Questioning China’s ability to actually fight

China’s military may be modernizing rapidly, but deep-rooted structural flaws, political control and a lack of combat experience could limit its battlefield effectiveness in a potential war with the US and its allies.

Last month, the RAND Corporation think tank released a report questioning the combat readiness of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) despite its breakneck modernization.

RAND argues that while the PLA boasts advanced weaponry and the world’s largest navy, it prioritizes upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule over actually preparing for war.

The report highlights systemic issues, including promotions based on loyalty over merit, ideological training over combat realism and centralized decision-making that hinders battlefield adaptability.

RAND compares the PLA’s modernization to historical cases where military strength failed to ensure battlefield success, citing the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. The report suggests China’s military reforms remain slow and incomplete, emphasizing deterrence and political control over operational effectiveness​.

A separate RAND report examines the PLA’s dual challenge of demographic decline and modernization. It notes that while China’s shrinking population poses long-term concerns, the PLA still has a significantly larger youth pool than the US. However, poor recruitment incentives, unattractive service conditions and competition from the private sector hinder efforts to attract elite talent​.

Cultural barriers, such as military service’s low social status and a conscription-based model, further complicate China’s military modernization. Despite major investments, the PLA struggles to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for a world-class military. If recruitment challenges persist, RAND suggests China may need to rethink its military doctrine and force structure​.

While RAND critiques the PLA’s centralized command structure, Chinese military doctrine stresses political oversight and ideological cohesion to prevent military insubordination—a feature the CCP views as a strength rather than a liability.

In a November 2023 article for The Strategist, Payton Rawson explains that China’s dual command system in the PLA integrates military and political leadership to ensure CCP control.

Rawson states that the structure comprises a party committee, political commissar and political organs to uphold party leadership, prevent corruption and ensure alignment.

He notes that the benefits include increased political loyalty, a lower risk of military coups and a unified command that aligns military actions with party goals. However, he notes that this system may hinder decision-making speed and innovation.

However, emphasizing the PLA’s dual command system’s perceived shortcomings, lack of combat experience and recruitment problems risks underestimating China’s military modernization.

The PLA compensates using advanced simulators, provides realistic Blue Force (BLUFOR) opposition in training scenarios and integrates AI into military decision-making processes.

Despite those advancements, substituting technology for combat experience could only take the PLA so far, as simulations can never fully replicate a combat zone. AI is no substitute for human judgment as it lacks self-awareness and accountability. Should the PLA gain combat experience, it needs the institutions and processes to translate that into operational and strategic advantages.

Those challenges may stymie the development of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, which provides experienced, independent lower-level leadership in Western militaries.

In response, China is developing a “made-to-order” NCO corps focusing on technical skills essential for the PLA. It recruits young people with the appropriate qualifications into the program and promises a stable career path. China’s military may train NCOs with technical expertise, but whether they can lead under fire is another question.

China has also hired outside talent, notably former NATO fighter pilots, to train its air force. While these former NATO servicemen may not have flown the latest Western combat aircraft, they can still impart sensitive tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to their Chinese counterparts.

They still think like their active-duty counterparts and may help refine Chinese pilots’ on-the-fly decision-making skills and mission planning.

In addition to using technology, focusing on technical skills and hiring outside talent, China uses cognitive and information warfare to gain “victory without gun smoke.”

In a January 2023 article for the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), Josh Baughman describes how China’s cognitive warfare strategy focuses on controlling perception and decision-making to weaken adversaries without direct military conflict.

Baughman notes that China’s cognitive warfare strategy operates in peacetime and wartime, leveraging psychological vulnerabilities like fear and misinformation to undermine opponents’ resolve. He says it integrates military, political, economic, and technological tools, using AI and social media to shape narratives and public perception.

He notes that China aims to win conflicts through psychological influence rather than solely military force by controlling information and defining events.

However, China’s cognitive warfare may have a limited effect on a population inoculated against such, as shown by the results of Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential elections, where state and civil society actors worked effectively to “pre-bunk” and discredit such efforts.

Further, Koichiro Takagi mentions in a July 2022 War on the Rocks commentary that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War shows that cognitive warfare didn’t confer any strategic advantage to either side and best supports kinetic combat arms such as airpower, infantry, artillery and armor. Takagi also stresses that wars are decided by decisive physical battles, not by cognitive shaping or mere positioning of forces.

While cognitive warfare shapes adversary perceptions, its limitations in actual conflict underscore the PLA’s reliance on external military observations, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, for operational insights.

Being an observer allows China to learn from the trial-and-error experiences of others without being involved in a conflict. This approach can result in mature, ready-to-absorb TTPs and operational and strategic lessons that could be contextualized according to China’s unique requirements.

In an October 2023 article for The Washington Quarterly, M Taylor Fravel mentions that China’s assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War offers critical military lessons for a potential Taiwan conflict.

First, Fravel says Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory underscores the difficulties of large-scale operations, especially in complex joint-force engagements like an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Second, he notes that Russia’s battlefield failures reveal the dangers of centralized command and rigid leadership structures, pushing China to refine decision-making flexibility.

Third, Fravel says Ukraine’s resilience suggests Taiwan may not capitulate easily, forcing China to prepare for prolonged conflict.

Fourth, Fravel notes that the US’s role in intelligence sharing and coalition-building against Russia raises concerns over a similar response to Chinese aggression, potentially denying China the element of strategic surprise.

Lastly, he says Western sanctions on Russia reveal China’s economic vulnerabilities, incentivizing efforts to insulate its economy.

Despite its high-tech ambitions, China’s military remains unproven in actual combat. If war comes, it won’t be China’s gadgets determining the outcome—but rather the soldiers controlling them.