Australia may soon acquire American-made B-21 Raiders, a sixth-generation stealth bomber that would offer significant strategic advantages and immediate military capabilities over nuclear submarines.
Last month, the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), an Australian think tank, released a report stating that Australia’s defense strategy under AUKUS may seek to procure the B-21 Raider, which would provide long-range strike capabilities to complement Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines.
The IPA report says the bomber is currently in low-rate production, with 100 units planned for US$750 million each. Canberra’s acquisition of the B-21 Raider would likely raise hackles in China, which has criticized the AUKUS security partnership as designed to contain its rise.
IPA touts the B-21 as a faster and more flexible option than submarines, as it can carry multiple weapons and sensors. Proponents highlight its particular suitability for Australia, given its vast geography and relatively small military force.
The think tank points out that in contrast to nuclear submarines, which will not be operational until at least the 2030s, the B-21 could provide Australia with immediate military punch.
IPA notes that historically, Australia has operated long-range strike bombers, making the B-21 a familiar addition to its defense arsenal. While the costs are considerable, they are still lower than the projected A$268 billion (US$180 billion) to A$368 billion ($247 billion) for nuclear submarines over the next 30 years.
The B-21 Raider’s advanced capabilities align with Australia’s defense strategy, emphasizing long-range precision strikes and rapid deployment to counter potential threats in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia’s 2024 National Defense Strategy emphasizes a “strategy of denial” to safeguard national interests amid an increasingly unstable Indo-Pacific. This approach aims to prevent potential adversaries from successfully projecting military power against Australia or coercing it through force.
The strategy also emphasizes deterrence, signaling Australia’s capacity to defend its interests and complicating any adversary’s decision to engage in conflict.
In line with the strategy’s emphasis on long-range strikes, the B-21 fits Australia’s strategy by enhancing its ability to hold adversary forces at risk, mainly through its long-range precision strike capabilities.
The B-21’s advanced stealth and payload features would enhance Australia’s defense capabilities, enabling it to target distant threats, especially in the northern regions where risks are most probable.
Michael Shoebridge argues in a November 2023 Defense Connect article that B-21s are cheaper than nuclear submarines. He points out that the projected cost of 12 aircraft is A$81 billion ($54 billion), compared to A$368 billion ($247 billion) for eight nuclear submarines.
Shoebridge says that B-21s can be deployed faster, with the first units available by the mid-2020s, whereas the submarines won’t be fully operational until the 2040s. He adds that B-21s provide greater flexibility and rapid redeployment capabilities, allowing them to strike targets quickly and return to base for rearming.
He notes that B-21s avoid the complexities and risks associated with nuclear technology, such as waste management and non-proliferation concerns. Shoebridge suggests integrating B-21s into Australia’s defense strategy could enhance deterrence and strike capabilities more effectively and economically than the current submarine-focused plan.
However, critics of Australia’s potential B-21 acquisition point to its high costs and high risk of provoking China, suggesting cheaper and more practical alternatives.
In an August 2022 article for the Chinese state mouthpiece Global Times, Song Zhongping notes that although the B-21 is designed to carry nuclear and conventional weapons, the US could potentially provide Australia with an export variant that can only conduct conventional attacks, transforming it into an exportable, tactical asset.
While the AUKUS agreement focuses on sharing advanced technologies such as nuclear propulsion, it does not cover nuclear weapons sharing. Australia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), prohibiting it from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Further, Song says that China has modernized its military to deal with the potential threat of B-21s by developing enhanced anti-stealth and air defense capabilities, long-range missiles that can hit Australian military bases, and developing its own rival stealth bomber.
Aside from possibly being offered a watered-down version of the B-21, Hugh White argues in a November 2022 Interpreter article that the B-21’s high cost and specialized capabilities are unnecessary for Australia’s defense needs.
White says that while the B-21 is designed to penetrate the formidable air defenses of major powers like China and Russia, Australia could achieve similar objectives more cost effectively with cheaper aircraft or drones. He contends that using B-21s to bomb China would provoke retaliation without significantly degrading China’s military capacity.
Instead, he recommends long-range maritime patrol aircraft or drones for missions like attacking Chinese naval forces or forward bases. He points out that the interest in B-21s reflects a desire to signal strategic intent rather than practical war-fighting capability, potentially leading to miscalculations by China regarding Australia’s defense seriousness.
Asia Times pointed out in September 2022 that acquiring B-21s could cost Australia US$5-6 billion annually over five to six years, potentially consuming half of its defense capital equipment budget.
This expenditure would compete with other defense priorities, such as the Australian shipbuilding program, which the government has deemed untouchable.
Additionally, production limitations may hinder the acquisition, as the US might struggle to meet its planned 100-unit production, leaving few extra bombers for Australia.
The cost-death spiral phenomenon, seen with the F-35 and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs, could also affect the B-21, leading to increased production costs and reduced unit numbers.
Given the potential security concerns and the need for a massive increase in defense spending, the strategic and political challenges of basing US bombers in Australia may prove unsustainable in the long run.

War is good for business. China is not going to war with Australia. Australis is spending billions simply based on fear of China.
Sure Charles aka Paul Keating, there is no need to fear China, esp if you have their gelt.
Let’s be honest, this is all about the 5I’s, Aus is totally integrated with UK.USA
in intelligence and alot of the military. This is just more integration.
So Charles/Paul do you prefer to be a Uighyr in China or an Aussie in Aukus?