US Air Force prepping for a nuclear showdown over Taiwan

China’s rapidly expanding arsenal and evolving strategy are reshaping the global nuclear balance, fueling concerns of a potential showdown over Taiwan as the US gears up for nuclear readiness tabletop exercises.

The War Zone has reported that US Lieutenant General Andrew Gebara announced at the Air & Space Forces Association conference near Washington, DC, that the US Air Force is planning a tabletop exercise to assess readiness for various nuclear-related scenarios.

The War Zone mentions that the exercise, scheduled for later this month, aims to prepare for potential low-yield nuclear weapon use in Europe, nuclear demonstrations or tests, and adapting to regional conflicts involving nuclear powers.

The War Zone quoted Gebara as saying that the US Air Force needs broader training across all levels, moving beyond the traditional strategic level to include tactical considerations.

The report notes that this shift reflects the evolving nature of nuclear threats, which now include a wider array of players and delivery methods, including lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons. It mentions that the exercise’s results will be presented at the upcoming CORONA commanders conference.

While the US Air Force seeks to enhance its readiness for tactical nuclear scenarios, China’s evolving nuclear strategy reflects its pursuit of secure deterrence and global prestige.

In a July 2023 China Strategic Perspectives report, David Logan and Phillip Saunders mention that China’s nuclear strategy has long been debated, with six primary models emerging to explain its nuclear force development.

Logan and Saunders say that the most prominent of these include the secure second-strike and nuclear shield models, which suggest China aims to maintain a survivable nuclear force against adversarial capabilities, particularly those of the US.

They note that the second-strike model focuses on deterring large-scale nuclear attacks, while the nuclear shield model extends this deterrence to include conventional threats, especially in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

As for the Great Power status model, Logan and Saunders suggest that China’s expanding nuclear capabilities serve the broader goal of enhancing national prestige.

This model posits that China is moving beyond its previous “lean and effective” deterrent and aiming to rival the US and Russia in nuclear capabilities.

Logan and Saunders note other models, such as theater deterrence and nuclear superiority, that propose China is preparing for regional nuclear conflicts or seeking dominance in the nuclear domain, though evidence supporting these models is limited.

Lastly, Logan and Saunders say that the bureaucratic politics model attributes nuclear developments to internal competition between China’s military and political institutions, but this, too, has weak support.

They point out that China’s nuclear force development appears driven by a combination of secure deterrence and an increasing desire for global prestige, with less emphasis on nuclear warfighting capabilities.

As China’s nuclear strategy evolves, its rapid arsenal expansion and modernization efforts reflect a clear ambition to bolster its strategic capabilities.

In a January 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and other writers estimate that China has approximately 500 nuclear warheads. Their projections suggest this number could grow to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035.

Kristensen and others highlight China’s development of new missile silos, advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the refitting of its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with JL-3 missiles. Additionally, they mention that China has reassigned a nuclear mission to its bombers and is developing an air-launched ballistic missile.

They mention the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) China Military Power Report 2023 aligns with these findings, emphasizing China’s potential to deploy these warheads at higher readiness levels.

The writers also assert China’s nuclear arsenal expansion is driven by its strategic goal of enhancing its deterrence capabilities and securing national security.

However, Kristensen and others stress the caveat that accurately assessing China’s nuclear capabilities is difficult due to official opacity and reliance on a combination of open sources, satellite imagery and expert analysis.

What’s clear, though, is that China’s rapid nuclear expansion increases the risk of nuclear coercion in any conflict over Taiwan, with the US possibly responding in kind.

In a September 2023 Atlantic Council report, Matthew Kroenig discusses the potential scenarios for deliberate nuclear use in a Taiwan conflict pitting the US and China. Kroenig highlights that both could consider nuclear escalation in the event of a high-stakes war.

He says that for China, nuclear use could manifest in various forms: signaling, demonstrating resolve with a test or attacking US forces or Taiwan itself to force a quick resolution. Similarly, he says that the US might consider limited nuclear strikes to counter a Chinese invasion or respond to Chinese nuclear use.

While Kroenig says both sides aim to avoid full-scale nuclear exchange, they both would face challenges in controlling escalation once nuclear weapons are used. He warns that a miscalculation by either side could trigger an extended nuclear exchange with profound global consequences.

He mentions that as China expands its nuclear arsenal, the US must prepare both conventional and nuclear responses, including by enhancing regional missile defenses and reconsidering the size and deployment of its nuclear forces to deter Chinese aggression.

In contrast to China’s rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities, the inadequacies in the US’s Cold War-era strategies are becoming increasingly evident, leaving it ill-prepared to manage the complex risks of nuclear escalation in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

In an August 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Andrew Metrick and other writers underscore that the US is ill-equipped to handle nuclear escalation risks with China, particularly in a protracted conflict.

The writers note that as China’s nuclear capabilities expand, the potential for nonstrategic nuclear use in the Indo-Pacific increases, creating conditions that challenge traditional US deterrence approaches.

They highlight fundamental gaps in US doctrine and capabilities, noting that the US relies heavily on Cold War-era strategies that are inadequate for managing China’s evolving nuclear posture.

They point out that tactical nuclear exchanges, particularly in a limited conflict over Taiwan, are more plausible now due to the Indo-Pacific’s unique geography and operational environments.

Metrick and others say these scenarios expose the US to platform vulnerabilities, signaling challenges and a lack of appropriate nuclear responses, especially in managing China’s coercive nuclear strategies.

They also mention that the US faces significant decision-making challenges in responding to China’s potential nuclear weapon use, as divergent views on appropriate responses could lead to political gridlock.