friendly to Israel and the West is not a foregone conclusion.

It is possible for Iranians to hold contempt in their hearts for both their leaders and the foreign powers that would upend their lives.

Andrew Thomas is a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Deakin University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.