Tourists look on as a Chinese military helicopter flies past Pingtan island, one of mainland China's closest points to Taiwan, in Fujian province on August 4, ahead of massive military drills off Taiwan. Photo: Twitter / JIJI

A group of men – knives and axes at the ready – boards opposing ships and immobilizes them. Think this is from the Age of Sail? Think again.

China’s recent escalation of its dispute with the Philippines is another example of Beijing’s willingness to defend its claimed territory. This event follows a similar escalation in 2020 along the Sino-Indian border where both sides used sticks and stones to defend their claims, not to mention China’s military drills around Taiwan.

With the US pledging to come to the Philippines’ and Japan’s aid over China-claimed rocks and reefs and possibly stepping in to defend Taiwan, Washington must better understand Beijing’s willingness to fight for its perceived territory – and establish a more effective policy – or risk a destabilizing conflict.

The risk of war over China’s disputed territories is real. Since at least 2012, Beijing has actively pressed its claims, including building military bases in the South China Sea and maintaining a regular coast guard presence around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

However, China has been willing to use force to defend its claims since at least 2003 when they became part of its “core interests,” as they are viewed as vital to national survival.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” of the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” by 2049 further ties these territories to the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, effectively making them uncompromisable.

Until resolved, China will likely continue claiming disputed territory regardless of regime – leaving a conflict with Beijing perpetually on the table. Recovering China’s lost territory has been a goal since the late 1800s.

This was true when the Republic of China (ROC) controlled the country, remains consistent under the People’s Republic of China and is even nominally true for the rump ROC on Taiwan. Moreover, territorial integrity has been a requirement for government legitimacy since the 300s – far older than most states.

Given Beijing’s vital interest in its territorial disputes, Washington’s reliance on accident avoidance or threats of force is irresponsible at best and reckless at worst. Cooler heads prevailed over China’s recent attack on Filippino vessels, but how long until both sides escalate further and Manila invokes its mutual defense pact with Washington?

The US promises to militarily defend the Philippines and Japan over their disputes with China already lack credibility. US military exercises and freedom of navigation operations have not led to a more peaceful Indo-Pacific. Smarter policy options are needed to avoid a conflict that could weaken – or even destroy – America.

Regarding the most serious Chinese territorial flashpoint, the US can fully meet its legal obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act while remaining below the threshold of conflict by revising the Six Assurances to provide additional pledges to both Beijing and Taipei.

The level of arms sales should not only be tied to the level of cross-Strait threat but also to Taiwan’s willingness to defend itself. Americans should not be expected to sacrifice their lives and treasure for an entity unwilling to protect itself. Additionally, military sales could be linked to independence activities in Taiwan.

As the US has no interest in Taiwan’s independence and this event is the most likely trigger for Chinese use of force, creatively modifying Taiwan’s arms sales could become a stabilizing force. Finally, Washington should explore options to diplomatically resolve the issue instead of allowing it to continuously threaten US interests.

On the East and South China Sea disputes, Washington should put its national interests first – which means minimizing potential American deaths over rocks and reefs.

The US could stop implicitly backing the Philippines and Japan’s claims – despite assurances of neutrality – by clarifying their mutual defense treaties could only be invoked in an attack on the home islands.

Washington should follow up and encourage Manila and Tokyo to creatively manage their disputes with Beijing, which could include a return to the “Duterte model” in the South China Sea or denationalized and regulated ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Additionally, the US can support the negotiation, establishment and implementation of the mutually-agreed South China Sea Code of Conduct to lower regional tensions.

Looking to China and India’s border dispute, the answer is easy: the US has no interest in getting involved. Washington has nothing to gain and would lose much by doing so. Avoiding land wars in Asia remains the best option.

America should understand the significance of China’s territorial integrity and its willingness to use force to defend it – including disputed territory. Washington must get serious about smart policies to protect its national interests with respect to these territories.

Some of these policies may not be popular and even upend convention but the stakes couldn’t be higher. America’s strength and survival are at risk. Prudently putting them first is the solution.

Quinn Marschik is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.

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4 Comments

  1. US should really try talking to China instead of pushing confrontation. China is willing to work something out, if only the US is willing to join the conversation.

  2. With the proper long-range artillery, missile, satellite observation and guidance systems, Taiwan could destroy nearly the entire PRC naval surface fleet, including its two or three aircraft carriers, in days if not hours and most all jet aircraft and ballistic missiles that get anywhere near Taiwan. Hypersonic missiles launched by the PRC from land-based sites and submarines could rain terror on Taiwanese cities but would not result in PRC conquest of Taiwan unless tipped with nuclear warheads. Taiwan’s coastline, with only a dozen or so small marine landing zones, if properly fortified with mines, artillery, mortars, and heavy machine guns, would forbid any successful invasion by the PRC even if by some miracle PRC landing craft could reach these beaches. If President Xi thinks he is going to conquer Taiwan, then he ought to think again because if he tries to do so, he will not succeed and he will become a pathetic laughingstock!