Defending Europe without the United States

Some 35 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it took President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to impose Russian hegemony on Ukraine to galvanize the Europeans into coming to terms with a geopolitical reality that until recently they had done their best to ignore: The global balance of power has changed and the United States is no longer ready to assume as matter of course the expenses entailed by the security umbrella that it provided to Europe.

Twice during the last century, the United States had to intervene militarily to save Western Europe, initially from the clutches of Hitler and subsequently Stalin. Those days now appear over. Granted, Washington is the force behind Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion. However, this engagement has not constrained Washington from negotiating directly with Putin on a one-to-one basis, leaving Europe out of the loop.

The reaction of the European Commission is a “White Paper” presented on March 19, 2025, which provides that the Europeans should allocate 300 billion euros (US$340 billion) to defense spending to end their military dependence on the United States by 2030. Or, in other words, to ensure that 450 million European citizens no longer depend for their security on the protection provided by 340 million Americans confronted by 140 million Russians who proved incapable of defeating 38 million Ukrainians.

On paper, the reaction of the Europeans appears noteworthy. In practice, however, the situation is far from clear. Currently, the 300 billion euros that the EU would like its members to allocate to defense spending do not exist. The funds will have to be raised.

Considering that defense is a national prerogative, it will be up to each EU member state to decide not only whether it wishes to increase the proportion of its GDP allocated to defense but also, if it wishes to go ahead, how to raise the required funds.

While Germany has made a U-turn in its fiscal policy by ensuring that defense spending will no longer be subject to its deficit reduction policy, other heavily indebted EU members might not wish to follow suit.

Disengaging the EU from its erstwhile American protector, whose reliability is now in doubt, is far more than a matter of funding. For the past 80 years, Europe thrived under the protection of the American umbrella.

During that time frame, two alliances took shape. NATO under American sponsorship and the European Community, which is an attempt to create an integrated European identity. While NATO is a military alliance and the EU an institutional one, the relationship between the two is muddled by the fact  that of the 27 EU member states, 23 are simultaneously members of NATO

The EU’s attempt to disengage from its over-reliance on its American umbrella is based on two basic assumptions.

• The first assumption is that, whatever way the conflict in Ukraine turns, Russia will remain a military threat to Europe.
• The second assumption is that the United States is no longer the reliable partner that it was assumed to be, and the security umbrella it provided until now to Europe might not endure.

Both assumptions are open to scrutiny.

Seen from a Russian perspective, the crisis in Ukraine is essentially a war between Russo-Slavs from Muscovy and Russo-Slavs from Kyiv. As such, it is liable to endure in one form or another until either one side succeeds in imposing its will on the other, a currently unlikely proposition, or a compromise is reached, which would result in the conflict being frozen. Thus, it is likely that Ukraine will remain a flashpoint for decades to come.

While one can assume that Putin views his relationship with Belarus from a similar perspective, there is no evidence that he seeks to expand his reach beyond the Russo-Slav ecosphere. Thus, an EU rearmament is, in fact, a contingency plan that concerns essentially what are the “frontline states” with Germany in the lead.

These states, namely Germany, the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, have had for centuries adversarial relations with their Russian neighbor and tend to view all things Russian with suspicion. For them, a resurgent Russia is a historical threat. The threat, in their eyes, has only been confirmed by Putin’s Ukraine invasion.

In contrast, countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal were never directly exposed to Russia. Thus, rearmament to confront a Russian threat that might never materialize is not one of their priorities.

This diverse perception of the nature of the threat that Europe has to face explains in great part why there is no EU integrated defense policy. A contributing factor to this vacuum was the existence of NATO and the American defense umbrella that it provided to the Europeans.

The end result was that, during the decades that followed the end of the Cold War, the Europeans not only proved incapable of generating a common foreign policy but also delegated their defense to the United States.

The war in Ukraine, with its global repercussions, and the emergence of the Trump administration, with its proclivity to go it alone, have caught the Europeans with neither a common foreign policy nor an integrated defense strategy.

Granted, neither was necessary before the crisis in Ukraine and the concurrent election of President Donald Trump. But now the uncertainties generated by the conflict and the loss of confidence in Washington’s commitment to stand by Europe in case of a new crisis have galvanized the EU into trying to disconnect its defense capacity from that of the United States.

