Myanmar’s dictator Senior General Min Aung Hlaing showcased a major infrastructure project on June 8, opening the Thanlyin Bridge 3 across the Bago River, linking the commercial capital Yangon with the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.
Started in 2019 with a 31 billion yen (US$197 million) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the bridge symbolizes economic progress under the State Administration Council (SAC) junta that is largely at odds with widespread armed conflict and economic decline its coup has caused.
Just days later, however, military-controlled media announced that security forces had thwarted a plot to attack the bridge opening ceremony. Several people were arrested with two 107mm rockets and launching gear in a workers’ housing area close to the bridge. Two more were arrested the following day with another rocket.
SAC-aligned media claimed that “(o)n the morning of June 8, 2024, in an old wooden cabin in the shipyard workers’ housing area in Ward 61 of Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) Township… several UG (underground) members were apprehended…(a)ccording to a report from a concerned resident opposed to terrorism.”
The military media, which can never resist displaying a “perp-chart” of mug shots and alleged connections between the conspirators, designated some of them as “rocket shooter”, “shooter assistant”, and “situation monitor.”
It claimed that a man called “Arkar Min (yet to be apprehended) of the Brigade Drone Force PDF (People’s Defense Force) provided instructions on how to use rockets via Instagram in the third week of April 2024.” Another alleged leader, Phyu Hnin Aye, was designated as “Rocket shooting director (at large from Mae Sot).”
The SAC has accused the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) of being behind the alleged plot but stopped short of designating it as an attempt on Min Aung Hlaing’s life. If that was the intention, it raises questions over the ability of the resistance forces to mount an operation that could have decapitated the SAC’s topmost leadership.
Two days after the incident, in a speech published in state media, Min Aung Hlaing “stressed the need to wipe out terrorists in Yangon Region…(he) underscored that as terrorists attempt to commit terror acts, taking a chance in unguarded moments of security forces, individuals have to monitor the movements of terrorists with security awareness and knowledge to ensure peace and stability.”
A rare admission of instability or the fears of a war criminal who just lived through a possible assassination plot? How many other attempts have been made to target who must be the most hated man in Myanmar?
There was an initial optimism among many Myanmar resistance forces that the SAC second in command, Vice Senior General Soe Win, had been killed in a drone strike in mid-April at the military Southeast Command in Mawlamyine.
Not seen for several weeks, speculation swirled that he had been severely injured, that he was in intensive care in Yangon, or that he had been transferred to a hospital in India but he soon resurfaced in apparently fine health.
The anti-SAC resistance has been making increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the largely symbolic drone attack on the military fortress capital of Naypyidaw in early April, which didn’t cause much damage but must have jarred the military leadership to some extent.
But the bridge plot reveals several larger trends in the war against the SAC. On the one hand, it illustrates that urban operations, which have been largely low-level, sporadic and in decline over the past year, are still viable if an urban cell can form, operate, plan and surveil a target, and smuggle into Yangon ordnance to carry out an attack. More dramatic would have been an actual launch of the rockets.
Another interpretation would suggest that the security services’ intelligence capabilities are sufficient to thwart such resistance operations, as they have managed to do in many large urban spaces such as Yangon and Mandalay.
There were numerous predictions that a surge of urban uprisings would follow the successful Operation 1027 in northern Shan state in October, which saw insurgents seize scores of towns and over 200 military positions. But this failed to materialize, partly because of the difficulty in staging urban operations in Myanmar’s proficient and ruthless police state.
The incident also reveals the air of twisted normalcy that hums through Yangon, where the regime’s top leader, Japanese engineers from the Nippon Koei Company and reviled SAC members like the former Karen leader Mahn Nyein Maung open new infrastructure as if the situation is stable.
The regime blithely claimed the bridge “will help utilize the East-West Economic Corridor, which will benefit the Hpa-an/Myawady area, as well as the development of Mon and Kayin states and the improvement of connection with regional countries” – areas the embattled regime has largely lost control over, including that crucial section of the Asia Highway.
But the bridge operation also raises important questions about resistance targeting choices. 107mm rockets have been used in multiple battlefronts in Myanmar, and are notoriously inaccurate and prone to malfunction.
Originally developed by the Chinese military in the 1960s, in a multiple launch system called a Type 63, the rockets can be used in very low-tech mode, often simply propped on a stand or sandbag and ignited using a simple battery in a “fire and forget” fashion. They have a range of several kilometers with a blast radius of 12 meters and were popular with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their resistance against the Soviets.
107mm rockets have become a weapon of choice for many Myanmar resistance groups, before and after the coup, used in multiple attacks on built-up areas or airfields. Resistance forces deployed 12 against Mandalay’s Tada U airport in January, with only five actually igniting.
The military airfield at Nam Paung near the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina was targeted in April, but it’s not clear how much damage was inflicted. The rockets are plentiful, easy to use and indicative of the asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s scattered armed conflicts.
But two recent incidents deserve greater scrutiny over the decision-making protocols of anti-military resistance forces. The SAC claims that a large number of 107mm rockets were captured in early February in the city of Bago, and that the “Dark Side Revolution Burma” (DSRB) PDF was planning attacks on tea shops and restaurants where large crowds were gathered to watch the annual Myanmar Academy Awards ceremony on television.
There is no confirmation that the group was actually planning such an attack against civilians. The DSRB is not a widely active organization, so this could potentially be a false flag accusation of the SAC.
Yet in April in Pyin U Lwin, during the annual Thingyan water festival, the Mandalay PDF fired nearly a dozen rockets into the large town, striking a military academy and wounding several cadets, but also hitting a monastery and hospital, killing two Buddhist monks and severely wounding a number of civilians including children.
It wasn’t widely raised at the time but this is potentially a war crime committed by resistance forces. The use of indiscriminate weapons, especially in built-up areas, could also be in breach of international humanitarian law.
The targeting of Min Aung Hlaing with such unguided munitions in a large crowd of civilians could also have constituted a war crime if it had not been thwarted. But the “bridge plot” should also serve as a moment of clarity for the resistance.
Targeting large crowds with indiscriminate weapons is something the SAC does on a daily basis, murdering civilians across the country with airstrikes and artillery. For anti-SAC forces, even those plotting the assassination of senior regime figures, extreme or desperate measures may have a counter-productive effect if innocent civilians become collateral damage.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar