Philippine naval upgrade more spectacle than strategy

As tensions rise with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines may be advancing a naval modernization strategy centered more on signaling and alignment than actual deterrence.

This month, USNI News reported that the Philippine Navy (PN) launched its first Rajah Solayman-class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in Ulsan, South Korea, marking a significant step in its maritime modernization.

Named after a 16th-century Filipino hero, BRP Rajah Solayman (PS20) is the first of six ships procured from South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) under a 2022 contract aimed at reinforcing the country’s overstretched fleet.

Initially designed as a 1,500-ton vessel, the OPV was later expanded to 2,400 tons under HHI’s HDP-2200+ design, which enhanced its range and endurance for extended patrols.

Armed with an Oto Melara 76-millimeter main gun and Aselsan SMASH 30-millimeter remote-controlled weapon systems, the ship is built for maritime security operations amid increasing tensions in the South China Sea.

Philippine military officials have emphasized that the six-vessel program will replace aging patrol assets, supplement forces in critical maritime areas and enhance the country’s sovereignty defense posture. The ship’s 5,500 nautical mile range and 30-day endurance ensure prolonged operational capability.

While production is slated to conclude by 2028, South Korea is already positioning itself for further defense contracts in the 2030s, including potential frigate and corvette programs under the Philippines’ next phase of military modernization.

Yet, beneath these moves is a crucial strategic question: Are they aimed at real deterrence, or are they crafted more for show, particularly to China?

In line with the Philippines’ de facto “assertive transparency” strategy to name and shame China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and galvanize international support for its cause, Manila requires high-profile, high-visibility assets, such as frigates, OPVs, and light combat aircraft, to effectively respond to China’s gray zone challenges.

However, the survivability of such assets in the event of escalating tensions with China may be questionable.

As seen in Taiwan’s case, high-visibility platforms, such as surface warships and fighter jets, are vulnerable to rapid destruction in a Chinese first strike, prompting substantial investment in asymmetric warfare assets, including submarines.

But with Philippine submarine procurement still in the early planning phase, the Brahmos missile system has become the centerpiece of the country’s asymmetric deterrent posture.

However, as Ashley Tellis notes in a July 2024 article for The Print, without supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure for dynamic targeting, these missiles will remain largely symbolic.

Tellis says those deficiencies mean the missiles will be useful only against fixed, nearby targets, such as the contested Scarborough Shoal, and are not credible tools for flexible or long-range deterrence.

Furthermore, China could easily repair or replace damaged or destroyed warships, given its massive shipbuilding capabilities. Underscoring this capability, a 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the US.

If the Philippines truly recognized the urgency of building asymmetric capabilities, it might be willing to make more difficult defense trade-offs.

For example, Felix Chang mentions in a November 2019 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) article that Vietnam, a similarly challenged maritime neighbor, acquired six Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 2009 at a cost of US$2 billion, equivalent to half its defense budget.

While Vietnam’s proximity to China and history of conflict justify such investment, the Philippines has not demonstrated the same urgency or strategic commitment to undersea deterrence.

Yet, such stealth investments appear to be mismatched with the Philippines’ budget constraints and its current emphasis on diplomatic visibility through multilateral defense engagement.

In line with this, the Philippines has been signing military access agreements with “like-minded” countries, such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, with the possible goal of maintaining a high tempo of high-publicity multinational naval exercises in the South China Sea.

“We have noted a marked decrease in the illegal and coercive actions of the PLA each time there is a multilateral or bilateral maritime cooperative activity… No PLA Navy, Coast Guard, or maritime militia noted within proximity,” says Philippine Navy spokesperson Admiral Roy Trinidad, as quoted by Defense Post in a February 2025 article.

Still, when push comes to shove in the South China Sea, it is unclear whether the Philippines’ “alternative” defense partners will come to its aid. Even the US, its most capable and only treaty partner, has more than once prioritized its broader strategic interests over Philippine concerns during past incidents with China.

At the political level, multinational naval exercises may also serve as part of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s broader effort to claim legitimacy among wealthy liberal democracies, thereby securing economic assistance and political support despite the historical controversies associated with the Marcos dynasty.

Moreover, since the US has indefinitely stationed the Typhon and NMESIS missile systems in the Philippines, nominally for training purposes, it provides Marcos Jr with a strategic buffer that reinforces his domestic position.

Typhon is armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles that can reach mainland China from the Philippines, while NMESIS is an anti-ship system that could hit Chinese warships transiting the Bashi Channel.

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy prioritizes Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific region, while accepting a higher risk in theaters such as Europe. This focus gives Marcos Jr room to rely on US support to enhance his security credentials and consolidate domestic legitimacy.

According to a February 2025 Social Weather Station (SWS) survey, 78% of Philippine respondents support political candidates who assert sovereign rights against China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. With such strong public sentiment, Marcos Jr could frame his administration as resolute on sovereignty, even with limited military muscle.

However, the Philippines does not face any existential threat on the level of Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and South Korea, as no country since World War II has threatened its destruction. The country’s primary threats are internal, including poverty, political instability, insurgency and terrorism.

While China has been a troublesome neighbor for the Philippines, it does not seek the destruction of the Philippine state, making China more of a challenge to be managed than a threat to be dealt with.

Even if Philippine policymakers understand that nuance, and Marcos Jr courts Chinese investment while under rising economic pressure, his previous hardline stance and the Philippines’ longstanding dependency on US politico-military ties may prevent anything substantial from happening in the near term.

But as long as Philippine defense planning is shaped by external validation rather than internal resolve, its military buildup risks remaining more symbolic than strategic.