Is Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy washed up?

In the unfolding drama of 21st-century geopolitics, Northeast Asia is emerging as an increasingly pivotal arena. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy – once hailed as the cornerstone of regional security and economic architecture – is now facing fresh turbulence amid shifting global dynamics.

As new alignments begin to take shape, critical questions arise: Is the United States losing its grip on the region? And, more provocatively, is China succeeding in drawing traditional US allies such as South Korea and Japan into its orbit?

Recent developments, including the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Tokyo and the Expert Dialogue held at South Korea’s National Assembly, suggest that tectonic shifts are shifting – albeit slowly and cautiously. The language of these diplomatic engagements reveals a subtle but significant recalibration of strategic postures in the region, raising both opportunities and alarms for global stakeholders.

Winds of change: the trilateral meeting in Tokyo

On the 22nd of this month, in Tokyo, the foreign ministers of South Korea, China, and Japan convened for their first trilateral meeting in over 16 months. The meeting was significant not merely because it happened after a long hiatus but because of the changing geopolitical environment that necessitated it.

With South Korea and Japan both reacting to what many interpret as a deprioritization of the region by the United States under the Trump administration, the door is now ajar for a more multipolar diplomatic setting.

The meeting emphasized cooperation in sectors directly impacting citizens’ daily lives – such as healthcare, disaster relief, aging populations, trade and science and technology. Notably, the joint commitment to organizing a Korea-China-Japan summit soon speaks volumes about the momentum behind this trilateral initiative.

Yet, this was not merely a bureaucratic gathering. Beneath the technocratic tone lay a quiet but notable recalibration. South Korea and Japan, although still formally aligned with Washington, appear increasingly open to engaging Beijing in areas traditionally reserved for strategic partners. While this may not constitute a pivot, it certainly reflects a hedging strategy – acknowledging the rise of China, while subtly compensating for uncertainties in Washington’s commitment.

A subtle shift in strategic thinking

What is particularly revealing is the softening of political rhetoric around China by both Seoul and Tokyo. Although tensions remain – especially concerning historical grievances, territorial disputes, and North Korea’s behavior – the tone and content of the Tokyo meeting displayed a clear inclination toward stability and multilateralism, rather than confrontation.

Indeed, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul of South Korea explicitly stated, “We agreed to deepen substantive cooperation in areas closely linked to people’s daily lives.” This is no mere diplomatic platitude – it reflects a growing consensus that the region must build institutional frameworks independent of external powers.

The acknowledgement that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is a “shared responsibility” among the three countries further cements the notion of a Northeast Asian community taking charge of its destiny.

The US Indo-Pacific strategy: losing traction?

The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, introduced during the Trump administration and continued with modifications under Biden, sought to counterbalance China’s rising influence through strategic partnerships and military alliances. The core philosophy was to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific” by reinforcing ties with regional powers, most notably Japan, South Korea, India and Australia.

However, this framework has encountered several headwinds. First, the Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy undermined longstanding alliances by questioning defense commitments and demanding increased cost-sharing. This eroded trust in the reliability of US security guarantees, prompting allies to reconsider their strategic autonomy.

Second, the Biden administration, while rhetorically recommitting to the region, has been preoccupied with crises elsewhere – especially Ukraine and the Middle East – leading to concerns about strategic bandwidth. Simultaneously, America’s domestic polarization and economic challenges have made its foreign policy appear erratic and reactive, rather than coherent and enduring.

Against this backdrop, China’s patient and consistent diplomacy – emphasizing economic integration, people-to-people ties and regional institutions – offers an alternative and atractive vision for Asia. This vision, while not without its risks, appears increasingly appealing to countries tired of being caught in the crossfire of great power rivalry.

China’s quiet diplomacy: pulling without pushing

China’s strategy in Northeast Asia has been notably nuanced. Rather than aggressively confronting US allies, Beijing has focused on building bridges in areas of mutual interest – such as climate change, pandemic recovery and trade. The recently held Trilateral Expert Dialogue at South Korea’s National Assembly is a case in point.

Organized jointly by the Bipartisan Forum for Advanced Diplomacy and the Institute for Global Strategic Cooperation, the forum was attended by ambassadors from both Japan and China – underscoring a symbolic shift toward dialogue, even amidst differences. Sessions focused on regional resilience, economic frameworks, climate change and cooperative diplomacy. While security issues were not sidelined, the emphasis was clearly on pragmatic cooperation rather than ideological alignment.

