Golden Dome: real missile defense or grand strategic bluff?

Echoing Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” and reviving Cold War fears, US President Donald Trump’s US$175 billion Golden Dome missile defense initiative is being billed as America’s ultimate defense.

But will Trump’s big-ticket plan offer real protection against Chinese, Russian and North Korean long-range missiles or is the Golden Dome more Trumpian political theater?

Modeled loosely on Israel’s Iron Dome but far more ambitious, Golden Dome would integrate ground-based and space-based systems to detect and intercept missiles, including hypersonics, multiple media sources reported.

The plan, initiated by executive order in January and formally unveiled by Trump this week, envisions a “system of systems” involving hundreds of satellites and interceptors and aims to be operational before the president leaves office in January 2029.

Trump claimed Canada has expressed interest in joining the program, with both nations reportedly discussing enhanced North American Air Defense (NORAD) cooperation.

Funding for the project is uncertain, however, with $25 billion tied to a stalled Republican-backed defense package. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), meanwhile, projects costs for building and maintaining the Golden Dome could spiral beyond $800 billion over two decades.

The initiative already faces criticism over technical feasibility, its potential risks to nuclear stability and the involvement of private firms like Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Peter Thiel and Alex Karp’s Palantir. Defense contractors Lockheed Martin, L3Harris and RTX are among those competing for contracts.

From a geostrategic perspective, Golden Dome could reignite deterrence fears in China and Russia, with both nuclear-armed, near-peer US adversaries viewing its missile defense as a threat to the viability of their nuclear arsenals.

In a 2024 article for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Ottawa Sanders suggests that China worries future US systems could intercept surviving Chinese missiles after a first strike, prompting China to expand its nuclear forces and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.

The US Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report similarly notes that China’s nuclear arsenal is undergoing rapid expansion and modernization, with an estimated 600 operational warheads in 2024 and a projected stockpile of over 1,000 by 2030.

The report adds that China is fielding hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), notably on the DF-27 missile and through fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), capable of evading US missile defenses via unconventional trajectories and maneuverability.

Further, Sanders notes Russia shares similar concerns, viewing US missile defense as a threat to its second-strike capability and responding with an array of so-called “super weapons.”

In a September 2021 Chatham House report, Samuel Bendett and others mention that these include the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of bypassing missile defenses via a South Pole trajectory, and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, which maneuvers unpredictably to evade interception.

Bendett and colleagues add that Russia’s Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone threatens coastal targets with radioactive tsunamis, while the Burevestnik cruise missile boasts theoretically unlimited range. They also cite the Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles as enhancing Russia’s ability to strike high-value targets.

Sanders states that while China and Russia advocate for strategic dialogue, tensions persist, with US missile defense seen as a destabilizing factor in global arms control efforts and nuclear stability.

While operational specifics remain murky, Howard Altman and Tyler Rogoway note in The War Zone that Golden Dome is envisioned as a multi-layered shield integrating space-based interceptors, terrestrial radar and ground-launched missile defenses to neutralize incoming threats.

Altman and Rogoway add that it aims to detect and destroy ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles during their boost phase, leveraging satellite constellations for early warning and tracking.

They emphasize that the system will rely on advanced command-and-control networks to coordinate rapid responses and ensure seamless integration with existing US missile defense assets.

However, no defense is impenetrable. Zachary Burdette writes in the peer-reviewed journal International Security that US space-based missile defense satellites are especially vulnerable due to their centrality to military operations and their inherent exposure in orbit.

Burdette explains that while satellites support vital functions like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), precision guidance and long-range communications, their predictability and limited maneuverability make them susceptible to counterspace attacks, including direct-ascent ASAT weapons and jamming.

Still, Burdette argues that the real challenge is not the loss of individual satellites but the potential erosion of resilience across entire constellations. While he notes that the US is mitigating this risk through proliferated satellite networks, terrestrial alternatives and decentralized operations, success hinges on continued investment and rapid adaptation to emerging threats.

At the strategic level, Golden Dome could have profound effects on US alliances. Leonie Allard and Jean-Loup Samaan write in an Atlantic Council article that by prioritizing space-based interceptors, the system may shift defense cooperation toward US-led technological integration, reducing reliance on ground-based systems.

Allard and Samaan argue that concerns over strategic autonomy in Europe could prompt parallel missile defense efforts, while Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea may deepen co-production agreements for critical missile defense technologies.

However, they also caution that Golden Dome cannot meet the diverse security needs of different US partners. They point out that Ukraine requires robust air and missile defense against Russia, while South Korea depends on a forward-deployed US military presence to deter North Korea.

They also note that while the US missile defense framework in Europe is regional, namely NATO, in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific cooperation is bilateral, making lessons learned in one region difficult to apply to others.

Allard and Samaan stress that the success of Golden Dome and other US missile defense initiatives depends on balancing deterrence credibility with alliance cohesion, ensuring partners view it as a complement rather than a substitute for US military presence.

Still, Golden Dome may be more political showmanship than strategic substance.

Todd Harrison writes in an April 2025 Real Clear Defense article that although the system’s multi-layered architecture, space-based interceptors, terrestrial radar and ground-launched defenses are technically feasible, the scale required to counter and neutralize major threats from China and Russia renders it impractical.

Harrison highlights prohibitive costs, potentially reaching hundreds of billions of dollars, and points to coverage gaps and the physical limitations of space-based interceptors.

He suggests that the Trump administration may view the Golden Dome less as a deployable defense than as leverage in arms control negotiations. In that light, it may be less a shield than a shimmering bluff whose real target is not just enemy missiles, but public perception and negotiating power.