US and Philippine forces operate the Typhon midrange capability missile system on June 27, 2024, in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Photo: US Army Pacific

China’s sharp rebuke of Philippine plans to acquire America’s Typhon missile system lays bare the high-stakes geopolitical chess game in Southeast Asia, where local political feuds and external power plays are colliding in a destabilizing contest for influence.

This month, multiple media outlets reported that China has criticized the Philippines’ potential plan to purchase the US Mid-Range Capability Missile System, known as the Typhon, labeling it provocative and irresponsible.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro asserted the country’s right to acquire the missile system, which would give the Philippines the capability to hit targets in mainland China, including staging areas for a possible invasion of Taiwan.

In response, Lin Jian, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, warned that the move could fuel regional tensions and incite geopolitical confrontation. Lin urged the Philippines to reconsider its decision, emphasizing the region’s need for “peace and prosperity.”

The Chinese official’s statement reflects China’s often-stated concerns about the involvement of external powers, spelled the US, in Southeast Asia and the potential escalation of an arms race.

While the US has indefinitely deployed the Typhon missile system in the Philippines since September 2024, China may seek to exploit the Philippines’ status as the weak link in the US alliance network in the Indo-Pacific to force the potent system’s eventual withdrawal and thwart any future Philippine acquisition plans.

Elite co-optation is a longstanding feature of Philippine political history. Philippine political elites are characterized by strong political support at the regional level but weak national-level support, hence their weak regimes.

That often results in weak legitimacy, characterized by political feuding and internal security threats such as private armies and long-running Communist and separatist insurgencies.

While most Southeast Asian regimes consolidate and sustain legitimacy through economic growth, Philippine political elites have consistently failed to deliver, leaving the country a laggard compared to its neighbors, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Unable to deliver the economic goods, Philippine political elites have relied on external parties to prop up their weak regimes. Since the Cold War, Philippine elites have been in a quid pro quo with the US, with the latter giving economic and military support in exchange for military access and basing rights.

However, as Richard Heydarian points out in Asia Times, the ongoing political feud between Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Vice President Sara Duterte, where the latter has threatened to assassinate the former, has placed China in a pivotal position.

In April, Marcos Jr accused Rodrigo Duterte of entering a “secret agreement” with China on the South China Sea, where the two sides have various territorial disputes. Duterte denied the allegation and fired back that Marcos Jr was a “cry baby.”

The former president raised eyebrows in Manila in July 2023 when he met with Xi Jinping in Beijing and expressed his “readiness to continue to play his role in promoting the Philippines-China friendship,” according to Chinese state media.

Heydarian says the Marcos Jr-Duterte feud is further complicated by China’s alleged involvement in undermining Marcos, who leans toward the US. He mentions that Philippine authorities have traced a deepfake video targeting Marcos to pro-China elements, suggesting China’s covert influence operations to bolster the Dutertes and destabilize the current administration.

He adds that as tensions escalate, Duterte has made alarming threats against Marcos and his political clan, accusing the national leader of betrayal through corruption investigations targeting her family.

Furthermore, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has called for military and police action to “protect the Constitution” and stabilize a “fractured government” against perceived internal threats.

The former president’s call is an implicit attempt to garner support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) by dangling promises of political influence, privileges and impunity.

It may also be an attempt to distract the AFP from its ongoing efforts to reorient its posture from internal security threats toward territorial defense, including in the South China Sea, much to the favor of Dutertes’ possible patron, China.

Nevertheless, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jimmy Larida assured Philippine lawmakers that there are no “grumblings” in the Philippine military and that it remains a non-partisan institution.

In a possible weaponization of Philippine history, protesters were allegedly paid US$9 each to stage a mass gathering at the Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue (EDSA) shrine, the site of the historic 1987 People Power Revolution that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos Senior, the current president’s deceased father, after nine years of martial law marked by brutality, corruption, cronyism, impunity and economic decline.

Such actions may have been intended to portray the Marcos Jr administration as losing its grip on power and to show that the Marcos family’s atrocities aren’t forgotten. Marcos Jr has been criticized for benefiting from his father’s regime and has sidestepped questions regarding the ill-gotten wealth his family plundered.

Asia Times has pointed out that the continued deployment of the US Typhon missile system in the Philippines may be in jeopardy should the Dutertes return to power given Rodrigo Duterte’s fiery anti-US rhetoric stressing US non-interference in internal Philippine affairs during his six-year rule.

While Heydarian argues that the Philippines could be a net beneficiary under the new Trump administration, looking past recent diplomatic pleasantries, US President-elect Donald Trump’s previous indifference towards the Philippines and predilection to strategic autarky may be an ill sign for the country’s military modernization and pro-US elites.

While the Philippines has made modest strides in its military modernization program, such as acquiring BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, moves so far may be of limited value in deterring China; other modernization projects, such as multi-role fighter (MRF) jets and submarines, have been in limbo for decades now due to a lack of funds.

As for potential Philippine plans to purchase the Typhon system outright, Teodoro’s statement may be more grandstanding than a genuine statement of intent.  

For costs, each Tomahawk missile used in the system costs US$1.8 million while a Standard SM-6 missile is even more at $4.2 million. These are considerable sums given the Philippines’ modest $4.37 billion 2025 defense budget, with $850 million allocated for modernization.

While the US has not released information about Typhon missile system costs, an April 2024 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report says the project has incurred US$233 million in procurement costs without mentioning the quantity of procured systems.

Moreover, the US currently restricts the sale of these missiles to upper-tier allies such as the UK, Japan and Australia, which are vastly ahead of the Philippines in terms of resources, experience, capability and US-given trust.

The Philippines may also be trying to extend the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) coverage to contested features in the South China Sea that may be of marginal value to US interests.

Given Trump’s known transactional approach to diplomacy, should the strategic-economic balance sheet with the Philippines not pan out in America’s favor, a second Trump administration may opt to sell out rather than bolster the Philippines vis-a-vis China.

The US has done as much on several occasions, including during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff versus China and US refusal to enforce the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling favoring the Philippines over China.

The same could be said for Washington’s relatively muted response in the aftermath of China’s escalatory tactics at the Second Thomas Shoal this year.

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3 Comments

  1. What about the DF-26 & DF-31AG? They are hypersonic missiles that we can’t stop. The latter recently test-fired successfully just south of Hawaii.

  2. hes the son of his father whos a thief and a conman – to try to drag china into the political strife strikes of a feeble attempt to blame others for one’s own failure – BBM has betrayed the filipino ppl and thats fact – D30 has gotten a good oil deal out of china but BBM perhaps has gotten an even better deal from the US for himself and a “promise” and typhon missiles from the US – ultimately the filipino ppl will be the one paying the price when the US and BBM decide to “ukraine” the philippines – under BBM, PH has become a infected and sore wound in ASEAN …

  3. Compare the Philippines and Singapore in terms of GDP per capita, infrastructure, national health standards and general political stability, and you can see huge differences. Why? Singapore had great political leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, and the Philippines had Marcos! And now, Marcos Jnr is repeating the damages (times 10) his father did to his country.