The US plans to shift a significant portion of its intelligence-gathering technology from planes to satellites, capitalizing on the strategic advantages of space-based assets but coming up against significant political, operational, and military challenges.Â
This month, Defense One reported that the Pentagon is considering moving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities from aircraft to less vulnerable spacecraft, according to General Mark Kelly, the head of Air Combat Command. The source says the US Air Force’s intelligence planes perform various missions, including intercepting enemy signals, tracking missiles, and tracking ground movements.
It notes that planes are expensive to fly, vulnerable to long-range missiles, and require large support crews at forward operating bases – but a high-flying satellite doesn’t need these resources.
Defense One says the USAF is replacing some older planes with newer, more modern aircraft while purchasing hundreds of small satellites for missile tracking, communication and other military functions to augment larger, more expensive ones.
The source quotes Ed Zoiss, president of L3Harris Technologies’ Space & Airborne Systems segment, as saying that moving intelligence sensors from planes to satellites is not difficult and could result in the military getting more modern technology faster than if the same sensors were installed on a plane.
Defense One notes that adding a new sensor to an intelligence plane is typically done during a block upgrade, which takes about six years, compared with putting a sensor into space, which can be done in under three years. It also says the Pentagon’s Space Development Agency will launch three new constellations over the next six years, and satellites could connect directly to tactical aircraft, sharing intelligence.
The planned migration of substantial US ISR capabilities from aircraft to satellites may be connected to the US hypersonic weapons projects that are part of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program. The CPGS program aims to enable long-range precision strikes against time-sensitive targets, including mobile missile launchers, when other options are unavailable, denied, or not preferred. With that in mind, satellite ISR may be a critical capability for targeting.
Such capabilities may be relevant in a strategic security environment characterized by great-power competition, with a shift from plane-based to space-based ISR capabilities well in order.
The proliferation of affordable air defense systems, doctrinal differences, and improvements in stealth detection may also be significant factors in migrating more ISR capabilities from planes to satellites.
Asia Times noted in December 2022 that while the US has operated spy planes during decades of counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, those planes are slow, propeller-driven, not stealthy and unsuited for penetrating protected airspace.Â
While drones can perform most spy-plane tasks without risking human pilots and have the added advantage of plausible deniability, they lack the continuous situational awareness of manned aircraft. They may not respond fast enough to a fluid operational environment.
Doctrinal differences between military-service branches may have blurred the outlook for spy planes, with the US Army and US Air Force having different perspectives on their future utility.
The US Army is currently using non-stealth Airborne Reconnaissance and Target Exploitation Multi-Mission System (ARTEMIS) spy planes to watch China’s naval forces in the Pacific and Russia’s forces in Ukraine from safe distances. However, the USAF plans to eliminate all non-stealth spy planes because of security concerns in case of a conflict with a similarly equipped enemy.
The ARTEMIS is limited to flying over friendly or permissive airspace, scanning the peripheries of China and Russia’s territories. It cannot penetrate their vast landmasses, which gives them their strategic depth despite its powerful ground-sensing radars.
In addition to those factors, most nations operate air defense radars that can detect stealth aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. However, most of these radars cannot generate weapons-lock quality tracking, which is necessary to shoot down these aircraft. Also, radar technology developments in near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia can threaten even sophisticated stealth reconnaissance aircraft.
In contrast, spy satellites offer several strategic and operational advantages over spy aircraft, enhancing deterrence and offering relatively secure and flexible ISR capability.
In a March 2021 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Conflict Resolution, Bryan Early and Erik Gartze argue that countries with the ability to conduct space-based surveillance have lower risk of being invaded by other nations. According to their research, such countries are less likely to experience surprise military attacks and are thus less vulnerable to major militarized disputes.
Performing surveillance in outer space presents a unique form of espionage, as it occurs in an exposed environment. Concealing one’s actions from space observation is difficult, and attempting to hinder surveillance by attacking spy satellites could lead to a conflict.
Also, Marcin FrÄ…ckiewicz, in a March 2023 article for TS2 Space, notes the operational advantages of spy satellites, saying they provide valuable information to intelligence agencies with real-time data and images of large areas, aiding in the quick detection of suspicious activity.
FrÄ…ckiewicz says spy satellites provide detailed observation capabilities using powerful cameras and sensors, enabling intelligence agencies to monitor remote areas accurately and identify potential targets quickly if necessary. He also says spy satellites offer real-time views and up-to-date images, which can be particularly useful in monitoring potential threats in areas of conflict or unrest.
He also says spy satellites are a cost-effective way to gather intelligence, as they don’t require personnel to operate them and can be used for tracking ships and aircraft.
However, Early and Gartze note that as spy-satellite technology and countermeasures against it become widely available, governments are exploring alternatives such as cyber espionage, which lacks the transparency characteristic of space surveillance.
Satellites are expensive to launch and replace if damaged or lost. With that caveat, the logical solution would be to launch numerous low-cost satellites. However, more satellites in space magnifies the danger of space debris.
Asia Times has noted that space debris is a significant threat to satellites and manned spacecraft, as even the tiniest fragments can cause significant damage at high speeds. Military satellites are also at risk, potentially leading to significant capability losses if damaged or destroyed by space debris.
Also, improving anti-satellite capabilities from near-peer adversaries could nullify the advantages of space-based surveillance. Asia Times has reported on these capabilities, such as anti-satellite lasers to defend sensitive sites like nuclear missile silos, nuclear weapons to take out satellite constellations, and hunter-killer satellites with mounted directed-energy weapons.
