It’s fretting season once again in Japan. You see, Japan frets every four years when America chooses a new president. (Americans fret too, but that’s another story.)
Most observers believe the Japanese would prefer the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, over former president Donald Trump.
One main reason: Trump is “unpredictable” – even though you’d think that after four years of dealing with him, the Japanese had figured him out.
But perhaps for Japan unpredictable translates as the fear Trump might ask the Japanese – or, better said, their bureaucrats and foreign policy class – to do something they don’t want to do.
Given that the United States is on the hook to defend Japan, and certainly after 60-plus years of the US-Japan Alliance, it shouldn’t be a surprise that Tokyo might be asked to do a few things out of its comfort zone – and especially now that the threat from the People’s Republic of Chine (PRC), not to mention Beijing’s friends in Pyongyang and Moscow, is higher than ever.
Among Japan’s other neuroses (regardless of who is in the White House) is the longstanding fear of “Japan passing” – the idea that a new administration might cut a deal with the PRC that leaves Japan out in the cold. And there used to be fear of “Japan bashing” – blaming Japan for America’s shortcomings – though that isn’t heard so much these days.
And there’s the deep-rooted fear that America lacks total commitment to defend Japan. Thus the Japanese government’s frequent insistence, when top officials meet, on discussing “extended deterrence” – or in other words, America’s commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend Japan.
Also on the list is fear of Japan being hit up for more money for “host nation support” for US forces in Japan. This is Tokyo’s particular worry when it comes to Donald Trump.
But that’s also a distraction, if not irrational.
The amounts he might request are pocket change in the grand scheme of things – and if paying keeps American military power on side.
But perhaps Japan might offer to spend any requested amounts for the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) itself – to improve warfighting capabilities, war stocks and terms of service for military personnel. JSDF missed recruitment targets by 50% last year. Yes, 50%. And part of the reason is pay and conditions are terrible.
But should Japan worry about Trump?
Not really.
Look at what he did in his first term. He had the best foreign policy team since the first Reagan administration – and it valued Japan.
And for all the worry that he was going to destroy the US-Japan alliance and make unreasonable demands, what did he ask Japan to do that it wouldn’t have done anyway? Nothing much.
As for economic pressure to punish Japan for supposed unfair trade practices? There was nothing to write home about.
Cynics might suggest that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s gifting Trump an expensive golf driver and hitting the links with the president soothed things to the point the US didn’t insist Japan do as much as it might have – such as getting its military and society in shape to fight a possible war.
Would it have been so bad if Trump had done so?
This time around, don’t expect anything much different from Trump version 1.
As for Japan preferring a Harris administration, likewise there are four years of empirical evidence.
And maybe a Harris version 2 is viewed as a comfortable extension of the Biden administration, which has been characterized by the bonhomie of summit meetings declaring the bilateral relationship stronger than ever – and a series of scripted military exercises sending a message of bilateral commitment.
But ultimately no real demands were made on Japan to get ready to fight a war.
And no fights are being picked on the economic front – other than perhaps the rejection by both Harris and Trump of Nippon Steel’s effort to acquire US Steel. As for that one, wait until the election is over and things might change.
But here’s something for Tokyo to consider when weighing the candidates: the new administration’s China policy.
And that really matters, given Beijing visceral intent to teach Japan a lesson.
Trump’s was the first administration to stand up to the PRC since Nixon went to China in 1972.
Beijing was backfooted. The Trump administration recognized the PRC as an adversary and was starting to get serious about rebuilding the US military – and also about making alliances into warfighting alliances.
China did not like Trump or his team, and was even afraid of them.
A second Trump administration will be similar to the first when it comes to taking on America’s enemies – which are Japan’s as well.
As for the Biden administration – which a Harris administration would likely resemble?
Nobody in the Biden administration scared the Chinese – as evidenced by Beijing’s dismissive treatment of Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan during their first meeting in Alaska.
That set the tone.
China’s military buildup proceeded apace during the last four years and continues. Also PRC ties with Russia and North Korea became something that has caused even bigger headaches in Tokyo.
The US military restoration? There’s been talk during the Biden administration, but not enough has been done.
And if Japan worries about the US commitment, consider this:
Chinese-origin fentanyl killed around 250,000 Americans during the Biden term. The US response? Setting up a working group with the Chinese to discuss the problem.
If that’s all Washington does in response to mass murder, it’ll be easy to figure out an excuse not to do anything much to defend Japan when the time comes. After all, we can’t have nuclear war and World War Three.
The Americans will decide on their president. Japan can only adjust accordingly.
No matter who wins, Japan will do well to get ready to defend itself – and it will need to do far more than it has to date.
But the key question is: Would Tokyo rather have an administration that Beijing doesn’t like? Or one that Beijing thinks it can do business with (and get its way)?
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He was the first Marine liaison officer to the Japan Self Defense Force, and is a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of the book, When China Attacks: A Warning To America.