China’s Fujian carrier flexes mass swarm attack power

China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, isn’t just a leap in hardware. It marks a bold shift in maritime doctrine that aims to overcome the limits of its smaller predecessors and project power far beyond the First Island Chain.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported, citing Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, that China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is on track to conduct “deck load strikes,” a type of mass swarm attack involving the simultaneous launch of numerous aircraft.

This marks the first time state media has publicly acknowledged the capability, which had previously been the subject of analyst speculation.

The tactic, pioneered by the US Navy during the Vietnam War and known as an “Alpha strike,” aims to overwhelm enemy defenses through rapid saturation, securing early detection and first-strike advantage.

The CCTV report noted that Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult system significantly boosts sortie rates over older ski-jump designs, laying the technical foundation for such operations.

Military analyst Cao Weidong noted these strikes would push the carrier’s systems to the limit, enabling it to destroy, suppress or deter enemy forces and support amphibious operations. The Fujian, launched in 2022 and undergoing steady sea trials since May 2023, is expected to be commissioned by year-end, joining the Liaoning and Shandong to form a three-carrier fleet.

This fleet would significantly enhance China’s naval escort and strike capabilities. The report portrays Fujian as central to a “historic leap” in China’s maritime strike capacity, with its full combat potential hinging on the success of deck load strike training.

China is leveraging Fujian’s deck load strike capability to overcome the limitations of its smaller carriers. This shift marks a doctrinal leap toward using large carriers as power projection tools and asymmetric counterweights to superior US naval forces under an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) umbrella.

China’s smaller carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, face an offense-defense dilemma. With limited aircraft numbers, committing more jets to offense weakens defense, while holding back reduces strike power.

According to China Power, the Liaoning has an air wing comprising 18-24 J-15 fighters and 17 helicopters, while its sister ship, the Shandong, has a slightly larger air wing, with four more fixed-wing aircraft and eight additional helicopters.

Fujian’s air wing dwarfs those of its predecessors, with China Power estimating 60 aircraft onboard, including 40 fighters, helicopters and early warning platforms.

Liaoning and Shandong would be hard-pressed to mount an Alpha Strike. A December 2024 Citadel article notes that an Alpha Strike from the USS Harry S Truman consists of 36 F/A-18 E/F fighters launching 144 air-to-surface missiles, including the AGM-88 anti-radiation missile.

Given Fujian’s air wing and electromagnetic launch catapult, it should, on paper, be capable of generating similar airpower surges. That capability may fit within a broader asymmetric naval doctrine against more powerful US carrier battlegroups.

Daniel Rice notes in a July 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s (PLAN) carrier doctrine centers on a three-layer defense system, enabling blue-water operations with growing independence and reach.

According to Rice, the carrier battlegroup is organized around concentric defense zones: the “Outer Defense Zone” (185–400 kilometers) patrolled by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strike and ISR; the “Middle Defense Zone” (45–185 kilometers) covered by destroyers and frigates with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets; and the “Inner Defense Zone” (100 meters–45 kilometers) protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems.

Rice describes the carrier as a command hub supported by replenishment ships for sustained operations. He adds that air operations follow either “split wave” or “continuous” patterns, optimized for saturation strikes or persistent air presence, indicating doctrinal experimentation.

Rice concludes that the PLAN’s focus on layered defense, integrated air-sea coordination and logistics highlights its transition from coastal defense to power projection, with battlegroups designed to dominate maritime airspace, support amphibious landings and counter multi-domain threats.

Such defenses are essential for China to push through the First Island Chain via the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel, strategic chokepoints that Japanese anti-ship missile batteries, combat aircraft and submarines could cover.

Supporting that point, China recently operated two carrier battlegroups simultaneously beyond the First Island Chain, a first with profound implications.

Jennifer Parker notes in a Breaking Defense article this month that among the few countries with aircraft carriers, even fewer can deploy two simultaneously at sea. She says China’s dual deployment signals growing blue-water capabilities and intent to operate beyond its near seas.

However, Ben Ho writes in a September 2024 Breaking Defense article that instead of engaging US forces in a Midway-style encounter, China likely sees its carriers as “fleets-in-being” operating within an A2/AD framework. A cornerstone of that A2/AD posture is the DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), also known as the “carrier killer.”

The US Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) describes it as a dual-capable missile with a 4,000-kilometer range, capable of threatening US carriers from deep within the Chinese mainland. The report adds it may also be capable of land-attack missions, putting US bases like Guam at risk.

China’s carriers could thus operate under this missile umbrella, potentially deterring US intervention in the Western Pacific. Chen Yu-fu and William Hetherington write in an October 2024 Taipei Times article that a three-carrier Chinese force could position itself 300 to 800 kilometers east of Taiwan, outside the reach of Taipei’s anti-ship missiles.

Chen and Hetherington argue that this posture enables China to pressure Taiwan from both the mainland and the Pacific while deterring US and allied action.

With Fujian at the center of a three-carrier fleet, China is adopting a blue-water strategy that blends massed airpower, layered defense and strategic deterrence into a credible counterweight against superior US naval forces.