China is sharpening its electronic warfare blades against the US Navy, targeting critical sensors and radars to disrupt the Americans’ high-tech battle networks in a race for all-domain battlefield dominance.
This month, the South China Morning Post reported that China’s People’s Liberation Army has unveiled a detailed list of US naval targets, including radars and sensors, for potential electronic warfare attacks against US aircraft carrier strike groups.
SCMP says this “kill list,” published in the latest issue of Defense Industry Conversion in China, highlights the PLA’s strategy for disrupting the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system, a critical component of the fleet’s air defense and early warning network.
According to SCMP, Mo Jiaqian, an electronic countermeasures expert with the PLA’s 92728 Unit, authored the report and outlined how the CEC’s reliance on wireless communication links makes it vulnerable to electronic interference. SCMP says key targets mentioned in the report include the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar on Aegis ships and the E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft.
SCMP says the PLA aims to exploit these weaknesses to access the US military network and disrupt operations. It mentions that this development underscores the growing technological rivalry between China and the US, with China leveraging its advanced electronic devices for military applications. The report says the US has responded with sanctions on Chinese enterprises, inadvertently accelerating China’s military-civilian integration.
Interfering with wireless communication links and exploiting them to access adversary networks shows the increasing convergence of electronic and cyber warfare.
In an August 2019 report, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions that the convergence of cyberspace operations and electronic warfare reflects a shift in military doctrine as both disciplines aim to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum.
While the report notes that cyberspace operations and electronic warfare are historically distinct, technological advances have blurred their boundaries, enabling cross-functional capabilities. It points out that while cyberspace operations traditionally employ software to disrupt or control networked systems, electronic warfare uses electromagnetic energy to jam, intercept or manipulate communications.
However, the report says modern operations increasingly see cyberspace operations and electronic warfare as supporting each other, such as transmitting computer code via radio frequencies to compromise adversary networks. For example, it mentions that the US EC-130H Compass Call aircraft, initially designed to jam enemy communications, now transmits malicious code to wireless devices.
This multi-domain approach to attacking networks underscores the development of multi-domain operation (MDO) “kill chains”—the process of detecting, identifying, and engaging military targets. Such chains may herald a new arms race between the US and China.
In the 2020 book, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, Christian Brose argues that the evolving race to develop kill chains marks a seismic shift in military strategy. Brose says that, unlike traditional arms races focused on hardware like battleships or nuclear weapons, this competition centers on cognitive superiority and decision-making speed.
He mentions that the US and China are racing to master technologies such as AI, quantum computing and advanced sensors that can accelerate and automate the kill chain. The goal, Brose says, is to close the kill chain faster than the adversary while disrupting their ability to do the same.
Brose argues that this arms race is not just about weapons but about controlling the flow of information — turning human intent into battlefield action with unprecedented speed.
In line with the multi-domain kill chain arms race, Asia Times reported in February 2024 that the US Department of Defense (DoD) had achieved a significant milestone with the initial readiness of the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) system, a cutting-edge initiative aimed at enhancing military interoperability and AI integration across all warfare domains.
This development marks a crucial step in the US DoD’s strategy to outmaneuver technologically advanced adversaries such as China. The CJADC2 system connects sensors from all armed forces branches into a unified network, enabling faster and more accurate decision-making. The US fiscal 2024 budget allocates USD 1.4 billion for CJADC2, underscoring its transformative potential. The system’s AI-driven capabilities enable rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of battlefield information, allowing for swift identification and targeting of threats.
This evolution builds on the older Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept, emphasizing interoperability with allies and partners. The initiative aims to create an information-fluent force capable of dominating networks and executing precise strikes from diverse locations.
In response to the US CJADC2 concept, Asia Times reported in April 2024 that China developed its Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) concept that integrates advanced technologies such as AI, quantum computing and big data into its military strategy to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US operational systems.
China’s MDPW strategy leverages a comprehensive C4ISR network to coordinate precise strikes across various domains, including cyber and space, to disrupt and dismantle the US military’s command and control infrastructure, thereby gaining a strategic advantage.
However, these MDO concepts might become the latest military intellectual boondoggle, promising much while based on faulty assumptions.
In a January 2024 War on the Rocks article, Davis Ellison and Tim Swejis argue that MDO, while innovative, faces significant challenges in practical implementation. They point out that the primary criticisms include the lack of a clear theory of success, technological immaturity and vague threat descriptions.
They highlight that MDO often relies on optimistic assumptions about technological capabilities, such as assured connectivity and rapid data processing, which are not yet fully realized. Additionally, they mention that the concept’s broad and sometimes ambiguous language leads to confusion and inconsistency across different military branches and allied nations.
Ellison and Swejis argue that the absence of specific adversary identification further complicates the development of effective MDO strategies. They also point out that MDO’s emphasis on speed and precision may overlook the complexities of real-world combat, where attrition and the fog of war remain significant factors.
They also question MDO’s integration within existing political and military structures, with concerns about inter-service rivalry and the feasibility of whole-of-government approaches.
Ultimately, Ellison and Swejis warn that without addressing these issues, MDO risks becoming another overhyped military concept that fails to deliver on its promises, potentially diverting attention and resources from more pressing strategic and operational challenges.
The slow ramp up supports the notion that a rapid PRC move on Taiwan may be attractive to them. Not an invasion, but a blockade of some sort.