Australia-Japan to jointly make missiles for pointing at China

Japan and Australia have agreed to co-develop long-range missiles, a move aimed at jointly checking China’s growing military might in the Indo-Pacific, The Mainichi reported.

The agreement was reached during a meeting this month between Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and his Australian counterpart Richard Marles in Melbourne.

At the meeting, Kihara and Marles expressed mutual concerns about Chinese military activities, including a recent violation of Japanese airspace by a Chinese spy plane.

The two ministers also discussed Japan’s recent acquisition of counterstrike capabilities and Australia’s procurement of long-range missiles. Meanwhile, talks are ongoing on Japan’s request to use Australia’s vast continent as a testing ground for its missiles under development.

As for the type of missile Japan and Australia will co-develop, Janes mentions that both are focused on the US Tomahawk cruise missile, which each has pledged to acquire for their surface combatants.

Both countries have signed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) with the US for 200 missiles each. The Janes report says Japan plans to deploy the Tomahawks on its Aegis-equipped destroyers, while Australia intends to arm its Hobart-class destroyers and Hunter-class frigates with the missiles.

This growing cooperation on long-range missile capabilities aligns with strategic assessments that emphasize the transformative impact of such weapons in modern warfare.

In a May 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies, Fabian Hoffman says that long-range strike (LRS) weapons such as the Tomahawk can create significant strategic effects in warfare by directly targeting the adversary’s national power and ability to resist.

Hoffman notes that LRS weapons fulfill four distinct strategic functions: counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership and counterforce. He says these functions enable states to undermine the will and capacity of opponents at the strategic level, independent of tactical or operational engagements.

He mentions that LRS weapons can achieve decisive outcomes without direct engagement on the battlefield by disrupting enemy logistics, leadership and military forces.

Hoffman points out the increasing relevance of LRS weapons beyond nuclear-armed states, suggesting that smaller powers can now hold larger adversaries at risk, altering deterrence and escalation dynamics in both nuclear and conventional contexts​.

This shift reflects a broader trend among US allies as Japan and Australia move toward bolstering their long-range strike capabilities to counter regional threats and enhance deterrence.

In a February 2021 RAND conference, Satoru Mori and Shinichi Kitaoka said Japan’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, such as the Tomahawk, is part of its evolving defense strategy.

Mori and Kitaoka argue that Japan should acquire limited offensive capabilities focused on countering threats posed by China’s military rise, notably its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies.

They argue that Japan’s traditional missile defense, which is purely defensive, may no longer suffice, prompting the need to develop the capability to launch proportional counterstrikes in coordination with the US.

They note that these capabilities would enable Japan to strike critical military infrastructure, such as missile launch sites and command centers, in the event of an attack, thereby enhancing its deterrence posture.

However, Mori and Kitaoka emphasize that this move is not a prelude to offensive operations but a necessary evolution to maintain regional stability and counter growing threats, especially from China, which has significantly increased its defense spending in recent years​.

In the same conference, Scott Harold noted that introducing the Tomahawk would shift the traditional “shield-spear” relationship within the US-Japan alliance, with Japan taking a more offensive role. However, he says such a paradigm change may undercut the US’ ability to manage escalation in a conflict with China.

In a March 2023 article for The Conversation, James Dwyer explains why Australia needs Tomahawks, as the country has lacked long-range strike capabilities since decommissioning the F-111 in 2010.

He points out that the F-111 had a range of approximately 6,000 kilometers, but its successors, namely the F/A-18F and the F-35A, have much shorter ranges of 2,700 and 2,200 kilometers, respectively.

He adds that these are the straight-line flight ranges of these aircraft, which would be significantly reduced in a combat situation.

Dwyer notes that Tomahawks would enable Australia’s ships and aircraft to launch missiles from a safer distance and provide deterrence by threatening specific targets, making an adversary think twice before taking hostile actions.

He says that the Tomahawk would give Australia A2/AD capabilities, enabling it to strike at an adversary attempting to implement a naval blockade or close off strategic chokepoints like the Malacca Strait.

Dwyer says the Tomahawk would also enable interoperability with key allies such as the US and Japan, allowing them to perform joint operations if needed.

However, Dwyer points out the hefty US$879 million price tag for 220 Tomahawk missiles, US$385 million for 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers and US$1.47 billion for 200 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM).

He also suggests that Australia’s Tomahawk acquisition may spark an arms race in the Pacific. The trilateral defense alliance involving the US, Japan and Australia demonstrates a joint approach to confronting China’s regional goals by enhancing conventional deterrence measures.

In an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Mori points out that trilateral defense cooperation between the US, Japan and Australia is pivotal in deterring potential Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.

Mori says that the coalition aims to demonstrate that China cannot succeed in unifying Taiwan by force, emphasizing the importance of conventional deterrence over nuclear capabilities.

He mentions that Australia and Japan, classified as Tier 2 and Tier 3 partners, respectively, would support US-led efforts to dislodge potential Chinese invasion forces, enhance resilience and impose costs on China.

Mori says Japan’s recent decision to bolster its defense capabilities is central to this strategy. He says this would allow Japan to assume a more significant role in offensive and defensive operations, freeing US forces to focus on Taiwan’s defense.

Further, he identifies critical areas of trilateral cooperation, mentioning intelligence sharing, missile defense and cyber resilience.

Mori adds that the three nations must coordinate joint capability development and munition production while reinforcing their unified stance through regular diplomatic and defense meetings.

He notes that this trilateral collaboration is crucial to strengthening conventional deterrence and avoiding over-reliance on US nuclear forces, which could escalate conflict if deterrence fails.