The US has unveiled a next-generation air-to-air missile, signaling a potent new weapon to counter China’s expanding Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategies around Taiwan and the wider South China Sea.
This month, The War Zone reported the US Navy has confirmed the existence of the AIM-174 missile, an air-launched variant of the SM-6 surface-to-air missile that marks a new chapter in its long-range defense capabilities.
The missile was first publicly acknowledged following sightings during US Navy exercises in 2024, including photographs of Super Hornet aircraft carrying the weapon during Hawaii’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) war games.
The AIM-174, with an estimated range of 320 kilometers, provides enhanced air-to-air, anti-ship and ballistic missile interception capabilities, extending beyond the reach of legacy naval missile systems.
The War Zone says the missile is part of the US Navy’s broader strategy to counter China’s increasing ability to deny US forces access to critical areas through a network of anti-ship weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and hypersonic threats.
According to the source, the AIM-174 allows US Navy aircraft to engage targets at extreme ranges beyond sensor visibility, leveraging advanced “kill web” systems that utilize networked sensor data from various air, sea and space-based platforms.
While The War Zone states that the missile’s full capabilities remain classified, its introduction significantly boosts the US Navy’s defensive and offensive capabilities in the Pacific theater, particularly in scenarios involving a potential conflict with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
As the AIM-174 enters operational service, it is expected to be crucial in extending the US Navy’s reach and protecting carrier strike groups from increasingly sophisticated Chinese threats.
The AIM-174 may be employed according to a “shooting the archer” doctrine, taking out missile carriers before they can come into strike range to target US carrier battlegroups or Pacific bases.
Asia Times mentioned in November 2022 that China’s Xian H-6K strategic bomber has been spotted carrying a new air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, potentially derived from the CM-401, emphasizing its A2/AD and standoff strike capabilities against US bases and forces in the Pacific. The missile has formidable combat characteristics, including a speed of up to Mach 6 and a range of 290 kilometers, with the ability to perform terminal diving attacks.
The H-6 K’s air launch capability significantly extends the missile’s range and performance. Similar to Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile, the H-6K underscores China’s strategy to diversify its hypersonic weapon platforms, including ship and road-mobile launchers, to counter US and allied forces.
China’s hypersonic advancements aim to deter adversaries by penetrating modern air defenses, posing a significant threat to US military installations in Guam and Wake Island.
Aside from targeting missile carriers, the AIM-174 can be used to hit large, slow and vulnerable high-value aerial targets such as tankers, airborne warfare and control (AEW&C) and special mission aircraft. Sophisticated airborne electronic warfare platforms may be among such targets.
Last month, Asia Times mentioned that China’s Y-9LG airborne electronic warfare platform, with its “balance beam” radar, can disrupt enemy communications, radar and navigation systems while gathering intelligence on threat emitters.
This platform, which entered service with the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) in early 2023, operates from a standoff position similar to the US Air Force’s EC-37B Compass Call.
The Y-9LG’s deployment underscores China’s strategic investment in airborne standoff intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems. This development is part of China’s broader strategy to enhance its electronic warfare capabilities and achieve information dominance in potential conflict scenarios, particularly in the Pacific.
However, the AIM-174’s reliance on kill webs may also be its vulnerability. In a January 2021 RAND report, Nicholas O’Donoughue and other writers mention that the vulnerabilities of US kill chains and kill webs are rooted in their reliance on networked systems and information sharing across diverse platforms.
O’Donoughue and others emphasize that a break in any part of this chain, such as sensors, communication links or decision-making processes, could disrupt the entire chain’s functionality.
They say that vulnerability makes US kill chains and kill webs susceptible to electronic warfare, cyber-attacks and other disruptive technologies that target the chain’s weakest links. The US’s traditionally linear kill chains are increasingly evolving into more complex “kill webs,” where information from multiple sensors and shooters is shared across domains to create more adaptable and resilient systems.
However, O’Donoughue and others point out that these kill webs are also vulnerable due to their increased complexity. They point out that distributed kill chains involving multiple platforms and sensors require effective real-time data integration and synchronization. They stress that failures in these areas can lead to delays or inaccuracies in targeting, potentially allowing adversaries to exploit gaps in the system.
In line with targeting US kill chains or kill webs, Joel Wuthnow, in a March 2023 presentation for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), mentions that China’s “system destruction warfare” concept represents the core of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modern operational strategy.
Wuthnow notes that the doctrine aims to incapacitate an enemy by dismantling its ability to conduct coordinated operations. According to Wuthnow, it targets critical operational systems, including command structures, reconnaissance intelligence, firepower and support capabilities, using both kinetic and non-kinetic methods.
He mentions that China’s goal is to paralyze the flow of information and disrupt key decision-making processes in adversary systems through integrated strikes, which could involve advanced precision munitions to destroy key command and control nodes, electronic warfare and cyberattacks.
He notes that the PLA’s focus on “multi-domain precision warfare” further exemplifies its reliance on emerging technologies, such as AI and big data, to enhance these attacks.
Wuthnow points out that the PLA’s modernization efforts, including new hardware like the J-20 stealth fighters, Type-055 cruisers and advanced missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, are geared toward enhancing its system destruction capabilities.
He says these developments align with China’s strategic objectives for 2027-2049, underscoring a shift toward informationized and joint warfare as critical elements of its military operations.
However, he says that while the PLA advances in these areas, institutional legacies like centralized decision-making and limited joint experience may still present hurdles.