Notably, policymakers and scholars called for institutionalizing trilateral mechanisms that could weather political transitions and global shocks. If such frameworks are developed and sustained, they may gradually evolve into an East Asian community with its own norms, priorities, and rules of engagement – potentially diminishing US leverage in the long run.

North Korea: a persistent divergence

Despite the convergence on many issues, North Korea remains a key area of divergence. Both South Korea and Japan voiced strong concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear provocations and its growing military cooperation with Russia. Minister Cho stressed the need to fully implement UN Security Council resolutions and prevent any strategic reward to North Korea, especially in the context of the Ukraine war.

Japan’s Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya also echoed concerns about cryptocurrency theft, nuclear threats and illicit arms deals. However, China’s position remained more measured, emphasizing dialogue and denuclearization without assigning explicit blame to North Korea or addressing its ties with Russia.

This divergence underscores a critical limit to trilateral cooperation. While South Korea and Japan still align with Washington on core security issues, their willingness to tolerate differing views on North Korea in a trilateral context reveals a growing diplomatic flexibility.

Strategic autonomy or subtle realignment?

The big question remains: is this trilateral engagement a step toward strategic autonomy or a sign of subtle realignment toward China?

For now, the answer lies somewhere in between. South Korea and Japan are not abandoning their alliances with the United States. Their military and intelligence cooperation with Washington remains robust. However, their growing engagement with China in economic, technological, and social domains suggests a recalibration toward greater autonomy.

This pragmatic balancing act reflects both geopolitical necessity and domestic pressure. With China as their largest trading partner and the US as their primary security ally, neither South Korea nor Japan can afford a zero-sum choice. Instead, they appear to be crafting a middle path – one that allows engagement with both superpowers while preserving national interests.

The road ahead: a multipolar Northeast Asia?

The proposed trilateral summit – pending resolution of South Korea’s domestic political instability – may serve as a litmus test for this evolving regional alignment. If successfully held, it could mark the beginning of a new era in which East Asian powers increasingly manage their own affairs, moving beyond the binary strategic choices imposed during the Cold War era.

From the perspective of US strategic planners, this shift represents both a challenge and an opportunity. Washington must understand that its allies in Asia may not necessarily be defecting from the US-led order, but are instead seeking greater flexibility and agency in navigating an increasingly complex global landscape. A more consultative, less transactional US approach – one that acknowledges and respects regional aspirations – could help revitalize America’s presence in the region rather than render it obsolete. The ball is now in Washington’s court.

The emergence of a multipolar Northeast Asia appears increasingly likely. If trilateral cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan continues to institutionalize, it could lay the foundation for a new regional architecture – one that may operate independently of, yet not necessarily in opposition to, existing security alliances. This could foster a more resilient and balanced regional order.

It is crucial for other regional players – particularly India – to take careful note of these undercurrents. The geopolitical environment in East Asia is shifting rapidly, and clinging to outdated narratives or rigid alliance structures could prove counterproductive. India must be agile, updating its strategic thinking and foreign policy posture to reflect the emerging dynamics of a multipolar Asia. Doing so will not only protect its interests but also position it as a more effective player in the evolving regional equation.

The recent diplomatic overtures among regional powers signal a quiet yet consequential shift in the geopolitics of East Asia. While the US Indo-Pacific strategy may not be obsolete, it is undeniably under strain and facing a critical test of its relevance. In contrast, China’s diplomatic strategy – grounded in economic pragmatism, multilateral engagement, and non-interference rhetoric – is gradually reshaping the strategic choices of America’s closest allies.

Whether this shift results in a permanent realignment remains to be seen. However, one thing is increasingly clear: the era of unipolar US dominance in Asia is fast fading. In its place, a more complex, multipolar order is emerging – one where diplomacy, economic interdependence, and regional cooperation may carry more weight than traditional military alliances.

Navigating this new equation will require vision, flexibility, and a deep understanding of regional sensitivities. The strategic future of Asia will not be written by force alone, but by those who can build inclusive institutions, foster trust, and respond wisely to the changing tides of global power.