Russia’s MIRV attack on Ukraine a nuclear-pointed escalation

Russia’s use of conventional-armed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped intermediate ballistic missile (IRBM) in Ukraine signals a significant escalation, putting NATO on edge and raising fears of nuclear brinkmanship.

The War Zone reported that Russia launched an unprecedented ballistic missile attack on Dnipro, Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) initially claimed the projectile was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from the Astrakhan region, though US and Western officials have since said it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

The War Zone report mentions that the missile, equipped with MIRVs, struck the Pivdenmash industrial complex, which manufactures missiles and other machinery for the Ukrainian military.

The attack followed recent US and allied decisions to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russia, prompting Moscow’s warning of deploying previously unused weapons.

The War Zone report states that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other officials are investigating the missile’s specifics, with conflicting reports about its type. It mentions the attack underscores the intensifying nature of the conflict and Russia’s strategic messaging, as Ukraine lacks the advanced defense systems needed to intercept such missiles.

The War Zone identifies the Russian missile used in the strike as the Oreshnik, a derivative of the RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile. The report says Russia developed the RS-26 in 2008 as a solid-fueled, road-mobile system designed to operate within the constraints of the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It boasts a range of 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation clarifies the distinction between IRBMs and ICBMs. An IRBM has a range of 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers, while an ICBM has a range beyond 5,500 kilometers. Contrary to UAF claims, this definition makes the Oreshnik an IRBM, not an ICBM.

Politico reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed the launch of the Oreshnik IRBM. Politico notes that the US Department of Defense (DOD) also confirmed the launch, noting that Russia had informed the US shortly before the attack through nuclear risk reduction channels.

As for why the UAF described the Oreshnik IRBM strike as an ICBM attack, Stephen Bryen suggests the claim is Ukrainian propaganda to provoke NATO intervention on its behalf.

Bryen, a former US deputy under secretary of defense, notes that the absence of confirmation from US officials of an ICBM launch, the impracticality of using the RS-26 for conventional strikes and the lack of satellite detection or defensive responses debunk UAF claims that the missile was an ICBM, not an IRBM.

Using conventional-tipped MIRV-armed IRBMs or ICBMs poses significant technical challenges. In an article by the Arms Control Association (ACA), Steve Andreasen mentions that accuracy is paramount for such weapons. Adapting advanced guidance and targeting technologies from tactical munitions is necessary for effective strikes with conventional warheads.

Andreasen says intelligence is another hurdle, as identifying and tracking high-value, time-sensitive targets remains difficult. He adds that target mobility further complicates matters as mobile targets can evade strikes within a missile’s flight time, demanding even greater precision and intelligence. He mentions command and control systems must adapt to allow rapid decision-making without risking mistaken nuclear launches.

Andreasen also states that the cost of IRBMs or ICBMs is a challenge, as they may be prohibitive for such weapons for anything less than a nuclear strike.

Further, depending on the design of future IRBMs or ICBMs, targets may be unable to determine whether an incoming missile has a nuclear payload or a conventional one. This uncertainty leaves them with limited time to decide how to respond, regardless of the situation.

This concept is known as “launch on warning,” where a retaliatory strike could occur before the warhead reaches its target, leaving the defending side unaware of the weapon’s nature.

The RS-26 and Oreshnik might feature a “hot swappable” warhead section, enabling it to be easily adapted for conventional or nuclear use. Russia has consistently leveraged this kind of ambiguity and uncertainty as a core part of its deterrence strategy, particularly concerning short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), such as the Iskander.

Russia’s Oreshnik attack highlights its approach to nuclear ambiguity, which has constrained Western support for Ukraine out of nuclear escalation fears – the next such attack may involve nuclear warheads.

In a 2019 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, Maggie Tennis mentions that Russia’s nuclear strategy leverages ambiguity as a deterrence measure, focusing on dual-capable systems that blur the lines between conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Tennis notes that weapons like the Kalibr cruise missile, Iskander SRBM, and Kh-101 air-launched missiles can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. According to Tennis, this duality complicates adversaries’ ability to assess the nature of a potential strike, raising the risk of miscalculation during crises.

She says Russian military exercises, often featuring dual-capable systems, further muddy the waters, leaving observers uncertain about the intent and potential for nuclear escalation. She adds that using such systems and opaque doctrines creates “entanglement” risks where conventional conflicts could escalate to nuclear use due to misinterpretation.

While Tennis points out that Russia’s intentional ambiguity, rooted in Soviet-era strategic deception (maskirovka), aims to confuse adversaries and maximize flexibility, this approach may undermine strategic stability, as it fuels worst-case scenario planning by the US and NATO.

In line with Tennis’ ideas, Simon Saradzhyan points out in a Belfer Center article this month that Russia has introduced significant changes to its nuclear doctrine in a newly unveiled 2024 edition, broadening the conditions under which it may deploy nuclear weapons.

Saradzhyan notes that the revised doctrine removes the term “exclusively” from its description of nuclear arms as a deterrence tool, signaling a potential shift toward a more assertive posture. He says it adds conditions such as threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and Belarus as justifications for nuclear use.

He mentions that the updated doctrine also expands its list of primary military risks from six to ten, highlighting concerns over the growth of military coalitions and efforts to isolate Russian territory.

Saradzhyan emphasizes that the document explicitly includes scenarios involving nuclear strikes against Russian forces operating abroad and credible intelligence of large-scale launches of air—or space-based attack systems.

Saradzhyan views these changes as lowering the threshold for nuclear deployment, with implications for escalating tensions with the West. He suggests that while the doctrine reflects a strategic warning to adversaries, its broader rhetoric may serve more as a propaganda tool than an actionable military policy, underscoring Russia’s intent to deter perceived encroachments and reinforce its geopolitical stance.