Because the creation of a “European” army is unfeasible both technically and politically, the only resort left to the EU is to promote the defense potential of the individual EU member states. That goal is easier to formulate than to achieve.

Europe’s fragmented defense industries not only compete against each other but have to contend with offers from American firms. Currently, 60% of the weapons used by the Europeans are of American origin, and the European market corresponds to 35 % of all American weapon exports.

Britain, France, Germany and Italy all produce their own tanks, competing not only among themselves but also on the international market with the American M1 Abrams.

Granted, through NATO, the Europeans have standardized their heavy artillery shells at 155 mm. Thus, the ten models of artillery pieces that the Europeans have donated to Ukraine fire the same caliber shell. However, the artillery pieces that fire the shells are all of different designs, thus creating a logistical nightmare in terms of upkeep and spare parts.

The same fragmentation exists at the level of aircraft, long-distance anti-aircraft systems and, last but not least, intelligence, for which, at present, there is no substitute for America’s input.

A related issue is troops. Currently, Washington has some 100,000 troops in Europe and could rapidly increase that number by 200,000 more for a total of 300,000. This is considered by NATO to be the minimum number of troops needed by Europe to confront a potential Russian invasion – and the number that the Europeans, in the absence of an American intervention, should be able to deploy.

But the number of troops is by no means the only issue. Currently, the three main frontline states, namely Germany, France and Poland, have a total of some 580,000 active troops. What they, and the 27 EU member states, don’t have is an integrated defense industry and, last but not least, a common foreign policy.

Within this global perspective, it is obvious that NATO, by its very existence, did not create an environment that encouraged the Europeans to develop an autonomous and integrated defense policy as an alternative to their reliance on the United States in case, as is happening today, the Europeans start to realize that the American umbrella might not be as dependable as it might have appeared during the Cold War.

For the Europeans, the current uncertainty is a throwback to the 1950s when the six members of what was then the European Union failed in their efforts to create an integrated European Army. Today, what is now an association of 27 states is not much closer than it was some 70 years ago to creating a common, integrated foreign policy and defense configuration.

NATO did receive something of a wake-up call with Russia’s actions in 2014 and made some efforts to improve deterrence and defense posture. The full-scale 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine reinvigorated the organization overnight, panicking Sweden and Finland into joining the alliance as NATO reinforced its eastern flank and sent support to Ukraine.

The Trump administration’s relationship with Russia is difficult to define, but Washington does not give the impression that it prioritizes Europe. Thus, “America First” has to be taken literally by the Europeans.

The end result is that the law of unintended consequences will have played against both Washington and Moscow. Putin now has to confront a resurgent NATO, while Washington will have to deal with a resurgent Europe that aspires to be no longer dependent on the American umbrella and the US defense industry for its security.

That all 27 EU member states will participate in this effort is doubtful. Actually, rearmament as portrayed by the European Commission concerns essentially the two main “frontline states,” namely Poland and Germany, with Sweden and Finland on the sidelines. With a total population of some 135 million, and not counting their economic weight, they are hardly at a disadvantage if the need arises to confront some 140 million Russians.

Over the past decades, the EU has been enlarged to the point of rendering it unmanageable. With members as diverse as Greece and Denmark, Germany and Spain, Estonia and France, and with none willing to abdicate any sovereignty, the cultural, geopolitical and historical obstacles to integration are still predominant.

The end result is that, in practical terms, European “rearmament” actually means German rearmament. Granted, it should take a decade or more, but it will reinstate Germany’s historic role as Europe’s main military power and buffer against Russia.

That will unavoidably raise the question of Europe’s nuclear deterrent – a question to which today there is no answer, but a question nonetheless.

Alexander Casella, PhD, has taught and he has worked as a journalist for Le Monde, The Times, The New York Times, Die Zeit, The Guardian and Swiss radio and TV, writing primarily on China and Vietnam. In 1973, he joined the UNHCR, serving, among other postings, as head of the East Asia Section and director for Asia and Oceania. He then served as representative in Geneva of the International Center for Migration Policy Development.