Taiwan’s bold expansion of its submarine fleet marks a high-stakes gamble to counter China’s growing military threat despite significant financial, logistical and geopolitical challenges.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan has set aside a substantial budget to construct seven additional submarines by 2038 to deter potential aggression from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
SCMP mentions that the decision, approved by the cabinet and awaiting legislative review, has sparked debate among analysts over its timing and fiscal prudence, given that the prototype submarine, Hai Kun, is still undergoing testing.
The report says that the project’s hefty price tag of NTD 284 billion (US$8.88 billion) contrasts with the prototype’s cost of NTD 26 billion ($806 million), raising questions about the rush to expand the fleet without finalized sea trial results.
The SCMP report says critics argue for fiscal discipline and caution against premature budget allocation. At the same time, it mentions that proponents emphasize the strategic need for advanced submarines to ensure Taiwan’s security and counter PLA threats.
While Taiwan’s ambitious submarine program stirs fiscal prudence debates, experts underscore its critical role in disrupting PLA operations and bolstering Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.
Mark Cancian and other writers mention in a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank that submarines could penetrate China’s defensive zones and target Chinese amphibious ships and supply convoys, disrupting PLA logistics and reducing the effectiveness of any invasion force.
Cancian and others say that submarines operating in the confined and shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait would exploit their stealth capabilities to avoid detection by China’s anti-submarine warfare assets.
They mention that submarines’ ability to operate in this environment makes them a critical asymmetric tool in Taiwan’s defense strategy, enabling them to inflict significant damage on the invading fleet.
However, Cancian and others point out that while submarines alone would not be sufficient to repel a full-scale invasion, they would play a crucial role in delaying and complicating the PLA’s efforts.
That, in turn, would give Taiwan and its allies, including the US, more time to respond and potentially prevent Chinese forces from establishing a sustainable beachhead.
In line with Cancian and others’ assessment, David Axe says in a September 2023 Forbes article that the Hai Kun and its seven sister submarines, alongside bombers, are vital to repelling an invasion and would have the potential to sink numerous Chinese vessels.
In addition to providing tactical and operational options for Taiwan, Collin Koh, in a February 2024 Newsweek article, points out the psychological and political value of Taiwan’s submarines.
Koh says Hai Kun’s public unveiling aimed to assure the Taiwanese public of accountability and that the project is progressing as planned. He adds that the unveiling projects deterrence, leaving China guessing about the submarine’s capabilities.
Although Taiwan’s audacious submarine program is a critical asymmetric defense undertaking, its construction, personnel training and strategic integration challenges have underscored the complexity of transforming this vision into reality.
In a June 2023 article for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), John Dotson points out that constructing eight submarines is a daunting task. Dotson says it is uncertain how long it will take for Taiwan’s current naval shipbuilding facilities to build all the vessels, especially considering the competition for production capacity and budget constraints for building surface ships locally.
He also mentions uncertainties concerning the training and certification of crews for a significantly larger Taiwanese submarine fleet and the establishment of protocols to manage overlapping patrol areas with allied and regional nations during peacetime and wartime.
Dotson notes that Taiwan’s biggest submarine operational challenge is integrating these assets into its overall defense strategy.
He says that Taiwan could consider operational models such as Nazi Germany’s “wolfpacks,” the US Navy’s controversial 1980s “Maritime Strategy,” and a passive submarine “fleet in being” to complicate PLA planners’ blockade or invasion plans.
Balancing the construction of submarines with a diversified naval force, Taiwan faces the dual challenge of integrating asymmetric strategies while countering China’s conventional and unconventional military tactics.
In January 2024, Asia Times mentioned that Taiwan’s simultaneous naval construction projects may indicate a challenge in designing its naval force.
This challenge arises from balancing building an asymmetric force to counter China’s unconventional tactics in disputed areas and establishing a conventional force to defend against a possible invasion.
Taiwan emphasizes developing a highly visible conventional naval force to counter China’s gray zone tactics. However, this approach does not effectively address China’s significant military advantage.
Taiwan’s strategy of diversifying its force design and procurement to handle conventional and asymmetric warfare may leave it vulnerable.
Taiwan’s new light frigates and corvettes could be more effective in dealing with China’s frequent surface and underwater intrusions into Taiwan’s territories. However, if Taiwan fully embraces an asymmetric warfare strategy, submarines could soon become its most important naval vessels.
China’s political influence operations have further complicated Taiwan’s endeavors to modernize and expand its submarine fleet as it struggles to maintain a balanced naval force design.
A January 2021 Strategic Comments article mentions that Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program’s success relies heavily on sustained political and financial support, particularly as it is closely associated with former president Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
In line with that, Alan Yu and other writers mention in a February 2024 article for the Center for American Progress (CAP) that despite China’s extensive efforts to influence the results of Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential elections, Taiwanese voters elected DPP candidate Lai Ching-te as president.
Yu and others note China’s concerted efforts to sway the election included a sophisticated disinformation campaign leveraging AI, aiming to manipulate public opinion and undermine political support for Taiwan’s military modernization, particularly its submarine program.
They point out that despite these tactics, Taiwan’s robust countermeasures, including legislative actions and public awareness initiatives, have at least partly blunted China’s influence operations.
That’s another major DPP graft item. Build eight subs at once? You repeat all the errors and faults of the first sub, which has yet to be trial tested.