Plagued by delays, software glitches and cybersecurity flaws, the US$2 trillion F-35 stealth jet fighter program is expected to come under fire when the Elon Musk-led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) launches its probe into the Pentagon’s books.
Musk has referred to the crucial defense program as a “flop” and its builders “idiots”, even before his DOGE investigators have dug in. That assessment collides with at least one US Air Force leader who says Musk is overestimating the capability of drones to replace fighter jets in actual warfighting.
To be sure, Musk’s criticisms have merit. A declassified February 2024 assessment by the US Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) revealed that the F-35 program faces significant challenges despite its promise of tech-driven, cutting-edge capabilities.
The F-35’s so-called “Block 4” development and operational testing has highlighted several critical issues that have hindered the program’s effectiveness and operational suitability, according to the publicly available assessment report.
For one, the Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2) process intended to deliver incremental Block 4 capabilities every six months has not met expectations, resulting in significant delays, the report said.
The Tech Refresh 3 (TR-3) avionics upgrade aims to provide enough computing power for Block 4 capabilities, including new sensor suites, long-range weapons, electronic warfare, data fusion and cross-platform interoperability.
However, the TR-3 software version 30R08 remains incomplete after over two years of development, with deficiencies introduced into previously delivered capabilities.
Due to insufficient modeling and simulation resources, the developmental process relies heavily on a fly-fix-fly approach, which has exacerbated delays. Those setbacks mean dedicated operational testing of TR-3 upgraded F-35s may not happen until 2026, two years after TR-3 was initially delivered.
Cybersecurity testing of updated software versions of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) has revealed unresolved vulnerabilities, while the transition to a new cloud-based Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN) has yet to resolve many persistent issues.
ODIN’s hardware deployment has improved speed but still runs on ALIS software, delaying the expected benefits of containerized applications and frequent updates.
Maintenance metrics for all F-35 variants remain below Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Operational Requirements Document (ORD) thresholds, with critical failures requiring twice the expected repair time. Reliability indicators, such as Mean Flight Hours Between Critical Failures, are consistently below standards.
Operational availability rates for the F-35 fleet are also below target, driven by spare parts shortages and high maintenance demands. These issues have delayed full-rate production and compromised the aircraft’s readiness for combat scenarios at a time when China is massively upgrading its air fleet.
These issues may explain Musk’s pre-emptive criticism of the F-35, including the billionaire tech tycoon’s berating of its designers, lambasting its design, and questioning of its stealth capabilities and utility compared to drones.
However, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall argues that Musk’s perspective is that of an engineer, not a warfighter, saying that his vision of drone superiority is still many years away.
While Kendall says his vision for the F-35 is that the aircraft should work in tandem with drones, it will not be replaced soon. He stresses that the F-35 is superior to 4th-generation fighter aircraft in every way and will stay in service until the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform is operational.
Considering the F-35’s myriad issues, Musk isn’t off the mark in his critiques. A December 2024 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report highlights that C2D2’s software changes frequently introduced stability issues and disrupted other system functionalities.
Further, in a May 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article, John Tirpak says that F-35 pilots rebooted the TR-3 program multiple times in the air and on the ground during tests.
According to Tirpak, even if the TR-3 upgrade is fully approved, an F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) spokesperson mentions that frequent patches and updates may still be needed to correct deficiencies.
In a November 2024 Project for Government Oversight (POGO) article, Greg William points out ALIS shortcomings. The software, supposed to be the backbone of F-35 maintenance, has shown poor reliability and high false alarm rates due to new aircraft hardware or software updates, impeding rather than facilitating maintenance.
In an article for Global Defense Technology, Grant Turnbull discusses ALIS’ vulnerability to cyberattack. Turnbull says the system’s global interconnectedness and reliance on data sharing across various nodes create multiple entry points for hackers, posing significant risks.
Turnbull mentions that successful cyberattacks could disrupt maintenance schedules by preventing essential software updates or parts ordering, effectively grounding aircraft. Moreover, he notes that malware could insert false information into ALIS, leading to the unnecessary grounding of serviceable aircraft.
He points out that ALIS’s complexity, compounded by single points of failure, such as Central Points of Entry (CPE) and the Autonomous Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU), further exacerbates the vulnerability. Additionally, he states that cyber adversaries could potentially extract critical performance data, compromising operational security.
Compounding the F-35’s software woes, a September 2023 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report mentions that the aircraft suffers from multiple maintenance issues, such as overreliance on contractors limiting government influence and decision-making ability, inadequate training for F-35 maintenance, lack of access to technical data, deprioritized funding for maintenance facilities, and lack of spare parts.
The F-35’s operational readiness rates have also plummeted. A January 2024 DOT&E report mentions that the F-35 fleet’s average availability stood at 51%, far below the 65% target.
The Full Mission Capable (FMC) rate was only 30% across the US fleet and 9% for the operational test fleet, the report said. Combat-coded aircraft fared better, achieving 61% availability and 48% FMC, though are still short of expectations.
Critical reliability and maintainability metrics are also unmet – particularly for the F-35C, which failed to achieve any Operational Requirements Document (ORD) thresholds.
The F-35A and F-35B met some reliability targets but faced corrective maintenance times exceeding thresholds by up to 278%. Rising Not Mission Capable for Supply (NMC-S) rates at 27% indicate worsening logistics. Persistent software instability and shortages in engine parts compound these issues.
The report says that despite improvements in maintenance and supply chains, these readiness gaps undermine the F-35’s ability to meet operational demands and require immediate corrective measures.
Military Watch mentions in an article this month that, in contrast, China’s J-20 stealth fighter has integrated more stable software and its development seems to be progressing with few signs of any issues.
However, China’s military modernization is opaque compared to the US, so such matters may not be made public. Still, the implications for the air balance of power in the Pacific may be significant, where the F-22 and F-35 may be the only aircraft capable of matching China’s growing fleet of 5th-generation stealth aircraft in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea.
It seems the F-35 may exhibit a characteristic first seen by the old F-117 way back in Vietnam days, when things military were viewed through the lens of Defense Secretary MacNamara’s background at Ford Motor Company. Under the rhetoric of “saving money”, one basic air frame was shoehorned into fulfilling many varied missions far beyond its capabilities that needed a separate purpose built airframe for other distinct missions that later in hindsight were evaluated to have been both a cheaper route and a more mission capable approach. In the case of the F-35, wrapping everything up in one airframe for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps’ varied needs and environments, you have a fat toad of a dog that won’t hunt because in the middle of the airframe sits a fat fan for the Marine Corp’s necessary need for vertical takeoff and landing that the Air Force and Navy don’t need. But they all still have to haul it around. Then MacNamara’s one size fits all approach way more than half a century later burden’s the military with this failed rhetoric of one basic airframe for all, no matter how bad it is. But Lockheed is laughing all the way to the bank. Someone needs to show this to Musk as the fly in the ointment that has been the basic thinking flaw that degraded many military needs.
The clock/calendar on my computer says it is February 20, not February 21.
No more USAid to tell the world that these F35 or F22 is super and the best thing since sliced bread when it is not. Just look at all Western weapons in Ukraine. Irrelevant. Whats relevant is drones, small drones, big drones. Who makes them?
Nobody likes the F35. Its too fat and slow and doesn’t fly far enough to do squat
The author still claims: “F-22 and F-35 may be the only aircraft capable of matching China’s growing fleet of 5th-generation stealth aircraft in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait…”
Seriously? Does he believe Trump would risk American lives over Taiwan?
There is no doubt that detection technology will eventually render stealth technology obsolete, likely sooner than later. At that point the F35 becomes the slowest, least maneuverable air superiority aircraft in the world.