The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, India, and military clashes that followed between India and Pakistan have reignited fears of a renewed spiral of tensions between the two neighbours. Even though the two sides have agreed to a US-mediated ceasefire for now, India has not withdrawn its decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) – a historic agreement that long survived hostile bilateral relations.
India has been mulling over the possibility of stopping the water flow of rivers flowing toward Pakistan.
It’s important to note that 80% of river water in Pakistan passes through or originates from India – a strategic asset that India has not used thus far in its battle against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. International laws and conventions do allow a country to take recourse to such measures, in case the other party engages in unlawful conduct such as cross-border terrorism.
Yet, what deserves closer scrutiny is China’s reaction. As an upper riparian state, China’s narrative on India’s Indus water decision reveals more about Beijing’s geopolitical calculus than about any principled stance on transboundary water management.
China’s double standards
Despite official proclamations of neutrality, Chinese commentators have largely cast India’s suspension of the IWT in a negative light, framing it as a form of unlawful coercive diplomacy rather than a response to the Pahalgam terror attack in India from across the border. Articles published on Chinese media platforms such as Baidu – with titles such as “Water is a Weapon – paint India’s decision as a manifestation of a strategy aimed at destabilizing regional equilibrium under the guise of treaty reinterpretation.
Such a narrative framing stands in stark contrast to Beijing’s own opaque and unilateral transboundary water governance practices on the Tibetan Plateau. Domestically, its expansive hydropower projects face minimal criticism, while India’s actions are vilified as attempts to “weaponize” natural resources.
Chinese analysts have described India’s control over the upper Indus as a geopolitical lever, an assertion of dominance that allegedly leaves Pakistan vulnerable and beholden to New Delhi’s goodwill.
Such accusations conveniently ignore India’s repeated calls, especially after the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, to review the treaty as a matter of national interest, not religious or ideological motivation. The portrayal of India’s treaty suspension as a strategic “water cut-off” further reinforces Beijing’s narrative-building attempts about India.
Subtle self-insertion into the Indus equation
Chinese commentators have also subtly inserted China into the water-sharing conversation by emphasising that the Indus originates from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, referred to domestically as the Shiquan River. This framing positions China not just as a neutral observer but as a potential stakeholder, with a latent claim to relevance in Indus Basin geopolitics.
Scholars such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies argue that India’s move aims to amplify diplomatic pressure on Pakistan while enhancing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s domestic political stature. Liu contends that the decision also reflects India’s limited retaliatory options post-Pahalgam and is a calculated effort to renegotiate the treaty under duress.
While acknowledging the challenges this creates for Pakistan, some Chinese analysts point out that Pakistan is not entirely defenseless. Strategic infrastructure, such as the Tarbela and Mangla dams, provides short-term mitigation. And the legal framework of the Indus Water Treaty, under World Bank auspices, allows Islamabad to pursue remedies through international institutions. However, considering the complexity of the situation, Pakistan’s options are limited.
The facade of neutrality and the reality of alignment
China’s professed neutrality rings hollow in light of recurring rhetorical patterns that consistently side with Pakistan. Phrases such as “India is using water as a weapon” and “the Indus does not solely belong to India” underscore a discernible alignment with Islamabad’s position.
A Baidu commentary noted, “The best way forward is to use a platform like CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) to promote water cooperation and stabilize South Asia. After all, water belongs to everyone, and the good fruit is not eaten alone.”
Such commentators overlook the fact that CPEC passes through a disputed territory between India and Pakistan, thus making any infrastructure development there unlawful in the eyes of international law.
The irony is unmistakable: while China appeals to the principles of shared water governance in South Asia, it remains opaque and unilateral in its practices as an upper riparian state.
China’s repeated violation of international norms by unilaterally stopping and releasing waters during the summer and monsoon season of the Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo river is a telltale sign of this behavior.
Strategic calculations and regional posturing
China is also using the India-Pakistan water dispute as leverage to signal its broader geopolitical intentions. Lin Minwang of Fudan University suggests that India might pursue limited military action against Pakistan to satisfy domestic audiences – but such a move would be widely condemned.
He emphasizes that China’s troop presence near the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir since 2020 acts as a deterrent, forcing India to weigh Chinese sensitivities in its regional security calculus. Such narratives portray China as a direct party to the India-Pakistan water dispute.
What is notably absent in Chinese discourse is empathy for the victims of terrorism in India. The narrative prioritizes geopolitical advantage and regional leverage, not human tragedy. China’s emerging posture is less about impartial and professional diplomacy and more about strategic signalling – reaffirming its “ironclad” friendship with Pakistan while reinforcing its stake in South Asia’s evolving water politics.
China controls the upstream portions of all the major rivers that flow into India! It can do to India what India threatens to do to Pakistan.
No amount of putting lipstick on a sacred cow can hide India’s humiliation by Pakistan. Weaponizing water will boomerang on the Indian corrupt and incapable Indian so-called leaders.
Very surprising to see this kind of talk even after the recent military debacle. India was once a growing economy, but has gradually lost all its marbles in decade past. Today, a land divided by region (north/south), race (caste), colour, and creed has no less than 140 active insurgencies. If you take away the wealth of the top 5% elite, the remaining 95% live on $1130 per capita per year, less than the Sub Saharan Africa.
The writer is part of the Indian Anglotariat that continues the English Raj and its English disease – wasteful moneyed Democracy, Capitalism, and Cricket. Its neighbours – Pakistan, Iran, China, and even Russia et al all have more efficient Republics, doing more with less, much evidenced by the PAF that with mere old J10Cs that PLAAF is now retiring and with home programmed kill-chain software Link47 was able to disable the mighty IAF with latest $300M Rafales.
As far as IWT, as the commentator Wgzhq said so well, if India reneges on the Treaty, China can do all to India that she does to China’s friend and ally Pakistan. What is good for the goose, is also good for the gander. Our Indian friends should look out the window and smell the coffee that knowing a few words of English does not mean the mastery of the globe a la Empire that is long dead anyway.
Weak and pitiful defense. If your only argument is about whataboutism or what China is allegedly doing, then you’ve gotten pretty desperate indeed. It’s not like China’s alignment with Pakistan, its iron brother, is a new fact. Hindutva supporters should therefore not start a game that they can’t finish. What they can impose on the downstream communities in Bangladesh & Pak, China can do too to the Indians.