South Korea has commissioned its largest-ever naval destroyer, a key plank of its naval modernization drive to bolster conventional deterrence against North Korea and other regional threats.
This month, The War Zone reported that South Korea commissioned its ROKS Jeongjo the Great destroyer in November at the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan.
The ship, the first among three KDX-III Batch 2 destroyers to be delivered, showcases the sophisticated Korean Vertical Launch System (KVLS-II) for ballistic missiles, indicating South Korea’s increasing focus on missile defense.
The destroyer measures 558 feet in length, displaces around 12,000 tons and is equipped with the latest Baseline 9 Aegis combat system, which enhances its surveillance, strike and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
The KVLS-II is a significant upgrade, allowing for the deployment of larger missiles, including the Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM) and potentially ballistic missiles, which are crucial for countering North Korean threats.
The development follows the US’s lifting of missile range restrictions in 2021, enabling South Korea to enhance its missile capabilities.
Naval News reported in March 2024 that South Korea had initiated the development of a new ship-launched ballistic missile, known as the “Ship-to-surface Ballistic Missile” or Hyunmoo-IV-2, following approval by the Defense Program Promotion Committee.
The program, overseen by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), will bypass the research phase and proceed directly to system development, with detailed design work expected to be completed by 2028, the Naval News report said.
The missile, designed for precision attacks on major enemy targets over long distances, will be integrated into KVLS-II and deployed on three types of Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) ships: the KDX-III Batch-II Aegis destroyers, the future Korean Next-Generation Destroyer (KDDX) and the future Arsenal ship.
In April 2023, Asia Times reported that South Korea had introduced plans for an “arsenal ship,” a missile-equipped vessel for land-attack operations targeting key objectives like command centers, logistics hubs, air defense installations and military facilities.
The ROKN has chosen Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) to develop its Joint Firepower Ship concept, with plans to acquire three vessels by the end of the 2020s.
Each vessel is intended to carry 80 missiles for preemptive strikes against North Korean military installations in the case of an impending missile threat.The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) will invest US$467 million between 2024 and 2036 to develop a new ship-to-surface ballistic missile for these ships.
The ships’ development may align with South Korea’s “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)” strategy as outlined in its 2022 Defense White Paper. KMPR is premised on the assumption that since North Korea is not deterred by military action or economic sanctions, the only way to deter the nation is to threaten the ruling Kim dynasty and its nuclear arsenal.
The strategy focuses on deterrence through both denial and punishment, aiming to instill doubt in North Korean leaders about the success of an attack and the potential for strong retaliation. It includes a damage-limitation aspect, intending to minimize the impact of any North Korean nuclear attack. It is designed for preemptive action, advocating for quick strikes on nuclear targets if a North Korean attack appears imminent.
However, South Korea’s ballistic missile-carrying warships may be vulnerable to a multitude of North Korean asymmetric threats, which include submarines, special operations forces, fast attack craft swarms, naval mines, drone swarms, suicide attacks and anti-ship missiles.
Yet South Korea’s ability to issue credible threats to North Korea may be limited due to its lack of nuclear weapons, exposing the limits of its conventional deterrence posture.
In a January 2021 article in the peer-reviewed International Security journal, Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim say that South Korea faces significant challenges in maintaining a credible conventional deterrence posture against North Korea’s nuclear threat.
To counter this, Bowers and Hiim mention that South Korea has developed an independent counterforce and countervalue strategy that relies heavily on advanced conventional capabilities, such as high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated missile defense systems and sophisticated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) technologies.
However, Bowers and Hiim point out that this strategy presents several dilemmas. Operationally, they say it requires South Korea to quickly detect, track and neutralize North Korean missile threats, which is extremely demanding given North Korea’s extensive use of hardened underground facilities and mobile missile launchers.
Additionally, they note that South Korea’s strategy must continually adapt to North Korea’s advancements in survivability and penetration capabilities, giving rise to high financial and technological demands. At the strategic level, they say this approach exacerbates crisis instability; counterforce threats could provoke North Korea to strike preemptively during a crisis.
Moreover, countervalue threats targeting North Korea’s leadership may encourage decentralized or unauthorized nuclear use, further destabilizing the region. And with a second Trump administration on the way, South Korea may have to rethink its strategic calculus toward its long-time rival North Korea.
During his first presidency, US President-elect Donald Trump favored re-engagement with North Korea, meeting Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018, and pledged to halt US-South Korea military exercises at the possible expense of downgrading Seoul’s deterrence capabilities.
Further, Trump’s transition team is discussing the possibility of direct talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, with re-engagement apparently being the second Trump administration’s goal, though no final decision, dates or timetables have been confirmed. It is also possible that Trump will de-prioritize tensions in the Korean Peninsula with the ongoing Ukraine war and Middle East conflicts.
Trump may also demand more financial compensation from South Korea for hosting US troops. The first Trump Administration demanded that South Korea contribute $5 billion to cover the costs of hosting 28,500 US troops based on South Korean territory. Such a demand may resurface during a second Trump administration, representing a potential steep new defense cost for Seoul.
The incoming Trump administration will also likely continue its previous hawkish position on China. The previous position called for a 350-ship US Navy, large-scale arms shipments to Taiwan and promotion of anti-China blocs such as the Quad. It also advocated for withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
These present possible divergences with US and South Korean approaches toward China. South Korea views its relationship with China as critical in influencing North Korea, as China is Pyongyang’s primary economic and diplomatic lifeline.
what sk needs is not to point missiles at nk nor doing funny drills with the us – what sk really needs to acquire peace is to talk to nk and work out a peace plan – the ongoing korean war is not a korean war, its an american war on russia and china pretending to be a korean war … wake up, skers !!!